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argues that this mobilization is itself political because it becomes about power and powerlessness. The
fourth chapter explores the mobilization of affects further, moving beyond intersubjectivity towards the
suggestion of solidarity. The final chapter returns once again to the central argument to describe how an
embodied expression of grief offers a response to a condition of powerlessness by producing an
affective solidarity.
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ABSTRACT
FORGED THROUGH CRYING: AN AFFECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF GRIEF
AND POLITICS
Danielle Hanley
Anne Norton
In this project, I take the quotidian experience and proliferation of grief as a
starting point. However, instead of being buried by this grief, this project argues that the
very way our bodies express grief through crying calls out to other bodies, and in doing
so, it holds the potential for political transformation. This political transformation
provides something of a counterforce to the way grief seems like it might engulf us, bury
us, and render us futile and inactive. The transformation occurs through the experience of
grief, and the way the embodied experience of grief can involve a chance to challenge the
very condition of powerlessness that results in and is intensified through the expression
of grief. Crying is transformed from a mere expression of grief to a response to
powerlessness, and a path to challenge this condition. The subsequent chapters in this
project work to build out various concepts and readings that support this contention.
Ultimately, this project lays out an argument for the potential of crying to engender
political transformation, which takes the shape of affective solidarity, which becomes a
mode through which to challenge the condition of powerlessness.
The first chapter provides a snapshot of the way grief animates politics, and
gestures towards an opening to explore the work of the embodied expression of grief. The
second chapter offers a theoretical vocabulary to the treatment of crying in this regard. In
this chapter, embodied expression becomes the vehicle for intersubjectivity through
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affects. The third chapter examines the mobilization of affects, and argues that this
mobilization is itself political because it becomes about power and powerlessness. The
fourth chapter explores the mobilization of affects further, moving beyond
intersubjectivity towards the suggestion of solidarity. The final chapter returns once again
to the central argument to describe how an embodied expression of grief offers a response
to a condition of powerlessness by producing an affective solidarity.
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INTRODUCTION

Lately, it seems as though there is a new tragedy that befalls the United States on
a daily basis. From hurricanes ravaging the southern portions of the country, to shootings
in night clubs, news rooms, and schools, there seems to be a new source of grief each
day. As the experience of grief gets folded in with the latest podcast episodes and primary
polls results, it becomes almost quotidian. This quotidian experience of grief can be
suffocating; as it piles up day after day, it can start to bury those who experience it, those
who observe it, and those who find it difficult to fathom a world outside of this grief. The
school shooting in Parkland, Florida is now a touchstone for the way that grief and
tragedy have become omnipresent, and forms a thread that weaves in and out of this
work.
In this project, I take the quotidian experience and proliferation of grief as a
starting point. However, instead of being buried by this grief, this project argues that the
very way our bodies express grief through crying calls out to other bodies, and in doing
so, it holds the potential for political transformation. This political transformation
provides something of a counterforce to the way grief seems like it might engulf us, bury
us, and render us futile and inactive. This political transformation occurs through the
experience of grief, and the way the embodied experience of grief can involve a chance to
challenge the very condition of powerlessness that results in and is intensified through the
expression of grief. Crying is transformed from a mere expression of grief to a response
to powerlessness, and a path to challenge this condition. The subsequent chapters in this
project work to build out various concepts and readings that support this contention.
1

Before offering a brief synopsis of these chapters, I want to consider further what I name
the ‘condition of powerlessness’, its relationship to grief, and the significance of the work
that crying performs between bodies.
Ultimately, this project lays out an argument for the potential of crying to
engender political transformation. That transformation takes the shape of affective
solidarity, which becomes a mode through which to challenge the condition of
powerlessness. That condition, powerlessness, is a key piece of the argument. To be sure,
crying is not uniquely available as a response for the powerless; crying is egalitarian in
the sense that it is a form of expression available to all. The context of my claim is
important—the relationship of the crying party to power is significant to the argument.
The experience of tragedy and the condition of powerlessness go hand in hand here. This
condition is defined by the relative inability to effect change. Powerlessness can come in
different forms and exist to different degrees: there is an element of relativity built into
the broader concept. But the powerlessness addressed here, the powerlessness that
emerges in the chosen examples, is a powerlessness that is associated with the apparent
inability to produce a desired end. This condition of powerlessness is clear in Euripides’
Medea and Morrison’s Beloved, as chapters three and four describe. The titular character
in Medea and Baby Suggs’ congregation in Beloved are both powerless, albeit in different
ways. Medea appears to lack any control over her fate, wronged by her husband and cut
off from any source of salvation in Corinth. As woman and estranged wife, Medea lacks
the means to respond to the tragedy that has befallen her, and her response is to cry. But
her tears open the chance to challenge her position—the mobilization of affects through
crying engenders new possibility for Medea.
2

The story of Baby Suggs’ congregation is different in many ways from Medea’s
experience, but the two stories share the fundamental condition of powerlessness and the
grief that accompanies this condition. The source of powerlessness differs—it emanates
from the sociopolitical context of slavery, race relations, and the way Morrison treats the
shared history of trauma as attached to bodies. While Medea’s powerlessness is
intimately connected to her female identity, the powerlessness experienced by Baby
Suggs’ congregation is linked to their blackness, which reinforces a subordinate status
and renders the expression of grief bound up in that powerlessness. There is little that the
congregation can do to bring about a change to that condition, but their collective
experience in the woods gestures towards an opening; it gestures towards a form of
solidarity. In reading Medea and Beloved together, these chapters offer a solidarity as a
potential response to that condition of powerlessness. In crying, solidarity emerges as a
possibility, as the form this response, this potential corrective might take. Crying creates
the conditions for solidarity, and itself can be a form that this emergent solidarity may
assume.
Parkland demonstrates a different manifestation of powerlessness as well. Here,
the students from Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School were rendered powerless
through multiple avenues. In the first, most immediate sense, the students were rendered
powerless by the gunman Nicholas Cruz roaming the halls, looking for victims to shoot.
Hiding in closets and classrooms, these students feared for their lives. In the aftermath of
the shooting, the inaction of politicians revealed in an additional, broader sense, these
students’ relative lack of power. That is, following the shooting, students, teachers,
parents, and even the general public called for changes to laws governing the sale and
3

purchase of firearms. These calls amounted to no such change, rendering the students
powerless once more, unable to bring about the change and protective measures they
desired. And so, the students in Parkland are also powerless, though not as a function of
gender or race, but instead as a result of the specific context and the broader political
context within which they exist.
There are numerous differences between these three examples, which draw on
both fictional and real events. In all three, however, crying expresses the grief that comes
with positions of powerlessness, and emerges as the response to these different instances
of powerlessness. The fictional examples offer places to interrogate the role of crying
before attempting to theorize the political transformation brought about through crying in
the Parkland example. Further, these examples animate an important addendum to the
experience of crying towards affective solidarity—while crying is indeed open and
available to those who wield power, the tears of those in power do not hold the potential
to engender the same kind of political transformation. While the experience of crying as
an expression of grief is indeed open to all, powerful and powerless alike, the political
transformation is a function of the position of powerlessness, because it is also a response
to this condition. If the crying party is not readily identified in such a condition, then the
argument does not hold. This dissertation is not arguing for the general political potential
encapsulated in crying, but instead for the potential within a set of conditions, defined by
powerlessness. 1 As I will take up in subsequent chapters, crying can also be a tool

1

For Rancière, the police order corresponds to a hierarchical structuring of the social order, which
concentrates power in the hands of those at the apex of this order. In contrast, politics corresponds to the
disruption of that order—this only occurs when those who are excluded from the police order exert
themselves in concert, to make themselves seen and heard on the basis of equality. My treatment of
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wielded by the powerful—but in that particular context it becomes yet another tool in the
repertoire of the powerful, instead of a vehicle towards change. This distinction between
the powerless and the powerful is important for establishing the contours of the argument
advanced in this project.
Just as powerlessness itself exists in a web of social relationships, social context –
and specifically the presence of others – is a key condition of the argument. That is, in
order for this particular form of politics to be forged, the activity of crying must be
witnessed by, received by, felt by others. Crying in solitude is not the subject of this
argument; it does not engender the political transformation that I describe here. As such,
it is crying in the presence of others, crying in the presence of a group, that is the subject
of this inquiry. The transformation occurs on the heels of intersubjectivity that is
engendered through crying. This intersubjectivity is linked to an intercorporeality that
crying establishes. That is, the physicality of crying, the way that it is produced by bodies
and appears on bodies also works to form a bridge between bodies. That bridge gives way
to intersubjectivity, where it is not just a group of people who cry together, but the act of
crying together in grief begins to generated a collective. Put another way, the physicality
of tears not only bridges the gap between bodies, but illuminates the reality that we are
bound up with one another. Our fate is intertwined with those around us, and the shared
expression of grief serves to make this evident. In sharing the expression of grief, in
crying together, this becomes clear; further, this dislocates the experience of subjectivity
from the individual alone, and produces an effect of intersubjectivity, where the crying

powerless and powerful in some ways corresponds to Rancière’s treatment of politics and the police within
his scholarship. I engage with this idea more extensively in chapter four.
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parties are implicated in the actions of the collective. It is that implication, that realization
of shared fate, which animates the move towards solidarity, which is the form that the
political transformation takes. This project is about the work that crying performs
between bodies, the way that it reaches out to other bodies, and pulls them into the orbit
of one another, illuminating the shared aspect of this experience, this response to
powerless.

Chapter Overview
The five chapters of this dissertation unfold show how the very way our bodies
express grief through crying calls out to other bodies; it forms a distinctly embodied
mode of connection, and in doing so, creates the potential for political transformation.
This transformation takes the shape of affective solidarity, and is built on the
intersubjectivity that is engendered by crying. In what follows, I offer a brief synopsis of
the chapters, ending with a discussion of how they build upon one another to support the
broader argument.
Chapter one, “The Politics of Mourning,” discusses the relevant recent
scholarship on grief and mourning. This dissertation’s focus on emotions of grief
intervenes most directly in this body of literature, which identifies the political work that
grief performs. The scholarship broadly recognizes the various ways that grief,
particularly the public expression of grief, is integral to political life. In that framework,
grief works to generate the bonds of peoplehood; it is critical for working through
traumas experienced as a part of collective history; it is part of a struggle that is definitive
for politics. I turn to the work of three scholars in particular to explore their treatments of
6

grief and mourning, and their role in politics. Although these scholars disagree over the
specific roles that grief plays, they share broader understandings about the generative
capacity of grief and its importance to the polity. In this chapter, I use the scholarship of
Simon Stow, David McIvor, and Bonnie Honig to establish some of the different
approaches to the relationship between grief and political life, and the different emphases
of each approach. Reading these scholars together also helps to establish some of the
limitations of the work on grief, mourning, and politics. That is, there are questions raised
about the role of the body in mourning, and its significance, questions which are
ultimately not answered by the aforementioned scholarship. In particular, missing from
these accounts, albeit to different degrees, is a treatment of embodied expressions of
grief, specifically crying, and the work that this expression performs in establishing
intersubjectivity. The remainder of the dissertation builds out the relationship between
embodiment, crying, and intersubjectivity to argue that crying holds the potential for
political transformation through the way it generates intersubjectivity, which opens the
possibility for affective solidarity. This argument intervenes in the scholarship on grief
and politics by offering not only an exploration of embodied aspects of the expression of
grief, but also by offering a picture of the form the political work takes.
Chapter two, “Crying, Affect, and Intersubjectivity,” turns to scholarship on affect
in order to develop a theoretical vocabulary for the interventions of this project. Affect
attends to what Sara Ahmed names, “the messiness of the experiential, the unfolding of
bodies into worlds.”2 This body of scholarship helps to construct the notion of
intersubjectivity, and underscores the role that the interaction of bodies can play in
2

Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness. 22
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working towards it. This framework sheds light on the significance of crying in political
life, particularly by focusing on the way this expression, felt and experienced through one
body, influences other bodies around it, proliferating the experience of grief through its
embodied expression. Although affect theorists have developed the concept of
intersubjectivity in productive ways, this concept is not new to political theorists. This
chapter identifies related concerns in the ideas of political thinkers such as Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Adam Smith, who describe the integral work performed between bodies
for politics, and thus demonstrate the significance, and age-old relevance, of
intersubjectivity. Scholarship on affect theory works to update this idea, to provide more
specificity, but as this chapter recognizes, it is also limited in its treatment of the
relationship between affect and power. My argument about the potential for crying to
engender political transformation is also an argument about the relations and interactions
through which power is expressed, exercised, and built: crying proliferates affects, whose
circulation and mobilization represent a circulation of power—power inchoate.
Chapter three, “Medea and the Mobilization of Affects,” offers a reading of
Euripides’ Medea against the backdrop of a discussion of the institution of tragedy. This
reading develops the relationship between crying and powerlessness. Crying
simultaneously emerges in response to the condition of powerlessness, and offers a
challenge to that very condition through its circulation of affects. Reading the tears in
Euripides’ Medea provides a chance to map the contours of that challenge, and the way
that grief can drive action to challenge the root cause of its expression. This reading
attends to the embodied expression of grief through crying that is made manifest in
Euripides’ play. Further, this chapter conceptualizes the circulation of affects and their
8

political potential by reading crying against attempts to regulate mourning processes
within the city, thus placing crying in conversation with the broader political processes
that birthed the very institution staging Medea’s tears. This gestures towards the
transformative potential of crying, and through reading the circulation of affects within
this play offers a commentary on the relationship between affects and power. Taken
together, reading Medea against the backdrop of tragedy as a political institution reveals
the embodied expression of grief, crying, as a vehicle with the potential to alter the
condition of powerlessness. This builds on the work of the previous chapters, focusing on
the embodied experience of crying and its effects, and reading it through an affective
lens, while also linking it to the work that grief performs for a polity.
Chapter four, “Beloved, Crying, and Solidarity,” turns to another literary source,
Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved. In the previous chapter, I develop the notion of
powerlessness in relation to Euripides’ Medea, and this chapter expands this idea to show
how powerlessness is constructed—here through a reading of race, and a reflection on the
broader social, legal, and political forces bound up in the powerlessness of the group in
Morrison’s novel. This chapter also draws on Jacques Rancière’s notion of “the part that
has no part,” to further ground this idea of powerlessness within radical democratic
theory, which is rooted in the concept of the people as possessing a transformative
capacity, one that ultimately inaugurates the political.3 My work builds on these ideas in a
number of ways: I argue that crying is one form of expression that is available to the part
that has no part, as a form of expression that is excluded from what Rancière understands
as “the sensible”; I also argue that crying’s transformative potential is drawn from its
3

Rancière. 2001, Thesis 2. Rancière 1999, 31
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disruptiveness—that disruptiveness is another name for the circulation of affects.
Rancière’s work offers an opening to bring a discussion of affects to bear on radical
democrat theory, further enhancing it through a sustained engagement with this embodied
expression of grief. Scenes from Morrison’s novel offer an opportunity to observe the
work of crying and the circulation of affects in action. The literary nature of the source
material here is helpful because it allows a degree of freedom and creativity found in the
description of these events that works to construct a picture of the circulation of affects
between bodies. Read together, Rancière and Beloved reveal how crying may effect
political transformation through the circulation of affects between bodies, specifically by
bringing about an affective solidarity. As crying’s affects circulate, they open up the
potential for solidarity. This too comes to characterize the expression of grief and the
response to powerlessness.
Chapter five, “Parkland and Affective Solidarity,” returns to the event described
at the outset of this introduction, the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School, in Parkland, Florida, to articulate the contours of affective solidarity, which is the
form of the challenge to powerlessness engendered through crying. This chapter steps
away from literary sources to locate the possibility of affective solidarity within the ways
our bodies express grief through crying, and the intersubjectivity engendered as a result.
By exploring the experience and expression of grief in the wake of the Parkland shooting,
this chapter considers both the condition of powerlessness as bound up in this expression
of grief, as well as the way that crying opens the potential specifically for affective
solidarity in the wake of this event. This chapter also develops the concept of affective
solidarity in relation to other, more conventional definitions of solidarity, setting it apart
10

by locating it explicitly within and between bodies, and in the intersubjectivity forged
through the transmission of affects. The chapter ends by returning to the questions that
were opened in a reading of literature on mourning in the first chapter, to demonstrate the
ways that an exploration of crying helps to fill critical gaps in this scholarship. This
chapter also revisits these questions to further reflect on the political potential of this
embodied expression of grief, by attending to the relationship between affective solidarity
and powerlessness.
In effect, these chapters lay the groundwork for an argument about the political
possibilities generated through the particular ways that our bodies express grief through
crying. This political transformation takes the shape of affective solidarity, and is built on
the intersubjectivity that crying facilitates through the circulation of affects. The first
chapter provides a snapshot of the way grief animates politics, and gestures towards an
opening to explore the work of the embodied expression of grief. The second chapter
offers a theoretical vocabulary to the treatment of crying in this regard. In this chapter,
embodied expression becomes the vehicle for intersubjectivity through affects. The third
chapter examines the mobilization of affects, and argues that this mobilization is itself
political because it becomes about power and powerlessness. The fourth chapter explores
the mobilization of affects further, moving beyond intersubjectivity towards the
suggestion of solidarity. The final chapter returns once again to the central argument to
describe how an embodied expression of grief offers a response to a condition of
powerlessness by producing an affective solidarity. The chapters that precede the final
chapter provide the pieces through which this argument is made possible.
11

The events in Parkland serve to bookend this project. In interpreting this event,
the necessity for and the surfacing of affective solidarity became clear. This event, and
the proliferation of events like this, which result an explosion of grief, where private grief
plays out on the public stage, is not necessarily new in America. But, in the face of what
feels like the rapid spread of such events, the rapid spread of tragedy in a political context
where change feels increasingly distant and partisanship seems to block the path to
political change more and more each day, this project reads the events at Parkland with
an eye towards the activism that emerged in the wake of this tragedy. The public
experience and expression of grief is connected to this recent activism, and as such, this
project probes Parkland to bring to light an obscured but powerful form of politics, one
that contains distinct possibilities for social reimagining and ultimately for change.
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CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICS OF MOURNING

There are many scholars who explore the relationship between politics and
mourning, and by extension, politics and grief. This scholarship is vast, offering insights
on the construction of key concepts in political thought, such as peoplehood, citizenship,
and political identity. For many thinkers, particularly those relevant to this project,
mourning facilitates the processes that generate peoplehood, citizenship, and political
identity. Considering the role that death plays makes it possible to confront the
limitations and challenges of these processes. For example, Judith Butler reminds us that
only the deaths of certain types of bodies are mourned. That is, while mourning might be
cast as a universal act, the international community actively excludes certain types of
bodies from these practices.4 Her treatment of homosexual bodies ravaged by the AIDS
virus functions as a particularly salient example; the preferred sexual practices of these
bodies mark them as outside of the norm, outside of convention, and thus ungrievable by
official standards.5 Butler’s work demonstrates that dead bodies represent a terrain over
which politics is contested. Her work draws our attention to the ways grief and mourning
can be politicized, and the way this unfolds over and through bodies. When Butler asks
about the grievability of a life, she can also be read as asking who sets the bounds of
grief, and the way these bounds are drawn using bodies. There is power in marking such

4

Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London ; New York: Verso,
2006). Butler states, in the preface, that “Some lives are grievable, and others are not; the differential
allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and which kind of
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boundaries—consider Creon in Sophocles’ Antigone. The new ruler of Thebes’ issues a
decree:
“Polyneices, who broke his exile to come back with fire and sword against his
native city and the shrines of his fathers’ gods, whose one idea was to spill the
blood of his blood and sell his own people into slavery–– Polyneices, I say, is to
have no burial: no man is to touch him or say the least prayer for him; he shall lie
on the plain, unburied; and the birds and the scavenging dogs can do with him
whatever they like. This is my command, and you can see the wisdom behind it.”6
Creon marks Polyneices as an enemy, and draws a line around his nephew’s body,
marking the border between friend and enemy of the city. He commands this--This is one
of Creon’s first acts as ruler, and it can also be read as an attempt to legitimate and
consolidate his position. The steadfastness with which Creon holds to this decree
throughout the play supports the idea that Creon’s power is bound up in marking
Polyneices’ body as enemy, as outside, and the willingness of the Thebans to obey his
word.
As such, Butler’s work serves as an important articulation of what emerges as an
age-old position, that dead bodies serve as sites of political struggle—struggles for
power, struggles around membership, and struggles over meaning. This struggle plays out
through mourning practices; it plays out through sanctioned and unsanctioned
expressions of grief that manifest in these practices. The main thrust of this project is not
Butler’s notion of grievability, but instead the form that this expression of grief can take:
crying. However, I invoke Butler here because her attention to the roles bodies play in
processes of grief, and in the exercise of power, is instructive. For Butler, bodies are the
objects of grief; they represent the loss to be mourned, or not, as is the case with the
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ungrievable bodies. But, for my work, bodies also play a different role: they perform
critical role of mourning, of the very expression of grief. My work moves to consider the
implications of the embodied aspects of mourning—crying as an expression of grief. This
shifts the focus from the bodies that are grieved, or not, to the body’s role in grieving. I
argue that as an expression of grief, crying generates affects, which in turn circulate a
kind of power useful in challenging the position of powerlessness. If we read Creon’s
decree over Polyneices’ body as a limitation on the ability to mourn the body of an
enemy, the decree could also function as closing off the circulation of power that could
potentially challenge his authority. Antigone’s expression of grief over her brother, then,
rejects this closing off, and works in response to this.
To be sure, there has been an upsurge of work in political theory that recognizes
the significance of mourning, and by extension grief, to politics. Butler is but one
example among many of scholarship that celebrates the central place grief plays in the
building, maintenance, or struggle over power in a polity. Scholars hailing from multiple
traditions have intervened in debates around the politics connected to grief and mourning.
This chapter explores three recent works by Simon Stow, David McIvor, and Bonnie
Honig in their arguments that detail the work that mourning performs for politics, with
specific attention to the way that grief is generative for political life. Through a reading of
these three scholars, I triangulate both what is productive about their accounts, as well as
the lingering questions that remain in their wake. In particular, I argue that these accounts
fall short of offering a sense of the significance of the embodied aspects of the mourning
process, and the way that the embodied expression of grief—here crying—produces a
differential account of the work of mourning. But while these accounts fall short, they
15

also work to open the space to interrogate the role that embodiment and affect play in
these processes. The embodied expression of grief gestures towards the significance that
affects play—crying over dead bodies generates affects, which circulate between bodies,
and emerge as a way that power circulates between those bodies. This chapter concludes
by offering a reading of the recent tragedy in Parkland, FL as a modern moment where
we can track the circulation of affects in this public expression of grief, in order to
highlight the critical role that the embodied expression of grief plays in this moment, and
the way this opens up new avenues of inquiry that will animate the remainder of the
chapters in this project.
Before delving into this scholarship, I’d like to briefly return to the discussion of
Creon and Antigone introduced in the previous paragraphs. Creon issues a decree that
forbids the burial of Polyneices’ body; Antigone rejects this decree, and buries her
brother in defiance of Creon’s authority. The play is punctuated by the sounds of her
mourning: she laments the death of her brother, but she also sings a dirge for herself,
brought on by her transgression of Creon’s decree, and her unwillingness to relent and
abandon her right to mourn. As such, her laments are bound up with a challenge to
Creon’s authority. And while Creon attempts to close off the circulation of affects that
come with the mourning of this enemy’s body, Antigone’s cries reverberate through and
against that attempt. As such, this tragedy offers a snapshot into the way that affects
circulate even in the face of attempts to limit their release. That is, there is within the
expression of grief, even as a transgression, a certain power that emanates from the
expression itself. Antigone’s cries, though they accompany her own death, perform work
within the play, and this is instructive with regard to the way that bodies figure into the
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experience of grief and the way it is released into the world. I argue that by interrogating
the work that bodies perform in this regard can help produce not only a model of
mourning, but also a way that mourning intervenes in a polity. I will return to this idea
towards the end of this chapter, with the reading of the events at Parkland, but I introduce
it here to foreground the questions are generated by the exploration into recent
scholarship on mourning: how do bodies figure into their analysis, and further, how does
the embodied expression of grief in crying alter the analysis by demanding attention be
paid to the way bodies circulate affects, and as such, a certain articulation of power.

Stow, Honig, and McIvor
To situate this project within the literature on grief and politics, the major
interlocutors I engage with are Stow, McIvor, and Honig. Stow offer a more conventional
approach to mourning, where the discursive processes that govern politics remain
paramount to his account. Bodies rarely figure into his analysis, and the work performed
between bodies is often addressed with trepidation, or a desire to limit its reach. McIvor
approaches mourning through a psychoanalytic lens, and as such, is attentive to the
connection between bodies, but still prioritizes cognitive processes and processing over
the effects that the bodies themselves introduce in their material capacity. Of the three,
Honig represents work that is most attentive to the material and affective, and functions
as an important counterbalance to the approaches of McIvor and Stow. She recognizes
the embodied aspects of mourning in her analysis of Sophocles’ Antigone and its
reception within culture and scholarship, and so her theorizing moves into a different
register than that of McIvor and Stow. These three authors exist in conversation with one
17

another, and as they represent different approaches to the relationship between mourning
and politics, they recognize the experience of mourning as having political valence.
These authors explicitly push back against the idea that mourning is apolitical because of
its universal character.7 The fact that mourning is a relatively universal occurrence simply
allows for further contemplation over the way political processes unfold through the ways
we mourn, and the ways that mourning functions in service of politics. The work of these
authors animates the broader conversation about the nature of political life and the way
mourning and grief figure into different conceptions of that life. My purpose here is not
to chart a course between these authors, but instead, to use the way their treatments of
this phenomenon establish relevant elements of the expression of grief, and further raise a
set of questions that the remainder of the project will take up, in an effort to further
support the argument that crying performs important work between bodies through the
circulation of affects, work that emanates from the materiality of the body and between
bodies.
In American Mourning, Stow argues that the dead are politically active, and that,
“While acknowledging that mourning often constitutes a problematic form of political
activity that can undermine democracy…it can also serve as an important mode of
critical-theoretical reflection and a rich resource for democratic innovation, education,
and resilience.”8 For Stow, it is the form that lamentations take that are politically
significant—the central claim of Stow’s work is that, “the stories a polity tells about the
7
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dead help shape political outcomes of the living.”9 The stories that are told should be
conducive to the political well-being of the democratic polity. It in its initial pages and
through the argument itself that Stow’s work emerges as consensualist. While struggle
plays an important role in the subsequent pages—struggle over identity, struggle to
maintain order—the critical-theoretical reflection and the prescriptions that Stow puts
forward ultimately work towards a “tacit consensualism within his agonistic approach,”
as McIvor names it. 10 From the standpoint of object-relations theory, McIvor posits that
for agonists, “somewhere there lurks a good object.”11 Stow identifies himself as working
within the agonistic tradition, with his celebration of a tragic mode of mourning, a mode
pushes Americans to critically reflect upon idealized account of national histories, and
can produce an ambivalence around the very practices that seem to be decidedly
American.

In many ways this culminates in Stow’s provocative prescription that

Americans should mourn the death of Osama Bin Laden. However, this prescription
illustrates the tendency towards consensualism within Stow’s approach, particularly with
the way that he returns to the role of memory, his general treatment of emotions, and a
commitment to order that trumps his discussions of struggle. Stow’s struggle with
struggle, then, illustrates the place it can have within mourning processes, however
difficult it might be to attain, and maintain.
Further, Stow’s account highlights the way that mourning should animate an ethos
of action—mourning operates in service of the community, and action should take on a
communal character. This constructs the collective aspect of mourning as important, as
9
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well as emphasizing the end goal of generating action. In particular, Stow’s work argues
for a particular form of communal response to loss, writing, “that cultivating and
employing an ethos of tragic mourning for its enemies in a time of war will serve the
interests of the polity more faithfully than an orgiastic celebration of their losses.”12 By
arguing for what he calls tragic mourning, Stow argues for an “ethos that does not turn
away from action or seek to overcome conflict.”13 Tragic mourning prompts people to
embrace conflicting viewpoints that populate the political landscape, and as such, moves
people towards an ethos of action—the conflict becomes productive of collective forms
of action.
In his reading of Aeschylus’ The Persians, Stow focuses on the Persians’ laments
for their fallen within the play, supporting a reading of the play that “while
acknowledging the elements of Athenian nationalism in the play, nevertheless see an
expression of empathy for the shared suffering of fellow mortals”.14 This reading
demonstrates there is a politically generative form of mourning found within the pages of
Aeschylus. The work that empathy performs is critical for the political world created
within the play, and within the audience—one aim of tragedy was to arouse pity, and
doing so through the laments of the fallen enemy attended to complexities that also
existed within Athenian society, one that plays out through having to contend for feeling
pity for one’s enemy, an effect of the play. While watching the Persians, the Athenian
audience would be asked to mourn a fallen enemy, and this was politically generative
because it enacts the struggle key for politics: “Tragedy’s mortalist humanism seeks not
12
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to overcome conflict but rather to frame it in a more productively agonistic fashion,
moving away from a moral or existential register to a political one.”15 Stow’s claim here
is not that by recognizing the shared humanity of friend an enemy alike, political
struggles can be overcome. On the contrary, he elevates political struggle, and locates it
in the complicated relationship between feelings of nationalism and feelings of empathy
for one’s enemy—the Persian laments prompt Athenians to engage with these feelings,
and as such, can foster political action based in that struggle. Mourning the enemy raises
questions of membership, peoplehood, and nationalism, and critical engagement with
these questions is an integral part of political life. Forms of mourning that do not generate
engagement do not contribute to the political well-being of a polity. However, critical
engagement with membership and nationalist discourses are still employed in the service
of establishing a cohesive narrative—this narrative can and should include pieces that are
in tension with one another, but ultimately works towards a broader, singular purpose of
producing a narrative around political membership. In other words, valuing the tensions
inherent in a political identity, that are produced through processes that encourage
wrestling with these tensions, does not overtake the desire for a functioning and whole
identity—it is in identification with the state that political action is ultimately made
possible. Again, this occurs in service of the collective, and animates subsequent action
that is communal in character.
Stow’s focus on mourning practices as a mode of critical engagement is
productive—but this focus also demonstrates additional ways in which Stow’s approach
to mourning is itself limited. At every turn, Stow fails to consider the way that bodies
15
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mourn, the material aspects of mourning practices and expressions of grief. Critical
engagement remains a highly intellectualized process. For example, on the heels of the
directive to remember our enemies comes a curious proclamation about the role of
emotions. Stow quotes classicist Helen Morales, who states, “the quotation makes us
remember the suicidal killers…as well as their victims. Remember with horror, anger,
disbelief, to be sure, but remember them nonetheless.”16 If emotions figure into Stow’s
analysis, it is either in this way—where they are in service of a more important, more
intellectualized end (here remembrance), or it is by way of warning, as the constant return
to menis demonstrates. Both trends within Stow’s text bolster the conclusion that
emotions are only relevant insofar as they can be expressed in moderation (the biggest
issue with menis is its tendency towards excess, and that excess towards violence), or can
be intellectualized. Both moderation and intellectualization emerge as forms of policing
emotions—both work to advocate for control over their expression. The emotions of
horror, anger, and disbelief provide reasons that the US should seek to remember a fallen
enemy. These emotions work in tandem with memory to produce reasons—these
emotions are quickly intellectualized, which is emblematic of the dominance of the
discursive frame. For the most part, the bodies of those mourning escape treatment in
Stow’s account—there is little attention paid to the way bodies express these emotions, or
the way they interact with one another. Stow does engage with tears, specifically what
Nicole Loraux names, “the pleasure of tears.”17 This treatment of tears links them to the
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process of mourning without end—alaston penthos.18 There is no resolution in this form
of mourning, and the absence of resolution renders this form of mourning antithetical to
consolidating and strengthening democracy.
Stow rejects the work of other scholars that posit “ a preexisting identity of
citizenship as the model for successful return, [which] seems to underplay the potential
role for the broader political community in [an] account of homecoming.”19 In this
regard, citizen’s identities are worked out, in part, through the rituals a polity puts
forward in response to loss. The return of soldiers from war, for example, can work to
shape the evolving identity of a polity, instead of challenging a preexisting notion of what
that identity might be. Again here, Stow’s tacit consensualism creeps into the frame.
While he treats identities as changing and evolving as part of a dynamic response to loss,
instead of as static entities, this still assumes the possibility of an overarching identity
that incorporates all the challenges and tensions. That assumption, even as it is layered
over with pages upon pages of attention to the complexities, tensions, and struggles of an
agonistic politics, illustrates a tacit consensualism. And that consensualism is also a
product of and reproduces the oversight of the particular ways bodies express grief and
the work that those bodies might perform towards animating these complexities.
While Stow’s work looks to “establish both the problems posed to democracy by
a nationalist mode of mourning committed to imperialism, bellicosity, and
exceptionalism, and the contrasting promise of a tragic mourning that…offers the
possibility of a democratically productive and critical patriotism,” it does so generally at
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the expense of exploring the way bodies experience grief, and more specifically through a
troublesome treatment of the one explicit form of materiality present in Stow’s text,
tears.20 To elaborate, Stow develops these twin claims, in part, through by advocating for
the need to temper the “menis that has driven American foreign policy in the years since
bin Laden’s attacks” by mourning the enemy, an act that encourages critical perspective
and “a less self-defeating engagement with those who would do America harm.”21 Stow
translates menis as grief wrath, and writes that this was cultivated by the modes of
mourning embraced by the US in the wake of 9/11. Menis returns again and again
throughout the text, as a warning from the past against the excesses of grief. Stow
associates menis with the pleasure of tears, and so it emerges as the singular instance
where materiality enters the text, but one that is linked to problematic modes of
mourning. Stow most readily associates it with the nostalgic mode of mourning,
“committed to an often-imaginary past,” which is also so often nationalist in its
articulation.22 The nostalgic mode of mourning papers over the various forms of conflict
that are meant to shape identities; in doing so, it demonstrates a tendency towards excess
manifests itself in a harmful unifying effect that hides the cracks and fissures of a
nation.23 This ultimately creates an unthinking mass, which Stow argues we can also
observe in the cycles of violence that characterized ancient Greek society in the age ruled
by menis.24 Grief-wrath emerges as a cautionary tale through which to communicate the
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pathologies of the nostalgic mode of mourning, which ultimately serves to bolster the
argument and prescription of the tragic mode of mourning. The materiality of tears, then,
is antithetical to the broader purposes that mourning should have for a polity. Further, it
is notable that Stow finds a model for the tragic mode within tragedy, an institution
whose development, at least in part, is tied to legislation that set out to limit the
proliferation of menis.25
And so, in Stow’s work, emotions serve two purposes: remembering and marking
excess. In the first place, a broader set of emotions is recognized as productive for
providing reasons for America to remember a fallen enemy. Feeling grief towards the
death of an enemy acts as a corrective against the tendency towards an overly unified or
nationalistic engagement with such an event—instead of demonizing the acts of the
enemy, recognizing their shared humanity is at once difficult and instructive. Feeling
grief towards the death of an enemy, alongside anger at their actions, produces a more
complicated narrative, and a more complex picture of membership in a polity. There are
two limitations that emerge from this reading of emotions in Stow’s work. First, again, it
is notable that this treatment of grief does not attend to the way bodies experience and
express grief. Instead, grief is deployed towards a larger purpose, and so any physicality
of grief, and the ways that this physicality might influence the struggles around identity,
Patroclus, drives him into battle, but also to drag his enemy’s body around the battlefield after death. As a
culture built on respect for the dead, and the centrality of funeral rituals and mourning practices for the
performance and perpetuation of that respect, Achilles’ dragging of Hector’s body is marked with excess—
the body of an enemy combatant was also subject to certain levels of respect. To be sure, the action of
Sophocles’ Antigone is also driven by similar questions around the burial of the dead, and the respect
afforded to the bodies of enemies. Bonnie Honig offers a helpful discussion of this in “Antigone’s Laments,
Creon’s Grief.”
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remain underdeveloped. This suggests that the experience itself has little or no bearing on
the broader processes that Stow identifies as integral to the functioning and flourishing of
the polity. The lack of attention to the ways that grief is expressed, and the ways those
expressions might come to bear on the functioning of the polity, reinforces this reading of
Stow as limited.
The second limitation of reading emotions as useful only insofar as they are
productive for the state-building enterprise is that there is an overemphasis on discursive
processes in this work. Stow writes,
“The fear that overwrought individually focused mourning practice might
undermine democratic politics was a further manifestation of the Greek concern
with excess rather than the fear of public emotions per se. Democracy was
considered especially susceptible to such excess because it demands a mode of
engagement—one of productive discussion and careful deliberation—that can be
undone by excessive emotion.”26
In this quote, Stow identifies the key roles that discussion and deliberation play in the
Greek understanding of democracy. I would go further to say that Stow’s definition of
democracy also prioritizes debate and discussion—the anxiety around excessive unity
mentioned earlier gestures towards a central role for these modes of action. In his
treatment of modes of mourning he names debate and discussion the twin pillars at the
foundation of democracy. These are prioritized over the expression and experience of
grief as part of the mourning process. Stow seeks a mode of mourning that will push
citizens to engage in the processes of debate and discussion, which he names as crucial
activities for political life. Further, later in the same section, Stow turns to Hannah Arendt
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in On Revolution, citing an excerpt from the text where she writes, “The absolute…spells
doom to everyone when it is introduced into the political realm.”27 An appeal to evil, for
Arendt and others of the same mind, would stifle public discussion and debate—this too
exists at the heart of Stow’s understanding of democracy and ultimately his treatment of
emotions. Grief is productive if it helps citizens critically interrogate their civic identity,
and if it engenders further debate and discussion, but if grief, or emotions more generally,
hinder that debate and discussion, they work against politics.
This is related to the second purpose emotions serve within Stow’s work. They
are constantly marked as excessive—this is related to the first purpose, insofar as the way
they function beyond facilitating debate, discussion, or remembering, emotions are
unnecessary and antithetical to the broader purpose. The constant return to menis
escalates this further, illustrating the potential danger that the expression of grief
harbors—the perpetuation of cycles of violence is the specific link put forward in the
text, but there is a deeper significance here as well. Not only can emotions be
unnecessary, but their expression can also be dangerous. It is the excesses of grief harbor
the potential to transform the feeling public into an unthinking unity, one incapable of
recognizing the utility of struggle over identity. Stow’s treatment of tears specifically
comes only in his discussion of menis in the section entitled “Tears of Grief, Tears of
Rage,” which begins on page 108. These excesses come through the material expression
of grief in tears. This suggests that for Stow, the material elements of emotional
expression are themselves dangerous. My reading of tears departs from the way they
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appear in this text, but builds off of it in some ways. Instead of reading tears as inherently
dangerous, Stow’s treatment alerts readers to the way power might be pent up in the very
material expression of grief. The move to limit it, the move that Stow supports in his
treatment, also can mark tears as generating a certain kind of power, one that emanates
through their materiality. Of course, Stow reads tears differently, but in marking them as
excessive and potentially dangerous, he also suggests the possibility of an alternative
reading, one that follows the circulation of power, by attempting to understand the root of
the danger as tied to the way their materiality forms a bridge between bodies, a bridge
that itself can facilitate action in concert.
The limitations of Stow’s work are instructive in terms of painting the centrality
of collective action, as well as opening an avenue to further consider the productive ways
that bodies mourn towards facilitating the collective character of that action. David
McIvor, in Mourning in America, writes in a different register than Stow, but similarly
introduces important ideas and limitations over the course of his work. He also argues for
the integral role that mourning plays for political life, but he characterizes this
relationship as one of working through. This prompts McIvor to offer a reading of
Aeschylus’ Oresteia as a resource for understanding the relationship of mourning to
politics, and as such, offer Orestes as a model for that relationship. His theoretical
commitments are quite distinct from the others, drawing heavily from the psychoanalytic
theories of Melanie Klein and David Winnicott, to offer an alternative account of the
politics of mourning. However, the scholarship on mourning is imbued with
commitments to psychoanalysis, and McIvor is helpful insofar as his major contribution
is that he brings to light the way mourning can act as a valuable resource specifically for
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democratic politics. McIvor builds on a rich tradition of scholarship linking mourning,
conceptions of the self, and political life, and arguing that mourning provides a driving
force for action and activism alike.28 While Stow’s work is helpful because it establishes
the importance of the collective character of mourning and ultimately action, McIvor’s
work performs a similar feat in his insistence on the link between mourning and action,
mourning and activism, but through the way it directs grief towards a higher, collective,
purpose. McIvor writes that the “democratic work of mourning does not transcend an
angry, agonistic politics, but it orients this politics to a higher order practice of
democracy.”29 This paints politics as a complex endeavor that involves working through,
a key concept for object-relations theory and McIvor alike. This working through,
according to McIvor, requires public work, defined by the democratic labors of
recognition and repair.30 He locates these practices in three concepts from the object
relations tradition: the depressive position, the good object and potential space.31 These
concepts help McIvor construct an aspirational politics of mourning where social
conflicts are identified, clarified, and openly engaged, working towards a politics of
recognition facilitated by intergroup contact and collaborative civic action. This
aspirational democratic work is encapsulated in Orestes.
McIvor traces some of the conventional debates over politics and mourning,
entertaining Pericles and Antigone before turning to Orestes and psychoanalysis instead.
He dismisses both the consensualist politics of Pericles (Stow) as well as the resistant
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politics of Antigone (Honig), and attempts to chart a course between these two extremes.
He is equally dissatisfied with the uncritical attachment to the polity that conceals the
struggle for social recognition that often occurs over the dead (consensualist, Pericles) as
he is with the shared rage that acts as an essential aspect of an agonistic politics of grief
(agonist, Antigone).32 Neither figure, neither explanation fully captures the politics of
mourning. For McIvor, both models of public mourning fall short as they tend towards
their extremes. He argues for a new interpretive lens that can adequately address difficult,
traumatic events in ways that both acknowledge conflicts and address the problems that
persist, which neither existing model does in his view. In characterizing the rituals of
civic memorialization of the Greensboro Massacre, the event at the center of the analysis,
McIvor writes that, “to criticize the dominant rituals of civic memorialization in
Greensboro…is an attempt to play the game of consensus in ways that include difficult,
traumatic events alongside those that are easier to remember in the interests of cultivating
a more honest and capacious public memory.”33 In some ways, this is similar to Stow’s
tragic mode of mourning, in that it works towards consensus but incorporates difficult
elements at the same time. Instead, it is through the psychoanalytic lens, that McIvor
negotiates these tensions.
Object relations psychoanalysis demonstrates the intertwinement between social
and psychic life. It “does not reduce the political to the psychological, but shows the
depts of the political and the inevitable intertwinement between the dramas of social and
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psychic life.”34 It is not that psychoanalysis can fully explain political events, but it adds
meaning and significance to the events that occur within political life—“object relations
psychoanalysis is a particularly powerful investigative tool for political theory, because it
dislodges Freudian assumptions about asocial drives and focuses attention on the ways
that internal and external dynamics reciprocally shape each other.”35 Politics is never
reducible to the internal or the external alone. This approach furnishes tools for
navigating the field of consensus and conflict together, complementing the institutional
and material elements that emerge in other accounts, while still being attentive to the
internal processes that animate involvement in external institutions. Recognizing this
inherent complexity allows McIvor to advocate for an action-oriented version of object
relations.
McIvor’s work is helpful in part because of its celebration of the way in which the
internal and external are intertwined. To be sure, this elaborates some of the helpful
elements that emerge from Stow’s treatment of mourning, particularly the importance of
mourning for the generation of a form of collective identity that incorporates the tensions
inherent in that identity—McIvor’s work adds a deeper engagement with the way that
internal processes influence the experience of a collective, and the way that those
collective experiences are internalized and work to shape subsequent internal processes.
It provides a vocabulary to attend to this reality—Klein and Winnicott move between the
social experiences of grief and the psychological processes associated with these
experiences, a move that McIvor reads as enabling a democratic politics of mourning.

34
35

McIvor. Mourning in America, 23
McIvor. Mourning in America. 23

31

This move is generative of an exploration of intersubjectivity, which I take up in the
chapters to follow. The movement between these realms is useful, because it sets up a
further investigation into the intercorporeal and intersubjective processes that are critical
to both social and political practices, even as McIvor himself does not engage with the
intercorporeality of the very expression of grief. Further, McIvor frames his intervention
as one that endeavors after the procedures and forms through which mourning can
enliven democratic agency.36
Yet, this psychoanalytic approach to the politics of mourning is also limited—its
contributions are so often filtered through an individual’s experience. For example,
McIvor argues that the psychoanalytic framework is especially well-suited to address the
intermediate space at the intersection of personal and collective practices.37 Internal
processes animate and enable external processes, where the psychological capacities of
individuals engender parallels to the social capacities of groups. However, his treatment
of this relationship seems to engage primarily with the internal processes as foundational
for the external processes, which prioritizes the individual experience ahead of the group
dynamic. This project seeks to prioritize that intersubjective space; instead of mining the
depths of an individual’s internal life to learn something about collective life, I argue for
the work that happens between bodies, and locate that work occurring in material
processes. The expression of grief, which externalizes these interior process, takes the
form of crying, which in turn, shapes the way these processes look and the work that they
do between bodies. Though I follow McIvor in his interest in the potential for mourning
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to generate democratic action, I am more interested in the character of the space that is
opened in that in-between, over the psychological work performed on an individual level
and its relationship to social interactions. Further, I worry that an emphasis on the
individual experience of trauma or grief overlooks the way these social interactions
produces, and more importantly assigns import to the materiality of these processes. I
follow Sara Ahmed in holding that emotions coalesce in social and material form and
falsely appear to individuals as the product of conscious choice.38 While McIvor’s
treatment of the psychoanalytic frame generally avoids this pitfall, treating crying as an
intersubjective act works to remain in the intercorporeal space. The way that crying
performs a bridge between bodies influences the contours of that space—this cannot be
fully realized through details about its internal origin point. The way that these internal
processes materialize on and then across bodies must also tell us something about the
shape of subsequent social interactions. Though McIvor offers a helpful account of the
link between the internal and the external, between the individual and the social,
especially in highlighting the key role that intersubjectivity plays in transforming the
working through of mourning into explicitly democratic work. Like Stow, McIvor’s work
introduces important aspects for further consideration, but the limitations that emerge
around these aspects also opens a further set of questions, particularly about the way
bodies figure into the analysis. It is not bodies as vessels that hold the psyche, but instead
bodies that populate the social arena, and the way that material expressions of grief
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further shape the experiences of the subsequent collective that we are left wondering
about in the wake of McIvor’s account.
While Stow and McIvor remain primarily overlook the work that bodies might
perform in this regard, Bonnie Honig offers an alternative treatment of the place of grief
in politics, one that is attentive to the affective space that bodies carve out within
mourning. More than that, her reading of Antigone brings out the importance of attending
to the non-discursive elements of the text, particularly the way that these facilitate the
concerted action of Antigone and Ismene. Honig’s unconventional reading of this text
highlights the way an exploration of otherwise overlooked elements can generate an
alternative politics of mourning. That politics emerges as a function of the material
aspects of Antigone’s expression of grief, and the way that materiality animates the
subsequent formation of bonds between the sisters. Honig identifies mourning and grief
as having an affective presence, which prompts the further exploration of the materiality
of these processes beyond her treatment of them within the context of this play. For
Honig, struggle is at the center of politics, and one that might be better served by
attempting to unpack the character, and perhaps location, of that struggle.
Honig’s turn to laments is not an attempt to avoid the conflict of politics, but
instead find another register upon which struggle can play out. She searches for a place to
generate action, one that offers the potential for a democratic politics.39 Like Stow, action
in concert rests at the center of her accounts of political life, but action is borne of
struggle over control of the political realm. In the face of a mortalist humanist approach
to lamentation, she argues that lamentation can be politically active, transforming
39
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mourning into a political act. That is, she writes, “we might draw from Antigone
inspiration for an agonistic humanism that sees in mortality, suffering, sound, and
vulnerability resources for some form of enacted if contested universality, while also
recognizing these resources are various and opaque in their significations, just like
language.”40 For Honig, while there might be a universal character in laments, there is
also a space to contest their meaning, and as such, their utility, which is bound up in the
need to interpret them. Laments turn out to have something to do with vengeance,
politics, and the quest for sovereignty. In her reading, it is their hyperbole that alerts
readers to the “broad reach of the politics of lamentations.”41 Antigone’s laments are
excessive, to be sure, as her dirge for herself only ends when Creon’s soldiers carry her
away to prison—but more than that, her laments might inaugurate new publics.42 They do
so by interrupting spoken word, invading the realm of the sovereign, as part of “a
conspiracy with language.”43 As a form of interruption, lamentation can be seen as
always already political—Honig reads it as facilitating action amongst those excluded
from conventional politics, with Antigone and Ismene as key actors in this regard.
Further, Honig reads Antigone as enacting a form of political agency as she conspires
with her sister towards a form of solidarity generally absent from other readings of the
text. This emanates from a reading of the text through the relationship of phone to logos.
Honig’s treatment reminds readers to consider the way bodies are marked with respect to
power most acutely, and the way that the sounds that bodies make are relevant to the
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exercise of power. However, because Honig’s treatment is built out of an engagement
with the play, she is confined, to some degree, with the forms of materiality that
punctuate that reading.
Honig presents mourning as a vehicle for political possibility and new forms of
solidarity, here between the sisters who are otherwise denied recognition in this regard.44
For Honig, the contestation of politics is a struggle over meaning, and lamentation
provides an avenue through which to intervene in this struggle. She argues against
reading Antigone’s laments for Polyneices as freezing her within the inactive role of
mourning sister, which is a more conventional reading of the text.45 Instead, in her view,
these laments seed the ground for political activism by exposing an additional space for
meaning making and the exercise of power. They allow Antigone to interrupt Creon’s
attempts to consolidate his power by marking Polyneices’ body as enemy—the laments
illustrate the precarious nature of Creon’s power, and as such, themselves represent a
form of power. That is, there is power that circulates through the challenge that
Antigone’s laments bring forward. These laments introduce a chance for solidarity
between Antigone and her sister Ismene, which is central to Honig’s reading of the text.
The potential for solidarity emerges from the materiality embedded within the laments, as
they occur over the body of the dead, and reach out on a non-discursive register. The
introduction of this register, then, is an important contribution in considering the
materiality of mourning, the way that bodies express grief. For Honig, the material
elements of mourning unfold on a non-discursive register, and as such, present a
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challenge to the extant constellation of power and the way this is embedded within the
established hierarchies. This suggests that the material form that mourning takes can
itself challenge power, and further, might even circulate an alternative form of power.
Honig does not make this explicit within her text, but her treatment of the way sounds
interrupts the exercise of power can be extended further, beyond Antigone itself.
Importantly, Honig’s work unfolds on this unfamiliar register. That is, her
attention to the non-discursive register, played through Antigone’s laments, sets her work
apart from Stow’s and McIvor’s interventions. This opens up a space to consider the way
politics extends upon non-discursive registers. Honig’s attention to lamentation is
instructive in this regard, as it introduces the idea that the non-discursive can be political.
This is a departure from Stow, at least, as well as from more mainstream scholarship,
such as that exemplified by Nussbaum and Krause. Honig’s work attends to this specific
form that emotional expression takes—she analyzes the laments of Antigone, moving
beyond simply the words she sings to consider the interval between these words, and the
sounds (phone) that populate these spaces. In her reading, these sounds illuminate a
conspiracy between Antigone and her sister Ismene—“she is better seen as enacting
conspiracy…conspiring to constitute or solicit publics by conspiring with language
itself”.46 Language becomes a thing to conspire with, marking it as having boundaries by
introducing the idea that additional elements might join up with it. Honig’s intervention
into the politics of mourning occurs, in part, through a sensitivity to affect. Not only do
laments introduce multiple affects into a space, in an effort to arouse pity from the
audience, Honig’s discussion of phone functions on an affective register as well,
46
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translating feeling into the material space. In many ways, my project builds on these
openings effected by Honig, examining the way crying arouses affects, working on this
register and opening space in similar ways.
Stow, Honig, and McIvor are all helpful interlocutors because their work seeks to,
from different theoretical vantage points, illuminate the integral work that mourning does
for politics, specifically a democratic politics. Each develops, over careful attention to
specific practices of mourning, and through engaging the institution and texts of Greek
tragedy, an argument for the importance of mourning for democracy. These practices are
driven by their intimate connection to grief, and represent the way grief is integral to the
functioning of the polity. For Stow, the grief expressed and engaged through these
practices serves as an important counter against a tendency to oversimplify a nation’s
collective history and discount complexities within that history, and by extension, their
collective identity. Collective action is, for Stow, the ultimate end for politics, and his
treatment of mourning prioritizes the search for the sources that enable and foreclose
such action. For McIvor, mourning is most appropriately understood as a working
through, as an active process that holds aspects of Stow’s penchant towards consensus
and Honig’s towards agonism in productive tension with one another. This is a working
through that occurs in the internal processes of one’s psyche, and are influenced by and
further influence the shape and possibilities of the collective. His movement between the
internal and external, the individual and collective, is instructive insofar as he
understands intersubjectivity as a key element animating the significance of mourning to
a democratic polity. For Honig, mourning practices as the expression of grief emerge as
the terrain of struggle, which is integral for her understanding of politics. Lamentations
38

become an additional medium through which to enter the terrain of politics, through
which that struggle might take shape. Honig’s singular attention among these three to the
material aspects of these laments, as she differentiates between phone and logos, between
sound and word, provides an important opening through which to consider the work of
mourning. Taken together, these scholars coalesce around the importance of mourning as
a process that enables collective action, that unfolds across multiple registers including
the discursive as well as a non-discursive, or affective, register, and as necessitating and
facilitating intersubjectivity.

Lingering Questions and Further Extensions
As such, the works of Stow, Honig, and McIvor recognize the important work that
mourning performs for a democratic polity. Mourning emerges as important for collective
action, as integral for intersubjectivity, and as a process that can have discursive and nondiscursive elements. The expression of grief, then, is critical for politics, insofar as it
works to animate collective action through intersubjectivity, processes that unfold upon
the discursive register (i.e. debate and deliberation) as well as non-discursive registers
(affective, material). The work of these authors illuminates the different ways that grief is
integral to the functioning of a polity. Grief is the primary emotion that these scholars
engage—it is the emotional reaction to loss that comes to play a key role in political life,
experienced by citizens together, and working towards various instantiations of solidarity
that facilitate the kind of action in concert that defines politics. However, these accounts
overlook, either actively (Stow) or passively (Honig and McIvor), one incredibly
common form of the expression of grief: crying. And as such, they do not attend to the
39

work that this expression performs, as a physical process, as emanating from and through
the body, and as an element of the mourning process that can alter the experience and
reception of grief. Crying expresses grief, it is not an emotion itself. Crying involves the
shedding of tears, and can be accompanied by inarticulate sounds, or it can be silent.47
But most importantly, crying is a response that one’s body issues to express grief, to
respond to loss. The accounts of McIvor and Honig do not attend to crying—they do not
attend to this form of physical expression, and as such, they do not attend to the ways that
the physical expression of grief itself affects the democratic possibilities brought about
through mourning. Stow does discuss crying, but he does not take seriously the claim that
this physical expression of grief could have generative effects on democratic political
life. In light of this oversight, I argue that as the embodied expression of grief, crying
influences the collective experience of this emotional response to loss, which in turn
affects the way that grief itself comes to bear on politics.
The aforementioned scholarship also engenders additional questions, those that
animate the interventions put forward in this project. In part, this emerges from the
limitations of this scholarship. While these three thinkers all attend in their own ways to
the work of grief, the physicality of grieving bodies escapes much attention. This raises
the question of how grieving bodies insert themselves into the life of the polity, and how
the embodied aspects of grief influence subsequent conclusions about the character of
collective action, the ability to enact and take part in the struggle at the core of politics,
and the shape and possibility of intersubjectivity. In particular, this project examines the
work that crying performs in this regard, as an attempt to fill the lacuna left by the
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openings engendered by the aforementioned scholarship. Specifically, how does crying,
as an embodied expression of grief, as an act that occurs on and through the body, open
particular instantiations of an emerging collective, while also foreclosing others? How
does crying work to insert bodies into a struggle that they are perhaps otherwise not
afforded entry, or overlooked in attempts to effect such a gain? In other words, how does
crying demand that bodies be seen in ways that are significant to this struggle, and how
does this influence the struggle itself? How does crying facilitate the experience of
intersubjectivity, and what does crying illuminate about the role of embodied expression
in that very experience? How does crying shape that experience, and influence the
character of the experience itself? And perhaps, the most pressing question of them all, is
how does the particular experience of intersubjectivity engendered through crying affect
the political possibilities engendered through the expression of grief in its embodied
form? Though Stow, Honig, and McIvor, albeit to different degrees, lay the groundwork
so that we are even able to ask these questions, by attending to the relationship between
mourning, grief, and politics, their scholarship does not provide answers these questions.
To be sure, this project assumes that the embodied experience of grief is itself
significant to the political work of mourning. This assumption is bolstered by suggestions
within the scholarship that the materiality of grief is relevant, most readily available from
Stow’s treatment of menis and Honig’s attention to both laments and phone. Stow is
intent on limiting a tendency towards the excessive pleasure of tears, but in advocating
for this limitation in light of the collective work that mourning should perform, he fails to
attend to materiality of crying. In this account, tears run the risk of proliferating both
individually-focused and thus not politically productive grief, and endless cycles of grief
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that turns into rage, which is inimical to stability and thus also failing to engender the
behavior and reflections productive for political life. Yet, there is an opening here to
consider the ways that the individual behavior transforms into a problem for the
collective to take up—or the way the individual experience of crying somehow becomes
a vehicle through which rage proliferates through a collective. While I follow Stow in
recognizing that the full realization of menis is troublesome because it forecloses the
processes that are integral to political life, this account leaves open the question of the
specific ways that tears spread rage through the polity, and with it, the role that bodies
play in this process. Honig treats laments as an additional mode through which struggle
occurs, and as such, they operate as a challenge to dominant modes of power within her
work. It is through her laments that Antigone is politically active, and they work to
mobilize in this regard. This raises the question as to how laments function in a different
register, and what the character of that register might be. Laments seem to unfold upon an
affective register in addition to their discursive character. This register is itself an opening
to pursue. Further, this is bolstered by Honig’s subsequent treatment of the significance
of phone within the exchanges between Antigone and Ismene, and perhaps the way in
which phone itself functions on an affective register. To be sure, Honig understands
phone as part of the non-discursive register, which I name as the affective register. The
question remains, however, about the affective character of the phone and the way that it
might be tied to materiality as animating its expression and experience. Taken together,
these elements of Stow and Honig both open a space for further consideration of the
material aspects of crying, as a function of the embodied experience of its expression.
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The embodied experience of grief is absent from McIvor’s introduction of
intersubjectivity, but his account also suggests that it would be theoretically productive to
engage with materiality to illuminate the contours of intersubjectivity. This could provide
insight into the experience of intersubjectivity, and the way that this not only has
implications for political life, but how the particular experience of intersubjectivity,
through bodies, through the way the expression of grief through bodies, influences this
experience. This inaugurates an inquiry into a more expansive debate on the locus of
subjectivity. That is, McIvor’s commitments to the psychoanalytic lens in particular
allow him to attend to intersubjectivity as the space where the political emerges. The
experience of grief necessarily confronts the overlap between the self and others—there
is a coming together that is inherent in this description that is important but one that is
lacking with regard to materiality. McIvor’s treatment of the phenomenon is interested in
what appears as an interior experience of intersubjectivity, where grief is internalized and
influences the internal processes of the psyche. However, it is the body that expresses this
grief, that externalizes it to follow this model. It follows, then, that the way that this
expression materializes should also influence the experience of intersubjectivity. The
crying body thrusts the experience of grief out into the world, and on my reading,
presents it for other bodies to take up and internalize in their own ways. To overlook the
form that this expression takes, and the way this materializes through the body, is also to
overlook the way bodies respond to that expression in turn.
In the next chapter, I turn to affect theory as a way to further develop the
significance of crying as an embodied expression of grief, and the significance of that
expression on the formation of the collective. This body of theory helps answer the
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questions left open by the work of Stow, McIvor, and Honig. Philosopher Baruch
Spinoza defines the body in its capacity to affect and be affected by others.48 The
scholarship that emerges in the wake of this definition is interested in the relationships
between bodies. In particular, it is attentive to the way that material and corporeal
elements of interaction are significant to the interaction itself. Affect attends to what Sara
Ahmed names, “the messiness of the experiential, the unfolding of bodies into worlds,”
and, “how we are touched by what comes near.”49 Here Ahmed touches on a critical
element that informs the arguments in subsequent chapters: being touched by what comes
near means that the way that our bodies respond and register responses to our world, to
the other bodies in our world, and even to the responses of those bodies, is what creates
worlds. The character of our experiences, the way bodies express themselves in these
experiences, is part of what shapes the possibilities and the world itself. Scholarship on
affect, then, complements the work on mourning discussed in this chapter, and does so by
focusing not only on the physical responses of bodies, but the significance of how this
gets taken up by other bodies for the very worlds that we can build.
The next chapter delves deeper not only into affect theory, but also the way that
affects, as a noun, can name the work that crying performs between bodies as part of the
expression of grief. In this regard, a turn to affects also attends more specifically to the
relationship between crying and the circulation of power. At the outset of the chapter
with reference to Creon and Antigone, I put forward the idea that mourning engenders the
circulation of affects. I also claimed that this transmission of affects brings with it a
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circulation of power as well. Honig names the mourning as the terrain of political
struggle, and suggests at different points the way that mourning intervenes in the exercise
of power. In the chapters that follow, I argue that crying generates affects, and those
affects circulate power—a kind of power that is found in the way bodies come together,
responding to and building off these affects. This argument fills a lacuna in the literature
on mourning, grief, and politics, reflecting on the way power emanates from these
processes, finding power specifically in crying as the embodied expression of grief. And
so, affect theory offers not only a vocabulary useful for naming the processes that occur
between bodies, but also a theoretical object that can enhance accounts of mourning,
grief, and politics by linking them explicitly to power.

Grieving for Parkland
Before turning to a more thorough discussion of affect and crying, I want to
return to the events in Parkland, FL following the school shooting at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School (MSD). If grief names the emotional response to loss, then this
tragedy offers an opportunity to engage with grief in the contemporary US, and the
politics of its expression. This tragedy also points to the places where attention to affect
can function as a companion to these other readings and interpretations of the work of
grief in a polity. In particular, it suggests that the material experience of crying played a
significant role in the response to this tragedy, linking the extended experience, across
multiple groups and multiple events, back to the body’s expression of grief. In the final
chapter I will argue that this generates the possibility for an affective solidarity, a
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solidarity not rooted in collective remembrance but instead in the constant return to the
embodied experience of grief.
In the days immediately following the fatal shooting at MSD, a group of students
emerged from the chaos, channeling their grief into activism. Led by one Emma
Gonzalez, these students demanded the politicians in Florida and in Washington be held
accountable for the terribly tragedy that occurred in their high school, when, on February
14, 2018, fellow classmate Nikolas Cruz entered the school and shot 17 people. A mere
three days after the shooting, Gonzalez, a senior at MSD, delivered a powerful speech at
an anti-gun rally. She spouted disdain for the “thoughts and prayers” sent by President
Trump and the NRA; she implored them to act. Gonzalez began her speech with a
moment of silence, and then carried on by saying, “Every single person up here today, all
these people should be home grieving. But instead we are up here standing together
because if all our government and President can do is send thoughts and prayers, then it’s
time for victims to be the change we need to see.”50 Most notably, this speech was
delivered through tears.
This is only one of many events that are part of the expression of grief in
Parkland. However, even this specific snapshot illustrates the limitations of existing
approaches to the relationship between mourning and politics, and the need to attend to
crying as the embodied expression of grief. First, it is notable that this is a public event—
but Gonzalez names grieving as occurring in the home. Her grief is made public by virtue
of the lack of action on the part of those in power. Grieving can play a role the private
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lives of the afflicted, but within the public arena it serves a different purpose than only
the emotional response to loss. Gonzalez’s public grief becomes a vehicle for action. The
public character of this event sets the stage to understand it as part of the struggle that is
at the center of agonistic models of politics. That struggle occurs in the public arena, and
as Honig writes, it often occurs over meaning. The public character is well-noted, within
Gonzalez’s speech, as well as reflected in the substantial news coverage it received. But
the struggle over meaning offers an opportunity to probe the role the discursive register
plays in this event, and what escapes mention if the work of grief is read in that register
alone. To be sure, Gonzalez articulates the struggle into which her grief, and the grief of
the victims and their families, intervenes—it is the struggle over the very meaningfulness
of her friends’ deaths. That is, action, here revisions to laws that would better regulate
gun control and limit ownership, renders these deaths meaningful. They are soldiers in
the fight against a government that does not protect its citizens. Inaction, here “thoughts
and prayers”, marks these deaths as meaningless, as numbers added to an overflowing
pile that has no effect on political processes. The opposing forces that animate this
struggle are succinctly laid out by Gonzalez in her speech.
On my reading, it is significant that Gonzalez dismisses the “thoughts and
prayers” of the President and the NRA alike, for multiple reasons. It recalls the familiar
trope associated with these shootings, one that has been in constant circulation, in the
wake of other shootings such as that in Las Vegas last year, in Orland before that, and in
Newtown some years earlier. Thoughts and prayer are often offered in lieu of any actual
change to the laws surrounding gun control, laws that could strengthen the control the
government exercises over gun ownership, for example. But further, “thoughts and
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prayers” are both discursive modes of expression. They unfold in a discursive register,
through the very words that inaugurate either action—to keep someone in your thoughts
is to keep their name close to you, in your mind. Prayers also come to fruition through
words that expression the sentiment you search for; they communicate a message
between yourself and some higher force. That both are linked to words is important—this
critique opens Gonzalez to a reading that marks the limitations of words here, and the
way that words seem to replace actual action. Gonzalez says as much, explaining that the
victims need to work for change since the government refuses to do so, sending their
words in lieu of change.
Do emotions engender action, according to Gonzalez? It certainly seems so—in
their move from the private to the public realm, grieving brings her and her classmates to
the stage, to give this speech, and to speak out at the anti-gun rally. Grieving has the
capacity to bring people together, and act as a function of their grief, to assert the
meaningfulness of the deaths that brought them together. But further, the specific
expression of Gonzalez’s speech is also notable. Recall that Gonzalez delivers this entire
speech through tears. This simultaneous physical manifestation and discursive expression
of grief, naming it and performing it together, read alongside Gonzalez’s dismissal of
thoughts and prayer, gestures towards the incompleteness inherent in conceiving political
work without attending to the material. Put another way, that dismissal alerts the
audience to an insufficiency, and the material, embodied tears that accompany
Gonzalez’s speech emerge as a potential corrective for that insufficiency. This is one
reading that Gonzalez’s speech enables, one that recognizes that her tears could be
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performing work in this moment, work that is not simply her body’s expression of grief,
but that the materiality of this experience actually alters the practice of democracy.
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CHAPTER 2: CRYING, AFFECT, AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY
“Pity sets us in motion by transporting ourselves outside of ourselves; by identifying with the
suffering being…How could I suffer when I see another suffer, if I do not even know what he
suffers, if I do not know what he and I have in common? Someone who has never reflected cannot
be clement, or just, or pitying; any more than he can be wicked and vindictive. He who imagines
nothing feels only himself; in the midst of mankind he is alone.” Tracy Strong quoting Rousseau
in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Politics of the Ordinary

Introduction
Missing from the scholarship in the previous chapter is the way the body’s
expression of grief influences the experience and the significance to the political work of
mourning. This chapter turns to the literature on affect to understand the significance of
this work—intersubjectivity. The embodied expression of grief alerts others to our
experience, to the location of that experience in and through our bodies, and the way that
experience is generative of a form of subjectivity that extends beyond the body of each
person alone to make the collective aspect of grief apparent. Intersubjectivity becomes
key for action in concert; it becomes key for producing political transformation. The very
way we experience grief on and through our bodies, the way we express this grief
through crying, establishes an intercorporeality which is linked to intersubjectivity. This
becomes critical to political transformation.
This chapter looks to affect to furnish a vocabulary to attend to such a
transformation. In addition, this chapter offers a discussion of crying as it relates to work
on affect, dwelling on the idea of intersubjectivity through affect theory, through the way
affect theorists approach the experience of the body as integral to this idea. Specifically,
this discussion begins with the work of Spinoza and subsequent commentaries on this
thinker. The experience of intersubjectivity, the way our bodies produce this state through
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crying as an expression of grief, is missing from the literature on mourning. Further, this
chapter reads selections from Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as sympathetic to
the notion of the transmissibility of affect, and draws on the insights of these thinkers to
bolster the claims about the potential for explicitly political transformation induced by
crying.

Emotions and Affect, Grief and Crying
To begin, I offer a discussion of the distinction between emotion and affect,
characterizing crying as an expression of emotion, and generative of affects. The
particular emotion that crying expresses in these pages is grief; that expression of grief
produces affects. This distinction builds on the work of theorists such as Sara Ahmed,
who writes that, “it is not what emotions are, but what they do,” that is significant.51
Affects provide a name to what emotions do in my account. Emotions and affects are
intertwined in this regard. Ahmed uses the language of emotion, but her discussion of
what they do is instructive going forward. She attends to, “how emotions work to shape
the surfaces of individual and collective bodies,” and again, it is in that how that I locate
the work of affect.52 In her discussion of emotions, Ahmed pushes back against their
colloquial treatment, writing that, “the everyday language of emotion is based on the
presumption of interiority.”53 This fails to account for the work that emotions perform
between bodies. Emotions are not psychological, internal states; they are social and
cultural practices. She also pushes back against an outside-in model of emotions, that is
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evident in the history of the philosophy of emotions, instead favoring the view that,
“Emotions are not in either the individual or the social, but produce the very surfaces and
boundaries that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as if they are
objects.”54 Emotions are doing work in Ahmed’s account; they produce the effect of an
inside and an outside, through the way they produce these surfaces and boundaries. As
such, the views that emotions are psychological states, or things that only pass between
bodies, from the outside-in, are necessarily limited in this account.
Though Ahmed uses the language of emotion, her focus on what emotions do
lines up with the way that I treat affect moving forward. Emotions work to shape the
surfaces of individual and collective bodies alike, and it is through the proliferation of
affects that they perform this work. To be sure, Theresa Brennan similarly distinguishes
between affect and emotion, writing that, “By an affect, I mean the physiological shift
accompanying a judgment.”55 Affects are surges of emotions. Again, this points to a close
relationship between emotions and affect, where affect in located in the physicality of
emotional expression. Brennan also discusses affective atmospheres, Brennan and
Ahmed alike draw on the work of Baruch Spinoza, who many understand introducing the
language of affect into the lexicon:
“By affect [affectum] I understand affections [affectiones] of the body by which
the body’s power [potentia] of acting is increased or diminished, aided or
restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of affections.”56
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In his rendering, the body is defined in its capacity to affect and to be affected by others.
The body is defined in its affective capacity. The body becomes a central node in a
network of relationships, which manifest themselves through various registers of
transmissions. Affects never belong solely to one person, but instead are intercorporeal
and social in nature. They circulate between bodies, and in doing so ceaselessly constitute
the nature of those bodies.57 In this regard, the body begins to lose its borders and
boundaries—they are blurred and fading, but never fully disappeared. Spinoza is
primarily interested in the relationship between bodies, and so the internal composition of
bodies themselves falls out of focus. Corporeal integrity falls away as it is replaced by the
between-ness of bodies, and a certain fluidity that this implies. It is the currents, moods,
and feelings that move between bodies, nudging the rise and fall of relationships,
bringing people into contact with one another. Affects, then, in Spinoza’s rendering,
describe the augmentations of the body’s power—they are changes in the state of bodies.
Ahmed, when she writes that emotions constitute the very surfaces of bodies, and the
effect of an inside and outside, is drawing on a reading of Spinoza’s famous description
of affects, and their various translations.
Recent years have seen a surge in scholarship that takes up Spinoza’s definition of
affects, and employs this definition to attend to the relationships between bodies. Ahmed,
Brennan, and Seyfert offer three productive readings of this work, and help to animate the
way I take up affect moving forward, specifically in the way that affects are productive of
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an intersubjectivity. While Ahmed’s use of the term ‘emotions’ is slightly confusing, the
way that she employs the term, with an eye towards the work that emotions perform, and
against both an outside-in and inside-out understanding of emotions, is itself instructive.
All of these accounts gesture towards the role that affects play in generating a sense of
intersubjectivity, which I build on below. While bodies might experience emotions, that
experience is not disconnected from the work that emotions perform between bodies, and
the term affect is used going forward to designate that work. And so, grief is the name of
the emotion that I address in this project, but it is in the affects grief produces, felt
through crying, that are of interest here.

The Affective Life of Crying
Drawing out the affective work of crying helps elaborate on the way Spinoza’s
rendering of the body, as affecting and being affected, necessarily dislocates individual
corporeal integrity, and as such, conventional notion of subjectivity. That is, crying
moves away from placing a premium on intelligibility as a key component of
subjectivity, which is also helpful in constructing a notion of intersubjectivity as a way to
open up alternative possibilities for political formation. Further, crying’s affects can draw
people together, illuminate structures of feeling that are present in society, and engender
transformations in the relationships between people. It does so through the expression of
emotions, which is a key part of the conventional understanding of crying. Together, the
work of crying helps to build a particular kind of world, where people are dependent on
one another, and the shared vulnerability of people is transformed from a liability to a
source of community, strength, and world-building.
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Jean Paul Sartre writes emotions as an action on the world—in his rendering,
emotions are not passively felt, but instead become active attempts to transform the
world:
“However, we must act. So we try to change the world, that is, to live as if the
connection between things and their potentialities were not ruled by deterministic
processes, but by magic.”58
Emotion is that magic; it is the action we have left in a world where we have no other
path.59
As a form of emotional expression, crying appears on the body, and is released out into
the world, through its material, corporeal, and even aural elements (tears, sobs, wails,
etc.), it brings us outside of ourselves, and helps our emotions act on the world. Focusing
on crying’s affective work helps illuminate the mechanics of this action. Further, as
crying quite often engenders a reaction—both in the person crying and in the onlookers to
the act, it is already one step down the road towards intersubjectivity and ultimately
solidarity. As Tom Lutz writes, “[w]hen an infant cries, or when a friend cries in the
course of conversation, we now among other things that a serious demand is being placed
upon our attention: tears demand a reaction.”60 As such, when others are present, when
they see, hear, and feel our tears, crying is part of an encounter amongst bodies; the
ability to generate a response can open a space for the various forms of affective work,
the demand for a reaction is itself an opening.
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How and why does crying generate a response? There is admittedly something
jarring about crying, which punctuates its affective work in turn. That is, this jarring,
disruptive character performs the task of opening the space for additional affects and
emotions associated with crying to creep in, because it engenders a pause, a stoppage.
Crying interrupts—it interrupts the even flow of someone’s breath just as it interrupts the
steady stream of words from someone’s mouth. Our speech takes on a new cadence as
tears flow from our eyes and sobs creep into our breath. It can pop up unexpectedly, even
in those moments or spaces that society has conditioned us against, such as in front of our
peer, our colleagues, our bosses. Even a baby crying on an airplane is disruptive, cutting
through the low, steady hum of the engines with its loud, piercing wails. It’s not as
though we do not expect babies to cry, but we do not necessary desire them to invade the
personal space we each create on an airplane, with our headphones, personal screens, and
armrests that act as walls between each of us and those around us. Even a baby crying is
disruptive to some degree. It interrupts some previously-established order. It can interrupt
the discursive practices that dominate many interactions—the wails emanating from a
baby force a pause to collect ones thoughts, and deep breath before continuing to speak;
they interrupt conversations, even for an instant. The suppression of tears in the ordinary
progression of the everyday is a reflection of the order it disrupts. But again, that
disruption is part of the affective work of crying, opening up the space for transformation
as other bodies feel and respond to our tears.
Crying blurs boundaries between bodies, with each other and with their
environment. In its visual, aural, vocal, and tactile dimensions, crying softens the
boundaries between bodies and their surroundings. A baby cries, and its caretakers enters
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the room, hearing the vocal elements and eventually observing the visual components of
this phenomenon. The affective work of tears here is not fully linked to the consciousness
of the baby, who exists in a relatively pre-conscious state. Much like Rousseau’s
description of the primal cry activating pity in those who hear it, the caretaker is pulled
into the room, in part by the centripetal tug of crying as an expression of discomfort,
sadness, or neediness to some degree. These pulls are the first movements, the hints of
potential, and the blurring that happens as a function of them, when the caretaker lifts the
baby from the crib, the affects swirling around and between the two before settling back
down. That pull of tears sets off a set of interactions that allow for the momentary
blurring of the boundaries between these bodies.
This blurring of boundaries serves to illuminate relationships. With a baby crying,
the relationship with a caretaker is illuminated. With a co-worker crying in a break room,
a different relationship is illuminated. Some might be drawn to the co-worker, to ask
what is wrong, illuminating a relationship of care, even in its nascent stages. Others
might be pushed away, uncomfortable with the expression of emotions taking place in
this space, illuminating a lack of relationship as it exists. The reaction to tears in regard
illuminates the contours, and even the limits of relationships. Crying can call attention to
our levels of comfort and discomfort with the emotions of others, with the way that others
exist in and act on the world. But considering the way that crying illuminates
relationships also suggests the ways that it might foreclose political possibilities by
closing off interaction with one another. This also illustrates the challenge of trafficking
in potentiality, which is part of the broader work of affect. Moving beyond the discomfort
one might experience with their co-worker crying is important in considering the way in
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which affects can work to construct worlds; being aware of the obstacles that we face in
this regard is important as well.
Not only can crying illuminate the contours of relationships that exist, it can also
engender transformations or produce new relationships. The circulation of affects can
transform the bodies in question, bringing them into contact with one another,
establishing a new stage for interactions. For example, following the school shooting at
Parkland, speeches from the surviving students produce a fair amount of tears in their
audience. Those people were not necessarily present at the Marjory Stoneman Douglass
high school, but were invited into the emotional reality of those who were there that day.
If we were to approach this through the psychoanalytic lens, we would be prompted to
consider the ways in which crying helps those onstage and in the crowd work through
their emotions in this collective setting. Instead, exploring this moment through the
affective work of crying draws the focus to the way the emotions travel between bodies,
and the shared atmosphere this creates. Crying allows us to consider the movement of
grief throughout the crowd, as its physical embodiment of grieving, along multiple
dimensions. It pushes us to think about how the tears and sobs express grief, and how the
collective expression of grief alters the landscape of the moment, and opens up potential
future trajectories. Crying together, even for those who are not familiar with one another
beforehand, provides a basis for some sort of common ground, one realized through the
circulation of affects.
Crying can transform relationships, creating connections between strangers who
share in the emotional reality of a given moment. It can also make the structures of
feeling that permeate society, sitting below the surface, at the edge of semantic
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availability, emerge in palpable ways. Returning to the Parkland example, grief ceases to
be solely an individual experience because tears move it outside of individual bodies, and
expose it as part of something broader, potentially transformational for that moment.
Consider the explicit action that this collective experience of mourning has produced; in
the wake of this shooting, the students from Parkland have organized nationwide marches
and walkouts, protesting the gun laws as well as the politicians who are complicit in their
laxness. The affective atmosphere generated by the tears of grief in the early days
following the shooting has helped to transform the relationship between these kids and
the public—it has also laid the groundwork for action as a function of that
transformation. The shared tears allow others to take part in their grief, however
momentarily, to be touched by it and transformed by it, and willing to show up to the
space opened by those tears. I am not trying to draw a clean line of causality here, but
instead highlight a set of connections and the way in which the affective work of this
particular emotional expression makes those connections felt and relevant in ways not
present prior to it.
Related to engendering a reaction, the blurring of boundaries, illuminating the
contours of relationships, and effecting transformations are all manifestations of the
affective work of crying. They are all made possible, in part, by another element of
crying’s affective work. In addition to demanding a reaction, crying also broadcasts
feelings out into the world. Crying does not necessarily produce an understanding, but the
broadcasting function does help open the space, to draw people in, to transform
relationships, to blur boundaries, to build something together. Crying can broadcast the
experience of grief to those around us and invite others to experience it as well. In this
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way, it is not simply about these forms of work, but the way in crying’s affects can be
mobilized to engender transformation, and the shape that this transformation takes
between bodies. In effect, it is about the link between crying and intersubjectivity, which
opens the potential to produce solidarity, that these forms of work inaugurate.
What kind of world does crying build? It is a world that is based on intercorporeal
and intersubjective interactions. It is a world that is not predicated on the isolation of
individuals from one another, neither through their bodies nor through others means. It is
a world that is built on a sensibility for one another, for each other’s feelings and
frustrations. It is a world that recognizes the staying power of the power constellations,
and the minimal access to change that exists. It is a world that seizes any and all
opportunity to challenge those constellations, to make marginalized bodies, individuals
and groups seen and heard through whatever means possible. It is a world in which the
experience of suffering, of powerlessness, by virtue of its expression, can be channeled
towards change. It is a world in which even the most common, quotidian forms of
expression can have the potential for transformation, a transformation possible for
grieving, suffering bodies afflicted by tragedy.
Consider the manner in which Kathleen Stewart describes affects:
“Ordinary affects are the varied, surging capacities to affect and be affected that
give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes,
contingencies, and emergences. They’re things that happen. They happen in
impulses, sensations, expectations, daydreams, encounters, and habits of relating,
in strategies and their failures, in forms of persuasion, contagion, and compulsion,
in modes of attention, attachment, and agency, and in publics and social worlds of
all kinds that catch people up in something that feels like something. Ordinary
affects are public feelings that begin and end in broad circulation, but they’re also
the stuff that seemingly intimate lives are made of.”61
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This description incredibly rich; it builds out the definition introduced by Spinoza,
bringing it into the experience of the everyday, in ways that reflect the description of
crying presented in this section. She names affects as surging capacities, a visceral
companion not only to emotions, but to the general movement that characterizes
everyday life. Affects are things that happen; they feel like something. Crying is itself a
surging of emotion that is felt on and through bodies, that moves between bodies, that is
in constant motion. Crying circulates; it circulates the affects associated with grief.
Affects are both public feelings in broad circulation, and simultaneously a recognition of
the intimate—so too we might think about crying as a surging of affects and placing them
into circulation, as well as part of our intimate experience of the world. Crying’s affects
become political, then, as they spread out across the crowd, surging through, between,
and among bodies, engendering intersubjectivity, and building towards the potential for
political transformation.

Affect and Intersubjectivity
My own commitments prioritize a form of intersubjectivity that can be felt and
experienced by people, and the way that this can engender the character of a collective.
Or perhaps more accurately, the form that intersubjectivity that is produced by crying
together, and the way that bodies respond to the affects produced by the bodies of others,
generated through crying. Because crying is a physical experience, one that produces
physical remnants in the form of tears, one that emanates from the body through these
tears, as well as wails and sobs, crying forms a bridge between bodies. That bridge, then,
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is also a bridge to a particular form of intersubjectivity. But the significance of
intersubjectivity is built out of recognizing the important role that subjectivity plays in
political thought more broadly. In attending to the materiality of crying, and the
physicality of this experience, I argue for an intersubjectivity that is built out of
intercorporeality. Scholarship on affect helps transforms the boundaries of subjectivity,
proving that it can serve as an effective resource to address the way an expanded
understanding of subjectivity is critical in the potential political transformation brought
on by the embodied expression of grief. My account highlights some of the ways affect
enhances and reconfigures these ideas, drawing them away from the individual
experience, and thrusting the question of subjectivity into a shared space.
Subjectivity is intimately intertwined with the questions that drive politics:
questions of identity are linked to questions of subjectivity. Who is a subject? How do
subjects come to exist? How do they come to act in concert? These questions have
plagued scholars for ages. In particular, these questions also animate considerations of
identity, peoplehood and citizenship, much like the work of Stow, Honig and McIvor
considered in the previous section. Subjectivity is also linked to the exercise of power in
important ways—who is a subject is ultimately a question about who exercises power
over whom and to what extent. Debates about subjectivity are bound up in the contours of
power—Antigone’s attempts to exert power over her uncle come back to questions of
subjectivity and identity. Thinkers from Plato to Foucault have contemplated the
construction of subjectivity, albeit not always in these terms. Plato’s Apology presents
Socrates arguing about the contours of democratic subjectivity; his Republic puts forward
a theory that accounts for the qualities of the ideal citizen-subject. Thomas Hobbes
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constructs a thought experiment through which men willingly subject themselves to the
power of a sovereign, transforming themselves into subjects for their collective survival.
The frontispiece of Hobbes’ Leviathan offers a visual representation of while at first
glance, the king’s head and body loom large, upon closer inspection, it is clear that the
body is made up of many individuals. Hundreds of years later, scholars such as Althusser
and Foucault intervene in these debates, putting forward their own treatments of
subjectivity that foreground the work of power in productive ways.62
In an effort to add to these accounts of subjectivity, I turn to the way affects
engender an intersubjectivity, between bodies, of a more collective nature. Further,
intersubjectivity built out of intercorporeality highlights the material elements of grief
made manifest through crying. Scholars of affect on the way bodies influence one another
and the work between bodies that occurs. Affect offers an additional perspective through
which to approach and interrogate subjectivity, the definition of which is at stake here. If
we are always a little outside of ourselves, the boundaries of the body fade in
significance, but if subjectivity is in some way linked to those boundaries, then we need
to reconsider the definition of subjectivity, of that ‘you’.
Affect attends to what Sara Ahmed calls the “messiness of the experiential, the
unfolding of bodies into worlds,” and “how we are touched by what comes near”.63 In my
reading, a focus on affect also helps develop a more realistic picture of political life
precisely by attending to what ordinarily occurs between bodies. This is productive
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because it pulls us out of the intellectual and intellectualized spaces that theories of
subjectivity often occupy. As the site of emotions and affects, the body emerges as
crucial to the analysis in ways that tend to be overlooked in the aforementioned
treatments of subjectivity, but by blurring the boundaries between bodies, we can look to
the interaction, and the intersubjective space. Crying perhaps originates within an
individual’s body, but because it manifests on the surface and thrusts emotions out into
the shared space between bodies, it is never only of one body alone. It is so much about
the relationships between bodies, and once we move away from the internal processes,
biological and otherwise, that produce tears, we can start to focus on the form this
interaction takes, and the way its elements affect the bodies of others, becoming part of
the environment, providing a medium through which to transform the space. This is part
of the felt experience of political life, because crying makes evident structures of feeling
that exist, upon which we can build the solidarity that drives politics. This is the move
from an internalized emotion or feeling, that Ahmed rejects above, to what occurs in
between and among bodies as the actual material of and for politics.
These structures of feeling enable potentially an affective solidarity. This is a
solidarity that is felt, not rooted in shared identity or ideology, but instead emerges in the
face of domination, through shared experience. Though available to all, it is most
valuable to the downtrodden and the powerless. Crying illuminates these structures, thus
facilitating the generation of affective solidarity. Crying’s affects can pull people
together, and can illuminate a shared set of feelings or experiences. Take, for example,
Emma Gonzalez crying as she spoke at a rally for gun control days after the school
shooting at her high school in Parkland, FL. Her tears and sobs help galvanize those
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around her, help to build a movement. It is not my intention to assign a causal
relationship here, but to recognize that the heightened emotional state, and the way this is
expressed in crying, helps provoke the building blocks towards action in concert. The
tears and sobs are part of the way we feel in the moment, part of how our bodies take
part, part of how we connect to one another. They take us outside of ourselves and lay the
groundwork for action in concert. The circulation of affects is a key part of this process,
and produces a solidarity that is felt instead of understood or assumed. To link this to the
discussion above, affect adds a dimension of sociality to subjectivity, tracing the
interaction of bodies to its material manifestations. These manifestations are felt on and
experienced through the body. There is an intimate connection between affect,
subjectivity, and sociality. As Patricia Clough writes in an issue of Body & Society
dedicated to affect studies,
“affect studies has intensified the difference or differance of subjectivity and the
human body while turning attention to the sociality of the transmission of force or
intensity across bodies, and not only human bodies. Affect is the very indication
of bodies forming in the transmission of force or intensity; hence the intimate
connection of affect, subjectivity, sociality, and technology…”.64
I name this connection affective solidarity, and develop it more fully in the final chapter
of this project.
Affect transforms the debate about subjectivity, moving it outside of individual
bodies, into a space that bodies occupy together. Affects create links between bodies.
This circulation and transmission is key towards generating collectives, and collective
action. Using Spinoza, Caroline Williams “thinks about affect beyond corporeal
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embodiment, [arguing] that there is a modality of affectivity that cannot simply be
inscribed within the borders of subjectivity.”65 Williams uses Spinoza to theorize affect
as an impersonal force, which is a useful insight because it sets up a further consideration
of the shape of subjectivity. She argues for an “affective subjectivity as a transindividual
social bond and as an unconscious dynamic.”66 Williams, like Elizabeth Markovits,
whose work I draw on in subsequent chapters, uses the language of the “circulation of
affects,” which is helpful because it bring back the idea of movement that Stewart
introduced, and gestures towards a world and a subjectivity that is constantly in flux. This
allows for some degree of flexibility or openness to be read into the concept, and for the
potential for transformation to begin to take shape. From Williams and Markovits alike,
this language also reflects the idea that affects do not belong to one body alone, but
instead are intercorporeal. As Williams uses this terminology, that intercorporeality also
dislocates the experience of subjectivity to some degree. I use the term intersubjectivity
to reflect this dislocation, and consider it to animate the political potential and the shape
of the transformation that the circulation of affects produces. Further, it points to the
production and circulation of forces that create as well as mobilize political subjectivity.
Affective relationships form between individuals and generate various iterations of
collectives; the structures and institutions that undergird political life participate in the
very generation of affects. Spinoza identifies affects as transitive links between states of
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affairs, that pass through subjects transferring and unfolding images and intensities.67
There are many kinds of encounters and variations of power – ways of affecting and
being affected – that are deeply invested in the political field.68
Applying the vocabulary of affect to the sociality of emotions is a productive step.
However, However, there is scholarship on affect that rejects the possibility of
intersubjectivity even as it argues for the transmissibility of affect. In this regard, Lauren
Berlant is a curious interlocutor. She provides extensive insight into the affective
structure of attachment, as well as the affective component of citizenship and the public
sphere:
“All attachment is optimistic, if we describe optimism as the force that moves you
out of yourself and into the world in order to bring closer the satisfying something
that you cannot generate on your own but the sense in the wake of a person, a way
of life, an object project, concept, or scene…Whatever the experience of
optimism in particular, then, the affective structure of an optimistic attachment
involves a sustaining inclination to return to the scene of fantasy that enables you
to expect that this time, nearness to this thing will help you or a world to become
different in just the right way.”69
Here, Berlant takes the language of political life and imbues it with affect. Attachments
take on an affective structure—it is the circulation of affects that sustains these
attachments and allows for their repetition. Berlant is writing about the fantasy of the
good life, in particular, which is a feature of particular pockets of political thought. For
her, that return to the scene of the fantasy is precisely what allows its proliferation, in
perpetuity. In understanding attachments as having affective structures, she intimates
embodied, material, and intercorporeal aspects of political life. She writes that, “the
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present is first perceived affectively,” elevating the perception experienced by the body,
but offering it a particular temporality—locating it in a specific historical moment.70 For
Berlant, attachment is a structure of relationality, and it is imbued with the experiences of
affects and emotions that attach themselves to those relations. It is not only bodies that
affect and are affected by others, but also, the very structures and relationships in which
we exist also affect and are affected by our emotional experiences. The process is
reciprocal and productive. In her account, affect registers the conditions of life that move
across persons and worlds, saturating the corporeal, intimate, and political performance
of adjustments that make a shared atmosphere palpable.71 It is a vocabulary that captures
the very transmissible qualities that undergird political life.
And yet, Berlant rejects the possibility of intersubjectivity because it requires a
merging of one consciousness with another, which she is highly skeptical of in her
writing. There is an incoherence of subjectivity—her work attempts to open up new
worlds, and the making of these worlds is crucial to moving the seemingly intractable
without resolving it into a smooth surface.72 But her lingering commitments to the
psychoanalytic frame foreclose the possibility of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is at
best, a dream, and at its worst, a fiction that forecloses other possibilities. This rejection
constantly returns to the speaking subject, and the development and integration of
identity.73 The speaking subject is necessarily individual; the world of late capitalism has
constructed a community of individuals. Affect moves between these individuals, but the
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individual is still at the center of Berlant’s account. Empathy is foundational to
intersubjectivity, but this is part of a sentimental narrative at the core of American
politics—this is all a fiction, and a damaging fiction at that. Berlant seems to conclude,
then, that intersubjectivity is itself fictional, which might logically follow, but does not
seem consistent with the rest of her ideas.
This rejection of intersubjectivity is problematic and curious, then, especially
because Berlant’s theory of affective attachment understands affects as part of the
ordinary hum of everyday life, and the way that we are tugged outside of ourselves, the
sentiment with which she begins her book. And yet, by rejecting even the possibility of
intersubjectivity, she closes her ideas off from a fuller articulation within the world of
politics. Again, this rejection of intersubjectivity is rooted in the remnants of
psychoanalysis that exist in Berlant’s theory; her rejection is based on a highly cognitive
understanding of subjectivity. This runs counter to much of the work of affect that
Berlant puts forward—her treatment of affect focuses on the contours of consciousness,
the way bodies experience their environments, and the folding and unfolding of
possibilities. It focuses on the space that bodies populate, that people populate, even if
they are present as individuals, they are affected by the forces, ruptures, beats, and shifts
of that space. These elements seem to suggest the possibility of intersubjectivity, yet one
that is absent in Berlant’s scholarship. In arguing for intersubjectivity produced by the
proliferation of affects I push back against this account.
Berlant does find a “we” that emerges through affective responses to the fraying
present, or the disintegrating institutions and possibilities of the present. Berlant’s
rejection of intersubjectivity might be read as a rejection of the cognitive model of
69

subjectivity, but what I develop here moves away from this model. I am not indebted to a
model of subjectivity or definition of affect that is beholden to the conventions of
cognition, and the self as housed within the depths of the brain. Instead, my
understanding of intersubjectivity, informed by the work of affect theorists on the
happenings between bodies, places emphasis on the shared space engendered by the
shared expression of grief. This does not discount or disprove the presence of a cognitive
self, but introduces the possibility that the sovereign self is perhaps not the most critical
element of political life. If Berlant’s qualms with intersubjectivity reflect a lingering
psychoanalytic framework, then my account might strike her as less troublesome,
because it is about a felt infrastructure of intersubjectivity, which is different from that
put forward through psychoanalysis.

Affect in the History of Political Thought
There are thinkers within the history of political thought whose work gestures
towards or is sympathetic towards the significance of affect. Thinkers such as Adam
Smith and Jean Jacques Rousseau move away from an account of crying that focuses on
the individual experience of emotions, instead Smith presenting an intersubjective
accounts of emotional expression. In this account, emotions circulate between people,
affecting those around us, animated by the environment and the collective presence.
Smith writes,
“by the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves
enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in
some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his
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sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not
altogether unlike them.”74
Here, Smith recognizes that we can, in some sense, enter the bodies of others through
their emotional expression. We can imagine ourselves in the scenarios enduring by
others, and as such, experience similar feelings, even if we do not go through the same
trials and tribulations. Smith is acutely aware of existing a world of different beings, and
the broader challenge of how to handle this emerges, since others are opaque to us. In this
account, tears function very much as a bridge between people. They are shared between
people; they invite us into the bodies of others. They invite us to understand this Tears
are no longer an outward sign of an internal state alone, but instead, for Smith, are
transformed into something that is always already shared. Smith’s work on sympathy as a
moral principle assumes that emotions are linked to relationships between people.
Further, Smith emphasizes the transmissability of emotional states; this is what invites us
into the bodies of others. The spread of sympathy is a crucial element in his theory of
moral sentiments—it is what undergirds morality in many ways. Crying performs this
work, and the internal/external divide all but falls away.
This follows from the treatment of crying and emotions more generally that Smith
presents in Theory of Moral Sentiments. That is to say, from the history of the philosophy
of emotions, it is possible to unearth a reading of crying that illuminates the
intersubjective elements in this behavior, as a way to develop further its benefits. In
particular, the transmissibility of emotions that Smith highlights has political dimensions,
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and is instructive in arguing for the political work that crying performs, the work of
highlighting, lubricating and generating the very dynamics that enable action in concert.
Smith’s account of emotions is one that illuminates the intersubjective dimension
of emotional experience. Emotions enable people to enter the bodies of others and
experience life from their vantage point. The account I offer builds on this account of
emotions and intersubjectivity, focusing on an additional dimension that emerges from
Smith’s treatment: the affective dimension. Smith’s understanding of transmissibility
helps pull the focus onto the experience of tears as they find their way onto the surface of
bodies and move into the space between bodies more specifically. This is not to discount
other treatments that examine the internal life of crying and emotions, but instead to
develop an account of the intersubjective work of crying to bolster the argument that the
affective work of crying helps to generate the conditions for action in concert.
Smith’s transmissibility provides an opening to consider the role of affect in
generating an intersubjective space, a space that is neither individual or collective but
decidedly both. It is in that space that political work occurs; it is in that space where work
that we each accomplish on our own, say, our own experiences of grief, start to emerge
from within, and we start to exist outside of ourselves alone. This limits the generative
capacity of emotions, reading Smith, rests in their ability to communicate to others a
particular experience, or better, to invite others in to our experiences, to feel how we have
felt in an effort to generate some form of fellow feeling or solidarity. Understanding
Smith’s treatment as one suggestive of intersubjectivity, through transmissibility, is
productive, because it finds within the work of political philosophers the seeds for the
ideas advanced in this project. This allows the claim about political transformation to
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begin to take shape, because the links between emotions and political life, even crying
and political life, already exist within the works of additional thinkers. Scholars who
traffic in affect theory have developed accounts that bolster claims around the
transmissibility of emotions, naming it affect that performs the transmission.
In his Essay on the Origin of Languages, Jean-Jacques Rousseau offers an
account of the origin of languages. In this account, he begins at a time before articulate
speech existed. He writes,
“As soon as man was recognized by another as a sentient, thinking Being, similar
to himself, the desire or the need to communicate to him his sentiments and
thoughts made him seek the means to do so. These means can only be drawn from
the senses, the only instruments by which one man can act upon another. Hence
the institution of sensible signs to express thought. The inventors of language did
not make up this argument, but instinct suggested its conclusion to them.”75
In one paragraph, Rousseau touches on multiple relevant threads. First, the origin of
languages arises out of necessity—that necessity comes with the recognition that there
are others like oneself to communicate with, and so therefore, there must be a way to
express one’s thoughts. Second, in addition to arising out of necessity, the origin of
languages is located in the senses. Language is invented from the tools that humans
possess naturally. Rousseau goes on to name “two general means we have of acting on
someone else’s senses,” as movement and voice, which employ the senses of touch,
hearing, and sight.76 The body, then, serves as the site of our initial communications. The
language of gesture and voice are, “equally natural, [but] the first is easier and less
dependent on conventions; for more objects strike our eyes than our ears, and shapes
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exhibit greater variety than do sounds; they are also more expressive and say more in less
time.”77 In some ways, what Rousseau writes here is obvious; it is easier to understand
when someone points at something, that they desire a particular object, than if they
describe said object in a language that you are unfamiliar with—the convention Rousseau
speaks of is that which accompanies spoken languages, where comprehension is based on
understanding the vocabulary, instead of gesture, where comprehension, Rousseau
suggests, is more straightforward.
Chapter two of this essay is entitled, “That the First Invention of Speech is Due
not to the Needs but to the Passions,” which is an incredibly informative title.78 Rousseau
introduces a distinction in this chapter between gesture and voice. Though both natural
forms of communication, they do not share the same developmental path in Rousseau’s
account. He writes, “It would seem then that the needs dictated the first gestures and the
passions wrung the first voices.”79 Need produces the first gestures—the body’s limbs
communicate out of necessity. In some ways, this is logical—the immediacy of gesture,
and the ease with which it comes to us as a form of communication speaks to this idea.
But, “the natural effect of the first needs was to separate men and not to bring them
together.”80 Man spreads out across the earth in search of food and protection; living far
apart from one another for survival. What Rousseau calls “man’s first needs,” survival,
drives men apart. In this story, man is driven by self-preservation, and flees others to
secure his continued existence.
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However, it is from the passions that we arrive at articulate speech:
“[T]he origin of languages is not due to men’s first needs…To what may this
origin then be due? To the moral needs, the passions. All the passions bring
together men whom the necessity to seek their subsistence forces to flee one
another. Not hunger or thirst, but love, hatred, pity, anger wrung their first voices
from them.”81
Here, Rousseau introduces a different order of needs, the moral needs, and these needs
are bound up in the way we feel about things; they are bound up in our emotions. Love,
anger, and hatred—when Rousseau speaks about the passions, he seems to be speaking
about what we might name as emotions today. Because spoken language arose from these
emotions, it also reflects them, and so the first languages were songlike and passionate.
He writes, “Figurative language arose first, proper meaning was found last…At first men
spoke only poetry; only much later did it occur to anyone to reason.”82 This is particularly
striking because in locating language in emotions, he offers a distinctive view of the
origin of language. Ancient thinkers, namely Aristotle, held that man’s ability to speak
made him political by nature. In the Politics, he writes, “Man is more of a political
animal than bees or any other gregarious animal…man is the only animal whom [nature]
has endowed the gift of speech.”83 Rousseau’s account is distinct from this in two
different ways. First, for Aristotle, speech is not a capacity that develops, but instead one
that is constitutive of man’s very nature. Second, speech is linked to logos, the reasoning
capacity, which Rousseau explicitly says comes later. Rousseau’s account of articulate
language, then, is distinct from older, perhaps more conventional accounts, because of the
way he locates its genesis in the passions (emotions).
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Reading these passages from Rousseau, a powerful interlocutor emerges through
the link he draws between the passions and articulate speech. The passions were integral
to the genesis of articulate language; they are not an afterthought or even a stepping
stone, but present at the start. As such, it is possible to read Rousseau as a theorist of
corporeality, which is not so distant from being a theorist of affect. Instead of being
distinct from one another, the passions give way to articulate speech, which eventually
produces reason. While Aristotle’s account prioritizes speech and reason, Rousseau sees
speech emerging from the passions, and from the movements of the body—the moral
needs, as he names them. But so too is gesture found in the body, and so there is a
wholistic understanding of the relationship of communicating to the body itself.
Further, Rousseau writes:
“Suppose a situation of perfectly well-known pain, you will not be moved to tears
as the sight of the afflicted person; but give him the time to tell you everything he
feels and you will soon burst out in tears. Only thus do the scenes of tragedy
produce their effect…Discourse unaccompanied by gesture will wring tears from
you.”84
This is curious. In his account, it is not enough to see someone in pain, to be moved to
tears, because you might not know the source of the pain, or be able to internalize it in
ways that will arouse your own response through site alone. However, if the person in
pain can describe their experience to you, he can bring you to tears. And so while
Rousseau attends to the corporeality of communication, and the transmissibility of the
passions (emotions), he also places a limitation on it. Rousseau, then, recognizes the role
the passions play in facilitating communication, but as they are intimately bound up in
articulate language, at some point they give way to that language. As Rousseau’s account
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is also a story of development and progress, and specifically the development and
progress of language, the corporeal elements eventually get overshadowed.
However, this does not mean that Rousseau dismisses the passions and the body
altogether. Instead, there is a certain respect he has for the role the body plays in
communication. Of course, it is the site of language’s inception. But, he recognizes that
speech supplants the initial forms of communication as more effective and efficient—
which is a major theme in Rousseau’s discussion of the natural progression of language.
In Emile, Rousseau notes that crying is the first form of language a child learns, which is
eventually replaced by speech: “When children begin to speak, they cry less. This is a
natural progress. One language is substituted for the other.”85 The first forms of language
were inarticulate; Rousseau also notes that, “in all languages, liveliest exclamations are
inarticulate; cries, moans are simple voices; mutes, that is to say the deaf, utter only
inarticulate sounds.”86 From this last statement, there is a certain amount of respect, or at
least esteem, that Rousseau holds the passions in—'liveliest’ is functional here, but it also
can be read as affording a generous reading of the inarticulate. Again, this infuses a
corporeality into Rousseau’s treatment of the relationship between articulate language
and the passions; this infuses a corporeality into Rousseau’s treatment of language. This
corporeality is different from other conceptions of language, namely Aristotle,
specifically with regard to its scope.
In addition, Rousseau’s broader project, beyond simply the Essay on the Origin of
Languages, is concerned with the invention of society, and the nature of human beings.
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This animates his discussion in this piece, insofar as he attends to the origin of languages,
as well as the origin of society—there is a lengthy treatment of this in Chapters nine and
ten, entitled, “The Formation of Southern Languages,” and “The Formation of Languages
of the North,” respectively.87 This is also reflected in the Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality, which focuses on understanding the origin of inequality, but tells a similar
story of development in which men’s natural faculties are supplanted through necessity,
the passions, and convention—what today we typically call, socialization. In this work,
Rousseau names self-preservation, as we have already seen in the Essay on the Origin of
Languages, and pity, which he defines as “an innate repugnance to see his fellow man
suffer,” as the two principles that guide human life initially. The primal cry signifies
suffering, and draws others to the sound. And so, the natural tendency towards pity
becomes integral in drawing people together, out of their isolation, towards one another.
And it is that drawing together that enacts the first moment that political life is possible
between these individuals.
For Rousseau, the cry is crucial for drawing people together into some form of
collective life. He describes this in detail, as a representation of that tendency towards
pity, and the way this circulates between humans. This exists at the core of political life;
it is the mechanism that drives people together for their collective benefit and protection.
The cry is a form of expression borne of the passions, borne of a moment of danger and
insecurity, out of necessity. For Rousseau, the cry communicates the state of danger, and
reaches out to others for help. The cry is the beginning of communication, which is the
beginning of politics in Rousseau’s account. However, this mechanism, this core, quickly
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gets corrupted with the movement away from the primitive that defines the modern era.
But that does not necessarily diminish its utility, even as its use falls away over time.
Many scholars have used Rousseau’s turn to language to further flesh out themes
within his broader corpus. For example, Tracy Strong writes that the Essay on the Origin
of Language and First Discourse propose three central themes in Rousseau’s works.88
Susan Meld Shell uses the evolution of language to represent Rousseau’s conception of
the state of nature, which returns again and again throughout his works.89 In her search
for a modern political psychology, Judith Shklar turned to Rousseau, including the Essay
to help ground a theory about the relationship between individuals and the collectivity.90
For these authors, the emotional life of humans and citizens alike was secondary to the
themes they draw out. In many ways, Rousseau’s insights about language work to
enhance or complicate the story found within his other works, be it his conception of the
state of nature, or the significance of freedom, or even the importance of impulse control
for the education of citizens. However, Rousseau’s extensive treatment of language in the
Essay on the Origin of Language also provides a starting point to consider the work of
affect in his theory of political life. Further, this work also illustrates the way that
Rousseau’s insights have an affective register embedded within them; that is, without the
resonance of the cry on an affective register, on a register outside of pure intelligibility,
there is no collectivity. That resonance can itself be understood as affective. Or, there is
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no collectivity that looks the way it does today. The affective register is crucial in the first
stirrings of political community; it is also crucial today, even if modernity has papered
over its importance with additional dynamics and sensibilities. For example, Strong
points out that for Rousseau, writing does not stabilize language but instead alters it,
substituting precision for expressiveness.91 Here, we start to see Rousseau’s nostalgia
creep in.
Rousseau’s treatment of language and the passions is complex, with many layers
unfolding across a variety of works. For the purposes of this project, Rousseau emerges
as sympathetic to the role that bodies play in communication, even if he traces the
development of articulate speech as moving away from the embodied forms of
communication and the corporeality of gesture. I contend that there is a certain nostalgia
that remains in Rousseau for the natural, for the way things were. It is not so much that
Rousseau wishes to return to the way things were, but it seems like he wishes to recover
some of the sentiment, some of the simplicity from way back when. He devotes multiple
essays to the topic of origins, and as such, it seems only fitting to read Rousseau as laced
with nostalgia, but to tie that nostalgia specifically to corporeality.
As such, there is also a way to extend Rousseau’s treatment of the corporeality of
communication into the realm of affect. In marking the body as the initiate site of
communication, Rousseau marks the body as part of the structures of communication.
Bodies communicate to each other. For him, they have a form of language, and while I do
not wish to read affect as language, I do think conceptualizing it as a form that expression
takes can be productive. This helps attend to the way that affects circulate, or further, the
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significance that their circulation can have. While, like the inarticulate moans and cries
that Rousseau names in his Essay on the Origin of Languages, there is some feeling being
transmitted in inarticulate expressions. They are not insignificant, they are simply not as
expedient or efficient. They still warrant mention for Rousseau, and so too, here they
occupy the central focus. It is not the articulacy that is relevant, but instead the ability to
use sound and sight to communicate something, even if it is not a clear transfer of
information.

Conclusion
The previous chapter ended with questions about the embodied expression of
grief and its significance to political life, and this chapter picks up with a discussion that
provides a vocabulary to attend to that significance. Affects, as they circulate through
tears and between bodies, emanating from the expression of grief, come to bear on the
way grief gets taken up by the polity. If the embodied expression of grief influences the
character of the collective, then crying acts as a way to make the experience of grief
public, while still part of our intimate lives—this movement between the public and the
intimate, the individual and the inchoate collective, is the work of affects that are
produced by crying, circulated by crying, and ultimately mobilized by crying as well,
which I will take up in more detail in the next chapter. But this movement also
inaugurates the move towards intersubjectivity, through the transmission and circulation
of affects. This is an important step in theorizing the political transformation that crying
opens up. This is also something that is lacking in the scholarship on mourning. That is,
while McIvor writes about the importance of intersubjectivity in the work that grieving
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and memorialization perform for a polity, this notion of intersubjectivity rests heavily on
the working through of trauma, which is work performed within the psyche that gets
projected outside of it, or process through which the work performed within society is
internalized. Intersubjectivity is part of the process of working through in his rendering.
In my account, intersubjectivity is a state that exists between bodies; it is brought about
through intercorporeality—as crying forms a bridge between bodies, it engenders
intercorporeality, and from that, intersubjectivity. As such, my treatment rests heavily on
the work performed by the circulation of affects between bodies, affects produced by
crying. These are the building blocks for the political transformation crying ultimately
makes possible, inchoate at present. In these ways, this chapter builds out the work of the
previous chapter, providing a language for the way bodies influence one another, as well
as by recognizing the corporeal and material aspects as critical for intersubjectivity.
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CHAPTER 3: MEDEA AND THE MOBILIZATION OF AFFECTS

In each of the three examples that animate the next three chapters, crying acts as a
response—in particular, it acts as a response to the condition of powerlessness. In doing
so, it is connected to the experience of tragedy—powerlessness is part of this experience.
For Euripides’ Medea, Baby Suggs’ congregation, and the students of Parkland, their
powerlessness is connected to suffering and sadness, brought about by forces they
identify as outside of themselves.92 The characters in Medea and Beloved are subject to
immense suffering and sadness, with little ability to substantially alter their predicament.
This is two-fold for Medea, as we receive her story in the form of a tragedy, as well as a
more general understanding of tragedy as an event that causes great suffering or
sadness.93 The students from Parkland also cry in response to their powerlessness—a
powerlessness evident from hiding in closets while a fellow student roamed the halls with
a gun, to standing up to the gun lobby and government officials. The imagery and the
stark contrast highlight the powerlessness of the students at Parkland. In each of these
examples, crying functions as a response to these conditions.
Characterizing crying as a response is not an exhaustive description of the role
that crying plays in each of these scenarios—it also expresses grief for these characters
and actors. But, on my reading of these texts and events, this is not separate from the
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condition of powerlessness or the experience of tragedy. Identifying crying as an
expression of grief works to specify the emotional character of this response. So while I
theorize crying as a response to powerlessness, in these examples, it is also an expression
of grief. Crying and grief are not synonymous, but often linked, as crying is a commonly
observed expression of grief. This is evident in everyday life, as well as in political
thought. Consider briefly attendance at a funeral in New York City—it is common to
observe other attendees in tears during the procession, and it is also not surprising to see
those closest to the deceased overtaken by sobs and wails, in addition to their tears.
Crying emerges as a culturally acceptable expression of grief. Further, consider the
Athenian’s statement about crying Plato’s Laws: “to forbid tears to be shed over the
departed would be unseemly.”94 Even as the interlocutors in the text move to regulate the
mourning process, they recognize crying as an expression of grief—when the Athenian
references “the departed” he is discussing the dead. This reinforces the connection that I
read between crying and grief more generally, as well as within the specific texts and
events that populate the subsequent pages.
The grief that permeates these examples is bound up with the condition of
powerlessness and the experience of tragedy (here suffering and sadness). Crying is a
common expression of grief, one that is generally accepted, even in spaces and scenarios
where some seek to regulate or limit a tendency towards excess. But on my reading,
crying is also more than simply an expression of grief. It is a response to the condition of
powerlessness and the experience of suffering—and as a response in this regard, crying
circulates affects that can pose a challenge to this condition. It is an affective event. And
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as such, there is a certain power that circulates as well, by mobilizing these affects.
However, Euripides goes further, to demonstrate that there is potential still to weaponize
affects—to use their mobilization to effect change, even if affects evade the full spectrum
of control. This builds on recognizing crying as an expression of grief, and provides a
way to build power in response to powerlessness. Euripides demonstrates the possibility
in the text of Medea, which is emerges both from within the text, and as a function of the
context of its reception. This chapter establishes an alternative way to read crying, one
that incorporates these other descriptions and claims, but focuses on the political
purchase made possible through treating it as affective experience that can challenge
powerlessness.
This chapter develops these claims through a sustained reading of Euripides’
Medea. The choice of Medea is useful for multiple reasons: first, as a tragedy in the
Greek tradition, it enables an examination of the history of tragedy’s development as a
political institution. This helps establish the institution itself as a location for politics and
political interactions. Related, the content of the plays provided a medium where the
playwrights could simultaneously validate and problematize aspects of collective life. In
particular, the development of the institution of tragedy and the limitations placed on
public grief and mourning emerge as an object of this validation and problematization.
Medea allows for the analysis of this kind of critique, alongside the implications for the
collective aspects of this experience. Medea pushes against these limitations by staging
the intense emotional experience of the titular character, who escapes consequence as the
play draws to a close—her tears facilitating the way for her exit. Further, the references
to tears and weeping within the text enables a reading of these affective events, which in
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turn facilitates tracking the circulation of affects. Together, this supports the argument
that mobilizing and weaponizing affects acts not only as a response to powerlessness and
but generates a potential pathway out of this condition. The chapter ends by using the
insights gleaned from this reading of Medea, which I will apply to the events at Parkland
in the final chapter, to build out a new reading of this tragedy through the circulation of
affects, another aspect that these two events share.

The History of Tragedy as a Political Institution
Tragedy is a political institution. Its birth is linked to the passage of laws to
regulate mourning in ancient Athens. As Honig writes, “In the 6th century BCE,
legislation is passed by Solon in Athens, then throughout Greece, restricting mourning
and burial practices.”95 It is controlled by the state—the Festival Dionysia is put on by the
state for the people. It focuses on political issues and conflicts—Euben identifies
Aeschylus’ Oresteia as a work fundamentally about justice, which “entails reconciling
otherwise warring parties and principles into a whole that enhances the respective powers
of each,” and Euripides’ Bacchae “is about being a member: in the political community
of Thebes, in the ecstatic community led by Dionysus, in the community of onlookers in
the theater of Dionysus, and in the democratic community of Athens.”96 Justice and
membership are two fundamental issues taken up by political thinkers—Euben reads
these plays alongside Plato’s Republic and Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian
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War to develop the argument around the “continuities between tragedy and political
theory.”97 While the content of Euben’s specific argument is tangential to the claims
advanced here, it does help bolster the idea that tragedy is a political institution in part
because it focuses on political issues, where justice and membership are two of many
types of issues that populate the vocabulary of a political thinker.98 This previous quote
from Euben, which refers to the different forms of membership at work in his reading of
the Bacchae is instructive in laying out the different layers that inform the assertion that
tragedy is a political institution. That is, the forms of membership reflect the movement
between the institution and the content of the plays, and simultaneously recognizes the
way in which these are bound up in one another. Membership in the political community
and Dionysius’ ecstatic community are explicitly explored in the text of Euripides’ play;
membership in the community of onlookers in the theater of Dionysius is experienced by
those watching the play’s performance—the community is created by physical presence
in the theater and the collective experience of being in the audience; and membership in
the democratic community of Athens is both what grants people entry to the Festival
Dionysia, as well as what is meant to be fostered as a function of this festival.
Greek tragedy appeared during the 5th century BCE, and scholars have connected
its emergence to attempts to limit specific mourning practices in public.99 Solon enacted
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legislation in the 6th century BCE that limited the ways people could mourn in public—
as Honig states, “kinswomen performed goos (a personal and more improvised sort of
dirge) which, when lamenting men killed in battle, focused on the ‘plight of the bereaved’
and not on the ‘heroic feats’ of the dead or their contribution to the public good.”100 This
kind of lamentation featured calls for vengeance, and was subject to Solonian
regulation—these regulations moved the once-public performance of these lamentations
that called for vengeance indoors.101 This limited the public audience for these calls for
vengeance, which scholars such as Gail Holst-Warhaft understand as changing “practices
of remembrance in order to end cycles of vengeful violence that were seen as a threat to
the new polis form,” and “reorient mourning away from its focus on irreplaceable life and
towards that life’s honorable dedication to the good of the polis.” This is explicitly linked
to women, particularly mothers.102 That is, these regulations were aimed, in part, at the at
the portion of funeral practices performed by women—this explicitly limited the role of
women in the public portions of funeral practices.103 To be sure, Solonian legislation did
not seek to fully remove these practices, but move them to places that would be less
disruptive, and that would be less likely to spark cycles of violence between tribes within
the city, which would allow for people to mourn their dead, while also preserving order
and stability for the polis. the frenzied expression of grief that Solon and subsequent
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leaders sought to delimit was linked to cycles of violence between tribes within the city.
Further, as these practices are not fully stamped out by this legislation, but repositioned
and repurposed, the process of mourning, and the experience of grief are marked as
important for the city, but not at the expense of order and stability.
Tragedy arises in the wake of these reforms.

It offered an opportunity to

experience and express grief, but in a controlled setting and towards what was deemed a
more productive purpose—as Honig and Holst-Warhaft note, towards the “good of the
polis.”104 The regulation of mourning practices brings to light questions about the place
of women in the polis, particularly as related to these mourning practices. The regulations
mark their grief as disruptive in the form that calls for vengeance, but still important, and
so, as Elizabeth Markovits writes, it became important that “these mothers, with their
disruptive grief…find some sort of voice to avoid more violent ruptures.”105 The
emotions associated with the mourning process, expressed and aroused by the
lamentation of kinswomen, are at once necessary and dangerous for democratic life.106
Markovits writes that, “Tragedy becomes the space in which the threat of a woman’s
claim to her children can be explored and contained.”107 And later in the same discussion,
“This could be a spot where Euripidean theater offers an opportunity for exception, a
forum in which the repressed seeped back out, releasing tensions generated by the
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original repression…”108 The emotions that were once exercised in now forbidden rites
are transformed and exercised in moderation in a polis-centric and policed form. Solon’s
attempts to limit female participation in the funeral process, confining them to private
spaces but channeling their experiences, splitting it between the orations and tragedy,
simultaneously recognizes the power of these laments, as well as the danger, thereby
legitimating and undermining them all at once.
The regulations and limitations on mourning that are linked by these scholars to
the emergence of tragedy help paint it as a political institution. In addition, there are
additional elements that help bolster this claim. As an institution that rises in tandem with
the rise of democratic practices in Athens, its roots are intimately tied to this process. At
the Great Dionysia, a massive festival where many tragedies were performed for the first
time, the plays were judged by a panel of citizens, who were chosen by lot, mirroring the
very process through which Athenians entered the public service. The prizes were
awarded, then, using a similar system to those that were foundational to Athenian
democracy, thus offering citizens a chance to exercise the capacities that also drove the
explicitly political institutions and processes—decision-making and accountability. This
participatory element allows citizens to develop a similar relationship to the institution of
tragedy as they might have with the Assembly, for example. Further, tragedy is a form of
public speech, which functioned as part of a political education for citizens. As Euben
writes, “tragedy was a public event and a political institution.”109 It opened up public life
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to debate and discussion, while also qualifying citizens to participate in these debates.110
This further paints tragedy as a political institution, with its public character, connection
to civic education, and democratic practices of lot and judgment.
Yet, tragedy rises in Athens as part of the process to limit the reach of unwieldy
emotions in the public sphere, which also links the rise of democratic institutions with a
particular form of policing emotions. As evidenced in the discussion above, there are
specific spaces and places where the experience of emotions is deemed acceptable—for
example, inside the home as opposed to out in public. While this seems to reinforce a
divide between reason and emotions, at least in practice, it is not as simple as this might
suggest in terms of opposition. Though Solon’s reforms mark the experience of grief as
disruptive, they do not fully erase it; grief remains a part of the city’s history and its
present through tragedy and funeral orations.111 The forms and spaces through which
grief is experienced are regulated, but it remains an integral part of political life, and the
public sphere. Stow echoes this idea in his treatment of the relationship between grief and
democracy in American Mourning. Grief is not inimical to politics, but the way we
experience grief has implications for political life—it has implications for whether and
how we navigate the complexities of our civic identities and thus our relationship to the
polity.112 And so, not only is the institution of tragedy political with regard to its
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development and even the practices associated with it, but also the emotions that it
arouses are also significant for civic identity, membership, and political stability.
Tragedy as a formal part of public life suggests that grief has a place in political
life. It is the excesses of grief that lead to violence—when the expression of grief
includes calls for vengeance, it threatens the stability of the polity. However, the
controlled forms of expression, especially those tied more closely to the identity of the
polity, mark grief as important for the polity. Mourning that could be oriented “toward
that life’s honorable dedication to the good of the polis” helped bolster stability, by
demonstrating the shared purpose and collective life, linking it to the loss of loved
ones.113 Further, Honig speculates that, “Tragedy, the genre of devastating loss, also
became important, perhaps to compensate for the loss of loss (mourning practices), as it
were, or to balance with its larger-than-life characterizations the smaller-than-life lot to
which Athenian combatants were now consigned.”114 The rise of tragedy as
compensating for the loss of loss is compelling, particularly because tragedy becomes a
space where losses are staged, albeit “by clothing contemporary political debate in the
costume of a legendary but still living past” as Euben notes in his discussion of
Aeschylus’ Oresteia, but one that is applicable beyond this work alone.115 The
maintenance of spaces to experience these emotions paint grief as necessary to the
flourishing of democratic life within the polis. Tragedy was a “relatively safe venue that
allowed and even occasioned emotions like, but not the same as, the emotions once
solicited by female mourners, some of whom were professionals not unlike the actors
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who performed in the dramas.”116 It is the exercise in moderation, an exercise that is
polis-centered and policed, that allows the audience to experience grief, among other
emotions. Grief experienced in response to loss allows people to negotiate their identity
in relation to that loss, and as it is experienced collectively, it becomes part of negotiating
a collective, and civic identity—this is the reading that both McIvor and Stow, to some
degree, support in their writing. Grief can reinforce this identity, but grief can also undo it
if directed towards vengeance and division.
These views on grief and its relationship to the polity echoes the sentiment that
emotions can perform work for the polity under specific conditions and within specific
contexts. To that sentiment, mobilizing affects is part of the work that grief performs in
the context of tragedy. By presenting the larger-than-life dramatizations of interactions,
members of the audience were moved to react to, to sympathize with, and to feel together
with the characters onstage. For example, these dramatizations prompt members of the
audience to grieve together as Andromache’s infant son, Astyanax is thrown from the
walls of Troy in the Trojan Women. The events onstage prompt responses from the
audience, generating emotions such as grief in response to the events onstage. But
further, affects also emerge with these emotions, and circulate throughout the crowd. It is
affects that shape the surfaces of bodies, and bring the weight of grief to descend upon
the audience together. Markovits writes that the mobilization of affects through laments
in these plays operates as a form of agency for the characters within the play. She
develops this argument specifically using Trojan Women and Medea. The mobilization of
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affects is significant on her reading—I read these plays in a similar fashion, but link the
mobilization of affects onstage to the potential they open up within the audience as well.
The collective aspect of this experience is important. Citizens come together and
experience the emotions once exercised in the public funeral processes—they experience
them together, which helps build the bonds of a collective, and they experience them in
an arena that is sanctioned by and controlled by the state. They watch as familiar, mythic
characters embroil themselves in conflicts that lead to death, downfall, and destruction.
They watch these figures repeat mistakes, get taken down by their own flaws, and
struggle to maintain familial bonds in the face of threats, both internal and external. That
tragedy allows people to experience these emotions together is significant. They
experience each other’s emotions by being part of something collective, within the same
physical space. The shared experience of these emotions and their eventual resolution
over the course of the play perhaps provided the citizens in attendance with the feeling
that together, they could also bring about some kind of resolution to the issues at hand.
Solon's reforms and the subsequent institutionalization preserve, at least in part, the way
Athenians experienced grief—for example, crying is a common response to loss, and as
part of the audience, citizens would be brought to tears through the events of the play.
They might cry with Andromache when her son is thrown from the walls of Troy in
Euripides’ Trojan Women. They might empathize with Antigone, when she deigns to
bury Polyneices, not wanting their own family member to go unburied as well. They
might also feel compassion towards Medea’s rage against her estranged husband, as well
as shock when she murders her own children. The audience of these plays was given the
opportunity to feel these things together, in tandem, and experience the affective charge
94

electrify the air as the expression of emotions reached a fever pitch in the theater, from
both the audience and the actors alike.
This feeling together is related to the content of tragic plays, which is also part of
the political character of the institution. These plays staged mythic stories and in doing
so, aroused a series of emotions. The content of the plays, then, is linked to emotions, and
the work that these do for a polity. In Poetics, Aristotle offers the following definition of
tragedy:
“A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having
magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind
brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic and not a narrative
form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis
of such emotions.”117
Aristotle’s definition of tragedy is concerned with a number of things, including: the
scope and completeness of the plot—the presence of a beginning, middle, and end to the
work; the flourishes of language that the work includes—such as rhythm and meter; and
that it is performed by actors, instead of read aloud by a poet.118 While all of these
elements work together, it is the last parts of the definition that are most relevant: pity
and fear, and their relationship to catharsis. Aristotle’s commentary on catharsis in
tragedy recognizes the important role that pity and fear play in this setting, insofar as they
warrant mention in his definition. For Aristotle, the arousal of pity and fear are not
simply important, but constitutive of the form itself. Both pity and fear are related to the
relationship between the audience and the actions onstage. It is the representation and
staging of these actions that arouses such emotions—according to Leon Golden, “In
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chapter 13 [of the Poetics] Aristotle declares that certain types of character and plot are
inappropriate for tragedy because they fail to evoke the specific tragic qualities of pity
and fear.”119 Aristotle writes that “pity is aroused by someone who undeservedly falls
into misfortune, and fear is evoked by our recognizing that it is someone like ourselves
who encounters this misfortune.”120 The audience’s ability to identify with the plight of
the heroes onstage, then, is a critical part of tragedy—they must be undeserving of
misfortune, as the audience may envision themselves, as well as misfortune could
potentially befall the members of the audience. That identification is important—all the
more so, on my reading, that this happens in an environment where people experience
this together, even in concert.
In Aristotle’s definition, the identification with characters onstage is the
mechanism through which interactions onstage translate into an experience for the
audience. This plays a central role in his definition, and opens an opportunity to theorize
further the relationship between the interactions onstage and the response of the audience.
This suggests a place to read the role of affect into catharsis. Affects help the audience
feel for the characters onstage; they help the audience identify with those characters. The
represent a way to understand the circulation of emotions, both onstage, but also within
the crowd, which is part of the experience as well. Put another way, reading Aristotle’s
treatment of identification in catharsis beyond a purely cognizable notion of identification
helps paint the role can play in this definition, and this setting.
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Further, with the arousal of pity and fear, tragedy performs catharsis, otherwise
defined as a purgation, a release of tension that the building up of these emotions
produces. Tragedy arouses these passions in a way that cleanses the viewer of these very
feelings—for McIvor, “catharsis is a term that haunts interpretations of both tragedy and
psychoanalysis.”121 McIvor writes that, “Aristotle’s most frequent use of the term is in
reference to bodily discharge.”122 Crying is frequently cited as the physical manifestation
of this emotional experience, both in works about tragedy as well as in other disciplines,
including scientific works and psychoanalytic literature.123 This provides a link between
the psychic processes and the emotional experience, and the explicitly material elements
that are produced by the body. McIvor’s treatment of Aristotle, then, helps locate the
materiality of emotions in catharsis, which appear on the body as tears. The focus on the
corporeal elements—tears and bodies—of pity and fear, through catharsis, alongside the
collective experience of watching the performance of tragedy in the theater, paves the
way to understand the way that these material, corporeal elements work to draw people
together. It was not just the collective experience that was important, but it was the
common experience of catharsis as a form of bodily discharge that had implications for
the political work performed in the theater, and as such, through crying.
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McIvor writes that “the elicitation of pity and fear was both ethically and
politically relevant.”124 McIvor falls short by not fully considering the way that the bodily
discharge itself could be generative of a collective experience—that is, McIvor’s
discussion of catharsis focuses on the bodily discharge, but that discharge is always the
physical manifestation of these psychic, interior processes, where the processes are key
and the discharge is a biproduct. My approach recognizes the significance of bodily
discharge in forging connections between bodies, connections that undergird political
life. Here, too, affect becomes a useful tool in clarifying the work performed between
bodies. Instead of treating crying like merely a biproduct of catharsis, it argues that
crying can work to forge connections between bodies, and in doing so, performs a
function that is critical to politics—it is productive of solidarity. This is related, more
explicitly, to the content of the plays, which I will elaborate in subsequent sections with a
treatment of Euripides’ Medea. The purgation of pity and fear as it is related to watching
the performance of grief onstage, then, has political implications that extend beyond
Aristotle’s treatment of tragedy.
There are many aspects of tragedy that mark it as a political institution. Tragedy
provides political language for a vision of democratic life, while simultaneously
validating and challenging cultural boundaries, and offering a space to work through the
tensions within the polis’ identity. It places these individual experiences within a
collective context. It accomplishes all of these things as a formal part of political life. The
history of the rise of tragedy in relation to the regulations placed on mourning practices
also bolsters the claim that emotions were an integral part of political life, but the specific
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experiences of certain emotions, those designated by the state as acceptable and
important to the broader maintenance of stability and order. However, there is more to be
said about the performance and dramatization of human relationships and interactions,
and the experience of emotions for political life—the way that these are felt, materialize
on and through our bodies, and extend beyond them as well. The texts of tragedies, then,
present, perform, and dramatize the work of emotions, often in heightened ways. Both
Victoria Wohl and Markovits note that tragedies generate affect in abundance.125 The
remainder of this chapter will examine the text of Euripides’ Medea in an effort to
demonstrate the way that within this text, crying is productive of affects, which in turn
will support the central argument of this chapter, that crying functions as a response to
the condition of powerlessness, one that possesses the ability to challenge that condition
through the circulation of affects—this emerges from my reading of Euripides’ text.

Reading Medea
Turning to the play itself, recall that Jason fell in love with Medea, and promised
to marry her if she helped him retrieve the fleece, which would grant him the throne.
Medea helped Jason steal the Golden Fleece, betraying her own father. Medea killed the
dragon that guarded the fleece so that Jason could retrieve it, and with it, claim the throne
in her native Ioclus. As the Nurse recounts in her remarks at the beginning of the play,
Jason married Medea by taking an oath to her grandfather, the sun god Helios:
“And Medea, in despair, rejected by her husband, howls out "the oaths he swore"
(emphasis added) and calls upon the right hand, a potent symbol of fidelity, and
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invokes the gods to witness Jason's treatment of her. She won't eat; she just gives
in to her grief, washing away all her hours in tears, ever since she realized her
husband had abandoned her.”126
As some commentators highlight, their marriage did not take the traditional form that was
common at the time, but instead takes the form of an oath before a god, which is itself
significant. As Gabriel writes, “The marriage of Jason and Medea is not an ordinary
marriage because Medea is not given in marriage to Jason by her male relatives,
according to the custom in ancient Greece. She betrays her father and her country for
Jason and gives herself in marriage. Yet, her act means that she is a woman without
kinsmen to protect her and that Jason is responsible for protecting her.”127 Medea’s
marriage reinforces a sense of precarity as it departs from these customs. It marks their
marriage as strange, out of place, and emphasizes the status of Medea as a stranger in a
strange land. She is a stranger to Greece, and a stranger twice over in the land of Corinth
as Jason leaves her for a younger bride, Glauce, princess of Corinth. In Euripides’
retelling, Medea murders her own children; her decision to do so consumes the last third
of the play. Early on, she hints that their murder will serve as punishment to their father’s
choices, but as the play draws to a close, she tells the Chorus that, “I have determined to
do the deed at once, to kill my children and leave this land, and not to falter or give my
children over to let a hand more hostile murder them. They must die….”128 Their deaths
are still linked to Jason’s decisions, but are now textured with the murders of Creon and
Glauce at her very hand. The children are transformed into Medea’s weapon, but in order
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to use them in this way, she must overcome her own emotional attachment to them.
Markovits writes, “Since she has no armor or battlefield, her children become the
weapon. To use them in this way means she must conquer her own attachment to them
and proceed despite her status as their mother.”129 These choices come with emotions and
affects alike, some more pleasant than others.
This section reads the way Medea’s tears, weeping, and general expression of
grief emerge as a response to her condition of powerlessness. In doing so, they act are
affective events that induce a circulation of power that Medea uses to transform her
condition. Euripides writes her as capable of using her emotions in a way that allows her
to wield a kind of power over that condition—this power derives from the way her affects
draw others into her orbit, allowing her some control over her position. In this way, as
they facilitate a kind of action in concert, Medea’s affects are political. Political action
necessitates the presence and help of others—Medea’s tears facilitate these interaction—
over the course of the play, we are directed to attend to them, and as such, Euripides
provides a chance to observe the keen work of emotions in this regard. However, it is
notable that her tears are called out within the text of the play, because it reminds us that
politics is not dependent on expression alone, but reciprocity—the tears must be noted
and bodies must react. The same holds for speech, of course—it is not just about the act,
which holds weight alone, but facilitates action when it is taken up by others. Affects
must be felt, words must be listened to—these vessels fail to become part of politics
without the presence and attentiveness of others. Though affect and speech unfold on
different registers, both must be taken up to have impact on political life.
129

Markovits, Future Freedoms. 109

101

Medea’s tears and the affects they circulate facilitate a challenge to her condition
of powerlessness. This is made possible through reading the affective events of crying
that Euripides writes within the text. In addition to offering a specific reading of this text,
which focuses on the content of the tragedy itself, this also generates support for the
claim that affects perform political work by influencing the way bodies interact with each
other, and in turn, can help work to generate new political possibilities from those
interactions. This reading can then be applied to subsequent events, including the events
at Parkland, theorizing the possibilities that emerge from the circulation of affects here as
well. To be sure, this section focuses on the affects generated by Medea’s tears, and the
effects these have on the subsequent formation of bodies, generating power from the
condition of powerlessness through the mobilization of affects. Euripides’ text is open to
being taken up in the way that I present it here.
Before we even meet Medea on stage, the Nurse quickly mentions Medea’s tears:
we hear her cries, wails, and moans emanating from the wings as the Nurse paints the
scene with context for the story. In the Prologue, she tells of Medea’s grief, explaining
that, “She won’t eat; she just gives in to her grief, washing away all her hours in tears
ever since she realized her husband has abandoned her.”130 Medea’s tears, then,
inaugurate the action of the play. As the Nurse explains, they appear as response to
Jason’s actions—more than that, they consume her in her grief. Medea’s tears are allconsuming, which makes them notable. They draw description from the Nurse—but it is
that Medea’s introduction to audience as one who cries is worth lingering upon for a
moment. Medea’s response to her condition is at once expected, insofar as a woman
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crying as an expression of grief is not particularly remarkable, but the tears serve as a
constant refrain throughout the text of the play, and instead of forestalling action, work to
inaugurate it. Medea is introduced to us awash in tears, and those tears punctuate the
action of the play. In this regard, the Nurse’s assessment of Medea’s tears is inaccurate—
while they might appear to replace action at this moment, they are part of what facilitates
the actions Medea takes and the choices she makes going further.
Medea’s response is not confined to herself, as we see with the Nurse’s need to
note the tears. They mark the event; this event is marked for us by the Nurse. Further, the
Nurse says to the Pedagogue, “you know that when the masters are in trouble, good
slaves share in the disaster and their hearts are touched too. Such deep sadness came over
me that I needed to come out here and tell the Earth and Sky the sorrows my mistress is
suffering.”131 In Markovits’ idiom, the relationship between the masters and their slaves
are part of an assemblage—the Nurse paints herself and the Pedagogue as part of this
broader assemblage.132 The consequences of actions of one part of the assemblage are felt
throughout its members, and the implications reach beyond the lifespan of one actor
alone. Medea’s suffering extends beyond herself; her intense expression of emotion
pushes the Nurse out of the house, seeking solace by extending that expression. These
statements about Medea can be read as demonstrating the way affects travel between
people, populating the space that bodies share, the intersubjective space. That the Nurse
is moved at all by Medea’s tears communicates the spreading of affects between bodies,
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influencing here, at the outset of the play, small actions. This sets the stage for a further
investigation into the significance of the circulation of affects, and the way these affects
operate to produce a kind of power for Medea.
To be sure, it is not just members of the household assemblage that note Medea’s
response. The Chorus also marks Medea’s response. As they enter the play, the
Corinthian women sing, “I heard a sound, I heard a cry from the unhappy Colchian
woman, not yet gentled. And you, old woman, talk to us. While standing in my doorway I
heard a cry from inside this house. And I felt sorry for the troubles of the family, since it
is dear to me.”133 Here the Chorus names the cry they hear from Medea, reiterating and
reinforcing the description that the Nurse has just provided. In addition to marking this
event, the Chorus adds their own reaction by calling Medea “not yet gentled.” They are
taken by the unrest that Medea displays, that they hear through her cries. Her state is
disruptive, to herself and to those around her. The Chorus’s description of Medea
illustrates that they expect her response to subside as she accepts her fate, to gentle—such
is the way that women are expected to handle their lot in life. Medea’s cry is not yet
gentled, it is still disruptive, and as such, it calls out to those around her and works to
circulate affects that will animate the action going forward. As the Chorus speaks of
Medea’s cries, this also highlights the transfer of affect, and the way the affects that her
cries mobilize work to draw in the women of the Chorus. There is power in this—here we
already see this power as drawing in those around her, making them aware of her
emotional state, but as the play trudges on, we will see that affects seem to be doing more
than circulating her emotional state, they also influence the action in the play.
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Within the structure of the Greek tragedies, the Chorus often plays the role of
directing the audience’s reaction to the play’s events—as Simon Goldhill writes, “one
interpretation of the Greek chorus…is that the chorus mediates and directs the audience
reaction to the tragic events onstage.”134 It is helpful to be able to receive the emotional
state of Medea in narrative form, because it allows us to envision that state and her
reactions, and move with them. The Chorus asks if the Nurse can bring Medea to them,
to “hear the sound of our words spoken in comfort.”135 They remark that, “Her grief is
stirred up to a pitch.”136 More than just marking the event, this description provides of
visual of the burgeoning grief, providing an opportunity to feel along with Medea as the
affects circulate amongst her audience. The Chorus’ remarks about Medea’s cry and
unhappiness is also a performance of the way affects and emotions spread beyond the
body of the acute experience. The Chorus’ description shows us that Medea’s emotional
state spreads beyond her body alone; she is a little outside of herself, felt by others
around her, who hear her cries, and are pressed by her grief and rage. At the same time,
this exchange also suggests that words are insufficient. Again, they help track the affects
at work here, particularly by describing the grief as stirred up, and offering the visual of a
pitch, or a peak, denoting the building or mounting of affects. The very language is
helpful in this regard. From this language, both the characters and the audience are clued
into the burgeoning or swelling nature of Medea’s grief, alongside the way it pulls the
Chorus into her orbit.
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Medea’s tears also punctuate her second exchange with Jason, following the
conversation with King Aegeus of Athens in which the King agrees to provide refuge for
Medea. 137 As Aegeus departs, Medea dispatches the Chorus to bring Jason to her,
revealing to them, “I grieve over the deeds I must do after this. For I shall kill my
children. There is no one who will rescue them.”138 Armed with the knowledge that she
can take refuge in Athens, Medea resolves to murder her children. This exchange differs
in tone from the previous one—Medea asks for Jason’s forgiveness as he arrives, admits
she was wrong, and even chastises herself for her earlier demonstration of hatred.139
Medea, Jason, and the Chorus all make mention of her tears over the course of this
exchange. First, Medea, calling herself “near tears and full of fear,” and telling her
children that “tears fill my tender site” now that she has “put aside the strife” with
Jason.140 The Chorus, knowledgeable about Medea’s plans, interjects with, “And for me
to, tears well up in my eyes. I pray there will be no greater sorrows than the present
ones.”141 By marking her own tears, we can read as Medea taking ownership over them,
and they become part of an arsenal that she can wield, playing on the association with
women and tears, an association that Medea exploits as this exchange unfolds. Further,
the Chorus is also brought to the brink of tears, mapping the spread of affects and their
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circulation between bodies. This spreading out is an important part of the mobilization of
affects—for this to be a useful political tool, others must receive, interpret, and respond
to the affects they experience. Medea can cry, releasing affects, hoping that they are
taken up in the way that she desires (here, to help combat her condition of
powerlessness), but she cannot guarantee that this will occur.
A little further into the same exchange, Jason asks Medea, “why do your eyes
glisten with tears, and why do you turn away your pale face, and not gladly accept my
words?”142 Medea’s answers Jason by dismissing the tears: “It’s nothing. I was thinking
about my children.”143 This response is curious, but supports the idea that Medea is
taking ownership over her tears, and over the way they circulate affects (to be sure,
ownership is not control). Medea’s tears are an affective event, one that Jason
experiences as well, but their once shared reality is fractured. It is significant that Medea
turns away from Jason, because it helps reinforce the divide between them. However,
Medea takes ownership twice over by allowing Jason to read her tears as an expression of
the difficulty she will endure leaving them behind in Corinth.144 Here she exploits the
conventional wisdom that women are naturally given to tears to helps convince Jason to
become an unknowing accomplice in her plan to bring about his downfall. Medea’s tears
seem to enlist Jason in this endeavor by playing on his vulnerabilities, particularly his
selfishness and his related inability to see beyond his own gains. As an affective event,
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noted by those around her, Medea’s tears circulate a type of power that seems invisible to
Jason, even as he is swept up in it.
By marking the affective event of Medea’s tears, as well as the broader
experience of her grief, we can read Euripides as mobilizing Medea’s affects, allowing us
to observe the conversion of her emotional response to her predicament into the very
lubrication that her plan needs to fall into place. This begins with the recognition and
marking of the event of her tears, her cries. This continues with the way Medea’s affects
become a crucial element for moving other characters to action that supports her ultimate
aim of effecting the very state of powerlessness upon Jason that marked her at the outset
of the play. The constant return to Medea’s tears as the action progresses provides a
powerful way to read this play. This mobilization of affect is indeed a political act, within
the context of the play, as well as beyond it. In the context of the institution of tragedy
and its history, the work of affect is also significant because it problematizes the very
containment of emotions that built into the founding of the institution. It shows how the
powerless use affect even as they are criticized for their emotional demonstration; this
criticism does not shut down the access to affect, but renders it subversive. So too the
containment of grief in a particular setting does not preclude the way it may still circulate
to challenge the condition of powerlessness. Recall that Markovits writes that,
“Euripidean theater offers an opportunity for exception, a forum in which the repressed
seeped back out, releasing tensions generated by the original repression…”145 and Honig
writes that tragedy channeled “the loss of loss (mourning practices).”146 Taken together
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and read with the way we can read Euripides’ Medea as mobilizing affects, the text
problematizes the very impulse to police emotions, the impulse at the heart of the
institution of tragedy. Read in this way, Euripidean theater is subversive: the affects that
circulate through the play, initiated by Medea’s tears, contain the potential to challenge
her position of powerlessness—the very institution built on regulation of excessive
emotions here stages not only their experience, but the power they proliferate.
To be sure, there is a difference between the way that Markovits reads
mobilization of affects in Medea and Trojan Women, and my reading of this
mobilization. Markovits’ mobilization refers to the proliferation and spread of affects—
this occurs throughout the play, both with regard to Medea’s tears, as well as the staged
laments and additional experiences within the play. For example, within the play, as
Medea turns to kill her children, she recalls their “soft breath” and their “lovely breath”,
the sweetness that emanates from their embrace, their “dearest hand, dearest mouth”.147
Remembering these qualities slows her down—this slowing down is at the heart of what
Markovits names the mobilization of affects. The rich description of the children’s
bodies, the very materiality that this assigns their presence, are part of her mobilization of
affects. They perform important work within the play to animate and punctuate the
relationships, adding texture to those relationships and to the action of the play. The
bodies of Medea’s children emerge in our mind’s eye through these descriptions, and as
they exert a pull on Medea, slowing her down but not stopping her altogether, they also
exert a pull on the audience, arousing that tragic pity that is perhaps difficult to find
otherwise. Further, marking Medea’s tears by the Nurse and the Chorus also mobilizes
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affects within the play, and within the theater. As such, this mobilization is a less
explicitly political reading of affect, with regard to power.
Euripides’ plays certainly mobilize affects—and Markovits’ reading of the
mobilization of affect as all that is left for Euripides’ powerless is compelling and
instructive. Yet, there is something more at work here. There is also a way that the
mobilization of affect, where the release of affect carries with it a desire to challenge that
condition of powerlessness, becomes explicitly political. That challenge is built upon the
way affects reach out to bodies. Euripides’ text is open to this reading, and as he writes
Medea awash in tears, and he writes her interlocutors calling attention to those tears again
and again, he offers a chance to interrogate that reaching out. It emerges as the beginning
of a challenge to the condition of powerlessness. As affect emerges as a means to
challenge the condition of powerlessness, as it circulates a form of power between
bodies, affect is also weaponized—through the text of the play, possibilities exist when
affects are mobilized, particularly the potential to challenge the condition of
powerlessness. If we trace the action in the play, we can see how the mobilization of
affects through tears ultimately produces the outcome that Medea desires, which
intimates the power bound up in the mobilization of affects, particularly those released by
crying as an expression of grief. The play ends with the following exchange:
Jason: [Ah me.] I long to kiss the sweet lips of my children.
Medea: Now you speak to them, now you love them. Before you pushed them
aside.
Jason: In the name of the gods let me touch the soft skin of my children.
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Medea: That will not happen. Your words are thrown into the empty air. (She flies
off into the air toward Athens.)
Jason: Zeus, do you hear how I am driven away and what I suffer from this
loathsome child-killer, this lioness? This is all that is left to me, all that I can do,
to mourn and cry out to the gods and call the divine spirits to witness how she
killed my children and keeps me from touching them with my hands and burying
their bodies. I wish I had never fathered them to see them destroyed by you. Exit
Jason.148
In this exchange between Jason and Medea, the two have switched roles. Jason is
powerless—he desires bury his children but Medea denies him this, saying, “No never. I
shall bury them with my own hand…”149 Medea denies him the thing he desires—this
mirrors Medea’s condition when we meet her at the outset of the play, desiring loyalty
and the keeping of oaths, denied by Jason. Further, as Jason states, all that he can do is
“mourn and cry out to the gods.” Just as Medea lacked other means to alter her condition,
Jason finds himself supplied with nothing more than his cries and the benevolence of the
gods. Further, Jason reiterates the description of his children strikingly similar to that
Medea which uttered minutes before. He notes their “soft skin” and “sweet lips,” longing
to touch them one last time. Jason, like Medea, is drawn to his children—their affects
swell even in death, drawing Jason into a desperation in the last moments of this play.
Finally, just as the play begins as Medea names herself a “mother who hates you”150
while still offstage, the play ends as Jason wishes “he had never fathered them.” Jason
ends the play where Medea started, wrapped in hatred and grief, powerless over his
circumstances, powerless against Medea—with crying out and mourning as his only
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courses of action in the face of this condition. The mobilization of affects within the play
have brought about the very ending Medea desired, and this allows us to read the
weaponization of affect into the text.
Medea’s last words in the text are biting, reminding Jason of the futility of his
position. But this proclamation, that his “words are thrown into empty air,” is worth
lingering upon for a minute, to help consider the power activated by the mobilization of
affects, a power that Jason is mostly blind to within the play. The action and the outcome
in the play illustrate that power lies with affect in this play. Reading Euripides as a writer
of affect, this is a powerful final statement from the titular character. For Medea, the most
crucial power did not lay in her command of language, but instead in the way she wields
her emotions to her bring about her desired end. There is power that circulates with
affect, power that Jason overlooked and ignored, a luxury that accompanies Jason’s
proximity the hand of King Creon. Jason’s words are thrown into empty air because in
his hurry to obtain a position of power within the established hierarchy in Corinth, he
overlooked the additional dimensions upon which power circulates—the affective
dimension is not closed off to Jason, but in his haste, he paid it no heed. In fact, he was
swept up in it, responding to Medea’s tears in a way that ultimately aided her aims. And
as such, Medea’s mobilization and weaponization of affect brought about the downfall of
his allies. His words are thrown into empty air because in the wake of the Medea’s
affective prowess, there is no one left who will listen to him.
This proclamation can be read in an additional light, one that applies to the way
we might read affect. Medea throws these words at Jason as she takes flight, justice
served. But, this is a lesson for affect as well—it reminds the audience of another key
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lesson in this play: the need for others to respond. Jason’s futility is a function of the
absence of any who might help him, and who might hear him. He calls out to the gods,
but doubts whether they hear him, and the others who might come to his aid—Creon and
Glauce—are dead. While the mobilization of affects was critical for Medea, because it
afforded her a way to respond to her condition of powerlessness, ultimately, their
weaponization depended on the response of others. That is, Medea’s tears are futile if no
one recognizes them, if no one remarks about them, if no one is moved to action in
relation to them. Affects can be mobilized but there is no guarantee that they will be felt
or taken up by others. The marking of Medea’s tears by others around her signifies that
the spread of affects is felt beyond her, which is a powerful first step. The Nurse, the
Pedagogue, the Chorus, and Jason also act as receptacles for her tears, moved to action in
different ways as a result of her weeping. But, had there been no response to her tears, the
mobilization of affects that occurs through here crying would have dissipated into the air.
Part of what is at stake in reading Medea’s tears, and their attendant affects, is
recognizing the way that the circulation of affects influences the exercise of power.
Affects themselves are a democratic medium—their expression and experience are not
confined to the condition of powerlessness, but available to all. To be sure, the expression
of emotion brings with it the release of affects. Consider the rage you feel towards
someone who has wronged you—you feel it bubble up inside of you and spill over into
the room. “Miss, calm down,” emanates from the bank teller, the parking attendant, or
even your mother as your rage fills up the room, even before you breathe a word in
response. That ‘calm down’ marks the affects that bump into these interlocutors. That
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‘calm down’ also attempts to shut down the affective event. That ‘calm down’ attempts to
foreclose the power that circulates through the affects generated by rage.
However, the fact that they are available to all does not mean they will be used by
all. Part of my argument here is that they are one of the only means available for use by
the powerless. Indeed, their mobilization and weaponization acts as a response to that
very condition of powerlessness. There is some commentary on this within the text,
where Jason references Medea’s tears, recognizing, even curious about, their presence,
but does not pursue after them. Jason experiences the affective event of Medea’s tears—
he receives them and is influenced by them, but he does not mobilize their affects, nor
does he seize upon them for his own purpose. Further, Medea’s plan almost needs her
tears to hit Jason in a particular way—they do, and he engages them, which pavs the way
for future action. But Jason might have refused her tears—he might have failed to feel her
affects, mark the event, or even recognize her glistening eyes. That refusal, within the
play, would have foreclosed Medea’s ability to extract revenge in the manner she desired.
It would have foreclosed her ability to use her grief as a medium through which to
facilitate action. It would have foreclosed her ability to transform powerlessness into
power because it would have denied to continued circulation of affects.
But Jason did not refuse Medea’s tears; he did not foreclose the circulation of
power through her affects. Instead, he becomes part of this process, and the affects are
mobilized against him, in an effort to overcome the condition of powerlessness. In the
end, this works—and if read this text as instructive beyond the events that it depicts, it is
possible to read this as a meditation on their potential, and the potential of tears in
particular. That is, the fact that Euripides represents Medea as crying again and again in
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the text suggests that crying circulates affects, and in the response to powerlessness. It is
that in being stripped bare, with nothing left but to weep in response to the sorry
condition she finds herself in, Medea transforms her utter vulnerability and precarity into
the very weapon that will secure her escape, her ultimate triumph. Read within the
context of Solonian regulations on the mourning process, and particularly the limitations
placed on women’s participation in these rituals, perhaps Euripides also recognizes the
power pent up in women’s laments. But he does not focus on the laments in this play, but
instead the tears, and their frenzy. In this play, power does not lie within the ritualized
production, but in the way tears drum up affects that circulate between bodies. It is a
recognition of the significance of the materiality of these processes, and work the
material elements do towards world-building. It is there where the power emanates and
circulates, and can be weaponized—not in its institutionalized forms but in the wild, so to
speak.

Reading Euripides
Within the texts of Euripides’ plays, emotions are palpable in a way that is more
intense than with Sophocles or Aeschylus. Anne Carson writes that, “there is in Euripides
some kind of learning that is always at the boiling point-it breaks the experience open and
they waste themselves, run through your fingers.”151 In many ways, this sentiment
encapsulates my own turn to Euripides--Carson’s “learning” is a function of the intensity
of emotions that is always at the forefront in Euripides’ plays. There is something
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incredibly raw about the way he writes the human condition. Aristotle writes that, “even
if Euripides is in other respects a bad manager, yet he is certainly the most tragic of the
poets.”152 This title is notable, for it signifies that even in his time, Euripides exceeded his
contemporaries in the way he presented and dramatized these aspects of communal
life.153 Further, the title also gives pause—what is it that makes Euripides the most tragic?
On my reading, it is in the intensities that punctuate the stories Euripides tells that the
mobilization of affects reaches its fever pitch, and the work they perform is laid bare.
While this effect is visible in other tragedians to some extent, there is a particularly raw
character that emanates from the choices Euripides makes. In addition, Euripides was
drawn to representing the downtrodden and powerless. For example, Trojan Women takes
place in the aftermath of the Trojan War, and follows the fates of Hecuba, Andromache,
and Cassandra after their husbands have been killed, their city sacked, and they have been
taken prisoner—they have fallen from the highest rung of society and become slaves, and
the lack power to alter their circumstances. Medea follows the actions of a scorned
women, whose husband has left her after she has given up everything for him. In both
these examples, the protagonists in the plays appear powerless, and have fallen into this
position from a loftier perch.
His constant attraction to those who have fallen from power, to the downtrodden
and the helpless, offers a place to examine the condition of powerlessness. In doing so, he
also writes crying into the text of these plays, which provides a place to analyze the work
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that crying performs as a response to this very condition, and the way it circulates affects
as a form of power. He writes his characters in such a way that their extreme suffering is
palpable, even as it might be mixed with disdain or disgust. Euripides’ Medea is the
epitome of this—we are appalled at her actions, but we cannot help but be drawn into her
orbit, pity her, and hope she does not follow through on her promise. By attending to the
way affects are mobilized in the text of Medea, I argue that affects emerge as a way to
confront existing power dynamics. The affects work to illuminate a structure of feeling
that can be used to mobilize people in the face of power and domination. They do so
through the emotional reactions that Euripides writes for his characters. This is also
evident in other works by Euripides. My reading of Medea argues the mobilization of
affects that occurs through tears within the play helps the powerless break through the
forces of domination, reach out to one another, and produces the conditions that allow
people to work together, to build a world together. This makes its way to the crowd by
watching these dynamics onstage, building on Aristotle’s emphasis on identification in
catharsis.
Euripides writes emotions as a levelling mechanism. He casts emotions, and in
my reading, their attendant affects as a way through which to break open the power
dynamics, challenging their tacit acceptance, both on the stage and within society. For
example, in Hecuba, the titular character pleads with Agamemnon to pursue retribution
for Polydorus’ death:
Hecuba: Without this man I cannot avenge my children. Why think further?
Necessity gives me courage to act. Succeed or fail, I’ll take that chance.
Agamemnon, I touch your knees, your bearded cheek, your god-guided right
hand. I beg your help.
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Agamemnon: What do you crave? Freedom? That’s easy?
Hecuba: No, no! Revenge on criminals, and I’ll be a slave for all my days to
come.154
Wohl reads this as Hecuba asking Agamemnon to transform the pity he ostensibly feels
into justice, writing that, “poetic beauty becomes a kind of jurisprudential rhetoric
pressing the cause for justice.”155 Though the request fails, the pity aroused over the
course of the play wells up in this moment, spills from the way she begs for his help:
“Pity us: standing back like a painter, look at me and observe what I suffer. Once a tyrant
I am now your slave, once blessed with children, now a childless old woman, without a
city, bereft, most miserable of mortals.”156 By painting a picture with her words, Hecuba
uses the only thing at her disposal, the affective atmosphere created by her situation, to
make her case. That is, by oscillating between extremes, Hecuba recreates her fall from
grace for the leader before whom she begs transform pity into retribution. The retribution
she seeks is revenge on criminals. That pity infuses itself in the chasm between tyrant and
slave, children and childless. Even though the audience would be familiar with the
conventional conclusion to this story, the moves within the play arouse emotions and the
mobilize affects through the text, and the choices the author has made. Even as this story
ultimately unfolds as expected, that moment of aporia is instructive, working with the
flurry of affects to pry open the closed past and foreclosed future of political life.

154

Euripides, Hecuba. 750-757
Wohl, Euripides and the Politics of Form. 51. For a more extensive engagement with Hecuba, see
Wohl’s work, as well as a forthcoming piece by Schlosser.
156
Euripides, Hecuba. 807-811
155

118

Euripides’ texts create an affective atmosphere and convey the power of affects.
The story of Hecuba is the story of a mother, once a queen and now a slave, and the way
this dramatic change in status also usurps her of the ability to protect her children. As
Carson writes, “this play begins at the end,” asking, “What bigger ending could there be?
The world and its world war are over. Most of the Trojans are dead…The characters and
crises of the Hekabe are little more than a few leftover trickles from the carcass of a
smashed civilization.”157 In both in Trojan Women and Hecuba, laments punctuate every
move in the play. Both plays stage a series of laments, mourning the loss of the women’s
city, way of life, children, and future. These laments are also the means through which
these women can confront their powerlessness; it is the most agentic act available to the
women of Troy. Markovits writes, “why write a play in which almost nothing happens
[about Trojan Women]? I want to suggest it is because lament—the mobilization of
affect—is what is left when one in a position with so little power…The only thing to do
is somehow endure or kill onself.”158 My reading of Euripides goes one step further,
arguing that there was a form of power that circulated in the mobilization of affects,
which Markovits finds in laments, and I find in reading the way that Euripides writes
crying into the text. However, what happens when we move outside this context, into one
where it is the mother that perpetuates these very crimes against her own children? That
is, Medea is hardly the most pitiable character in Greek tragedy; in Euripides’
dramatization of the story, it is she that perpetrates the murders of her children. This is
hardly pitiable in the same way found in Trojan Women or Hecuba. However, Euripides
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writes Medea, like the women of these plays, as powerless and scrounging for any way to
regain some agency, meaning, or power over her own life. Euripides writes a crying
Medea in his text, and in this way, offers an opening to read Medea as someone who
generates affects in response to her powerlessness, and who uses the affective event of
crying to mobilize others to come to her aid.
Other scholars have read Medea in various ways. The most striking debate is
whether Medea demonstrates the feminist or misogynist tendencies of Euripides.
Scholars often cite Medea’s “Women of Corinth” speech, in which she proclaims, “I have
come out of the house,” in support of this claim.159 Women were confined to the private
sphere, and coming out of the house here signifies Medea’s entrance into the public
sphere, the world of men, and the world of politics. Gilbert Murray reads Euripides as an
“aggressive champion of women.”160 Edith Hall writes of suffragette meetings in early
20th century England that began with readings of the play.161 She also writes that Medea
was one of the founding dramas in the genre of suffragette plays. These feminist readings
of Euripides build off of the strong characteristics that Medea displays, and even draw
power from the way she murders her children, eschewing her role in the family
infrastructure to take revenge on Jason in every way possible. Further, the play involves
many “judgments and choices which are at the heart of feminist politics.”162 In some
ways, reading the affects that emanate from Medea’s grief, through her tears, I follow
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these feminist interpretations by finding power within the stereotypically feminine form
of expression, crying.
Regardless of how compelling the feminist readings of Euripides might be, there
is also scholarship that reads misogynist impulses within this text. The “insane jealousy”
that she exhibits reproduces ancient and contemporary tropes of women as jealous, driven
by emotions.163 By presenting women in this light, Euripides reproduces these tropes.
Collits writes, “there is an ideological consistency between the loving, happy wife and
the helplessly devastated wrong women: both reinforce a received idea of women as
essentially dependent.”164 Medea is precisely a woman as a man would write her. That is,
Medea is at once the woman Euripides admires and fears. She is strong, able to persevere
in the face of adversity (a stranger in the land of Corinth, all alone), and take her destiny
into her own hands. But, that strength is also unbridled in important ways, which
eventually bring about her downfall, which is highlighted in scholarship that seeks to read
Euripides as a misogynist through the way he writes Medea. As Andrew Messing notes,
“In the discourse between Medea and Creon, Medea uses ‘traditionally feminine
weapons’ to manipulate Creon into allowing her to remain a day longer, giving her time
for revenge… Her demeanor has changed wholly from the stereotypical and pitiable
‘submissive female’ victim to a ‘dangerous female’ of the sort sure to provoke
misogynistic anxiety.”165 Messing cites scholars such as Helene Foley and Herbert
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Musurillo to bolster these claims. To be sure, the misogynist reading of Medea seems
simplistic, and fails to attend to the way these traditionally feminine weapons are
deployed within the drama and manipulated to serve as a source of power.
In addition to these readings of Euripides, other scholars have moved away from
attempting to categorize Euripides as feminist or misogynist, and explored the
significance of the way he writes Medea’s motherhood in particular. For example,
Markovits presents her own reading of the play, linked to the discussion of gender roles,
but focusing on Medea’s role as mother. She remarks that Euripides is hard to pin down,
writing that, “Of the three major tragedians from Athens, Euripides may be the most
difficult to make determinative claims about.”166 She goes on to say, “Without resolving
where Euripides stood in these debates, we know that his work reflects the intellectual
currents of late 5th century Athens.”167 This allows Markovits to take note of the various
existing debates in the scholarship on Euripides, but push forward to make her own
contribution to this scholarship and political theory alike. She reads Medea alongside
Trojan Women to consider “whether mothers might help us theorize new ways to take up
the cause of future generations, tempering the frustrations brought on by hopes for
generational sovereignty and ending the misrecognition that results in the absence of
intergenerational concerns from mainstream democratic theory and politics.”168 Here,
Markovits positions her work as intervening in debates in democratic theory, debates that
do not treat sovereignty and freedom as extending across generations. Her purpose in
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turning towards the laments in Trojan Women and Medea is to theorize sovereignty from
an intergenerational perspective.
Markovits takes up the figure of mother, problematized in different ways in each
play. She offers a reading of Euripides that celebrates her assessment that, “women
occupy a central place in his plays,” and women are often “the primary locus of
action”.169 She reads Medea as a member of an assemblage, and by dislocating the locus
of women’s agency, reads power back into the conventional gender role of mother.
“But the one I want to offer focuses on the ways in which this play further reveals
the intertwining of selves and the family as an assemblage (versus the family as
an organism with the father as head). The family—and Medea’s decisions on
behalf of it—is not just a collection of individuals, but a new entity. From this
perspective, we see the ways in which Medea’s sense of self is bound up in her
own identity as Jason’s partner...and her own identity as mother to these children,
and her own identity as a spirited…individual.”170
Markovits is interested in classifying the conglomerate itself, and does so by describing
the family as an assemblage. But more than that, she demonstrates that Medea’s identity
is wrapped up in this assemblage, intertwined with her role as mother, Jason’s partner,
and her own person. These identities struggle to exist in relation to and in tension with
one another. All of these identities are important for Medea—by reading Medea as part of
the family assemblage, the reader can begin to observe the way that Jason’s choices
affect Medea, and as Markovits writes, “Jason has made choices, taking advantage of
Medea’s apparent powerlessness, setting up a configuration in which Medea must either
acquiesce…or else take horrifying action.”171 Markovits goes on to write that Medea’s
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“membership in the assemblage shapes her own agency, and seems to overcome her
desire to be seen as a sovereign individual.”172 The focus on identity and agency is
instructive, insofar as it paints a complex picture of this character, one whose actions are
always informed by and informing the actions of others, who feels the implications of
others’ choices and whose choices reverberate through her assemblage. While Markovits’
work contains an insightful and creative reading of Medea, in foregrounding assemblage,
it also implies that the relevant collective here is the family. Markovits uses affects to
locate and theorize the family, which is also instructive.
My reading departs from Markovits in important ways—it does not pursue the
family as the central assemblage—instead it is Medea’s condition of powerlessness that
drives the argument here. Assemblage allows Markovits to push against that
powerlessness. I read Euripides as attentive to the work performed by affects—Markovits
writes crying as an affective event, where the circulation of affects is also the circulation
of power. It is for this reason that we constantly see characters reference Medea’s tears
and weeping—they mark the circulation of affects, and a way to challenge the position of
powerlessness emerges from this circulation. This is bound up in the connections that the
circulation of these affects facilitates, which we see occur throughout the text of the play.
This illustrates the power that circulates through affect, brought on by the affective event
of crying, which is itself a response to the condition of powerlessness. The way that
Medea’s expression of grief moves beyond her alone, and moves others in the play to
action is significant. This reading of Euripides’ Medea finds power in Medea’s tears,
power that materializes through the mobilization of affects.
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Reflection: Beyond Menis and Mourning
Euripides’s Medea is open to being taken up as a meditation on the power in
affects—this power can be found in their mobilization, circulation, and weaponization.
Medea presents these processes, and more importantly, presents them through the
constant refrain of tears, which Medea sheds over and over again throughout the course
of the play. The fact that it is through crying, and not through lamentation alone, that the
mobilization of affect occurs in the play, is significant. This is not to discount the role
that laments play with regard to affects or channeling emotions within this institutional
context. But this project is about crying, and as such, focusing on Medea’s tears moves
away from these more regulated forms of expression. Further, focusing on tears also
provides a chance to produce a subversive reading of this text, where the staging of a play
awash in tears within an institution founded upon containing the expression of grief.
Weeping twists that knife a bit deeper—it is the chaotic companion to laments, one
appropriate for the frenzied character of Medea.
Placing Medea in the context of the limitations and containment that built the
institution of tragedy helps to highlight the significance of the work this mobilization
performs. Crying is a relatively quotidian activity—its presence alone in the play,
especially given the particular circumstances, would not be surprising. On its face,
Medea’s tears are a conventional, even expected response to her condition. But upon
further consideration, it is within this common response that power circulations within
the play, not only challenging her position, but ultimately helping effect a role reversal,
rendering Jason powerless in the end. That reversal, and crying’s role, offers an
opportunity to reflect upon the way the play itself might generate a kind of power. The
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quotidian act of crying is transformed into a consequential and critical element within this
play. Of course, Medea’s tears are marked as excessive at the outset, by the Nurse, and in
the place of any action on her part. We might read this treatment of tears as a fox in
sheep’s clothing—marking the tears as excessive at once links them to menis, painting
them as unnecessary, out of place, and a mark of futility within the play and with
reference to broader cultural practices. In doing so, Medea’s tears seem to fit with a
reading of excess, and reinforce the very limitations on public mourning that gave rise to
the institution of tragedy.
However, at the same time, the constant return to tears within the play and the
mobilization of affects they ultimately perform, suggests that this reading is limited, or
even naïve. The excesses in Medea, including her grief, frenzy, murders, and deception,
do not simply serve to reinforce the limitations and constraints that bolster democratic
institutions in ancient Athens. Instead, they can be read more provocatively, more
subversively. These excesses do not preclude identification with Medea, though they
make it difficult at times. Further, these excesses bring about the circulation of affects,
culminating in the reversal at the end of the play. The need to guard against excesses as a
mode of protection is not the only message we can take from this play. Instead, that these
excesses bring about Medea’s desired end demonstrates that they contain a power that is
difficult to pin down, and difficult to effectively limit. It is a power that circulates
between bodies and in that circulation establishes connections between those bodies. This
is not true simply for the characters onstage, but the interaction between the characters
onstage and the feelings produced for the audience through the circulation of affects also
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suggests that this is not just warning about excess, but has some hints towards the
potentiality of grief, crying, and its affects.
This also offers a chance to reflect on the stability of democratic life in ancient
Athens, where the play would have been performed. The play demonstrates how the
powerless might use affect to transform their position. To the extent that political life was
contingent on containing forms of excessive emotional expression, this play suggests that
there is always a weakness in this approach. Jason seems so sure that he has solidified his
security by marrying Glauce. Yet Medea is able to wield her tears to bring about his
downfall. The contingency of Jason’s position, and Medea’s powerlessness is palpable.
So too we might understand the contingency and inherent instability of our political
institutions, and the way that these are vulnerable even through attempts to shore up their
stability. Reading Medea in this way asks us to consider the contours of that instability
and the way that opening up the space for mourning might allow its effects and its affects
to be incorporated into the life of these institutions. That is, the play asks us to consider
what the world looks like where the mobilization of affects is expected and accounted
for—instead of suppressed, criticized, limited, and otherwise policed. On my reading,
attending to the power Medea circulated through her affects might have produced an
entirely different outcome for Jason. It suggests that overlooking the power that circulates
in this way is as much an issue for Jason as it might be for the institutions themselves.
Further, it is not about the containment of grief but understanding the way its very
experience, its materiality, fits into our political institutions in the way that it animates an
intersubjectivity, which seeds the ground for solidarity. Such a solidarity can drive the
action in concert that exists at the core of political life.
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CHAPTER 4: BELOVED, CRYING, AND SOLIDARITY

The previous chapter moves between the text of Euripides’ Medea and the
institution of tragedy to advance an argument about crying and the mobilization of
affects. This chapter builds on the mobilization of affects, reading the potential of
solidarity that can result from such mobilization. There are hints of this within my
reading of Medea. Medea’s crying circulates affects which draw others into her orbit. But
it is not just about being pulled into the orbit of others; this project is about the way our
bodies are made to feel alongside others, and the significance of these feelings moving
between bodies, through the proliferation and circulation of affects. Toni Morrison’s
Beloved offers an opportunity to observe the work of crying and the circulation of affects
in action. I argue that crying’s circulation of affects opens the opportunity for solidarity
to emerge—solidarity opens the possibility of a political transformation, from
powerlessness towards the ability to challenge that very condition. The circulation of
affects through and between bodies enables intersubjectivity—and this intersubjectivity,
built on intercorporeality, built out of the bridge between bodies that crying’s physicality
makes manifest, is an important step towards action in concert. And when people act
together, to alter their present condition in some way, this is politics. Morrison’s Beloved
allows readers to observe the circulation of affects towards action, offering a window into
this critical mechanism.
This chapter also draws on the insights of Jacques Rancière, finding within his
work an opening to further explore the significance of both crying and affects.
Characterizing politics through the concept of disruption draws attention to the embodied
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experience of grief and crying, and the way that bodies can act as sites of disruption.
Crying’s transformative potential is linked to its disruptiveness. Using Rancière’s concept
of “the part that has no part,” I read the political transformation that crying inaugurates as
intimately connected to its physicality, audibility, and visibility—aspects that are difficult
to ignore. This chapter further refines the conditions under which I argue that crying
elicits a transformative potential, exploring the instances in which crying can foreclose an
opportunity for solidarity. The condition of powerlessness is paramount, as the necessity
for a degree of reciprocity, in order for a political transformation to take effect.

Disruption, Rancière, Politics and Power
In relation to its obvious physicality and materiality, crying is disruptive. This
colors the reception and regulation of crying. Crying alters the space it enters; Medea’s
tears changed the affective atmosphere between herself and her interlocutors, in ways that
aided in altering her condition of powerlessness (here a challenge to Jason’s power and
status). Crying’s disruptive character breaks up the space, interrupts the steady hum of
domination. In fact, it seems that its disruptiveness has been grounds for policing crying
in particular. It disrupts on various levels. Consider yourself crying. The sobs get caught
in your throat, disrupting the steady flow of breath, bringing about hiccups in turn. As the
tears roll down your cheeks, you begin to sniffle, trying to hold back the river of snot that
threatens to stream from your nostrils with each falling tear. If you really get going, then
the wails or groans accompany your tears, disrupting not only your breath, or your
speech, but also disrupting the peace and quiet of others around you. The tears might be
silent, but these other elements—groans, wails, sobs, sniffles, etc.—are acoustically
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disruptive to be sure. The acoustic silence of tears is supplemented by the material
character of their disruption, and their appearance on and through the body. Crying can
also disrupt a conversation, in a different sense. When your friend begins to cry in the
course of an exchange, your discussion halts. Perhaps you are afraid that you caused their
tears, or perhaps you do not know how to respond to crying. You respond, in some way,
to that disruption—this response is critical in understanding the potential of crying to
engender a political transformation. Without it, we are just crying into an abyss; politics
necessitates others to hear us, to see us, and to respond to us.
Marking the disruptiveness of crying is but one in a series of pathologies that so
often accompany crying. But this supposed pathology is also theoretically productive in
two ways, that problematize the view that disruption is pathological. In the first place,
there is a rich tradition of agonism in political theory, that finds transformation,
commonality, and action in disruption, marking it as critical to political life. This
suggests that the disruptive properties of crying, insofar as they do not necessarily
correspond to order, can potentially be productive for political life. In the second place,
this same body of literature emphasizes the relationship between disruption and equality,
not that disruption necessarily brings equality, but that these models of politics often
strive towards this. On the one hand, this project argues that crying provides an
opportunity for the powerless to challenge their position, and as such, this is consistent
with the idea that the disruptiveness of crying functions in that regard. However, on the
other hand, the ‘powerless’ is not a uniform group, and so crying does not always help
resolve the problem of powerlessness. Instead, crying’s disruptiveness can work towards
a response to powerlessness, but it can also reify the structures that construct such
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relationships. Crying’s disruptiveness opens the possibility to challenge powerlessness,
but it can also foreclose that very possibility
One way to read crying is to read its disruption as cutting against the dominant
regime, which is characterized by concerns of order, efficiency, and responses—in this
way crying begins to emerge as a potential tool for the powerless. This plays on a
common sense understanding of cultural conventions: disruption is a problem, so it
should be limited to the extent possible. However, on my reading of crying, this gestures
towards the possibility that crying might also offer some sort of path forward, even (or
especially) as it disrupts. The disruption is itself significant because it effects a break in
the atmosphere, in the control over a given setting, in the quiet. It calls attention to itself
in this regard, and that calling attention is politically productive.
For thinkers in the vein of Sheldon Wolin, Honig, and Rancière, politics takes the
form of disruption.173 Honig describes politics as, “disruptive practice that resists the
consolidations and closures of administrative and juridical settlement for the sake of the
perpetuity of political contest.”174 Wolin writes,
“I shall take the political to be an expression of the idea that a free society
composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality when,
through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or protect the
well-being of the collectivity. Politics refers to the legitimized and public
contestation, primarily by organized and unequal social powers, over access to the
resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity. Politics is
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continuous, ceaseless, and endless. In contrast, the political is episodic, rare.
Democracy is one among many versions of the political…”175
The distinction that Wolin draws here between politics and the political is a distinction
between the established institutional practices that we associate with political power
(politics) and the moments of exception where people band together for their collective
benefit (political). These moments are

fleeting; the political is an ephemeral

phenomenon, fugitive in character to emphasize its temporary and dynamic nature. The
exceptional, fugitive character of the political that Wolin identifies corresponds to
Honig’s description of politics as disruption. It is that character that is productive in
understanding the form politics takes, which affords significance to the disruptive
character of crying, suggesting it is a political act. In the scholarship of Honig, Wolin,
and Rancière, disruption is not seen as pathological or damaging, but instead becomes the
very mode of engagement that defines politics.
Disruption is productive, in particular, of radical politics, when a given order of
domination is called into question by the emergence of a political subject, or a demos.176
Rancière writes, “Politics is a specific rupture in the logic of arche. It does not simply
presuppose the rupture of the ‘normal’ distribution of positions between the one who
exercises power and the one subject to it. It also requires a rupture in the idea that there
are dispositions ‘proper’ to such classifications.”177 I follow Rancière because of his
explicit discussion of power and the way a subject emerges in relation to power. That is,
politics as rupture occurs in response to, on my reading, domination of one group over
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another, domination that takes the form of exclusion. In arguing for crying as resource of
the powerless, and as a response to the very condition of powerlessness, the explicit
discussion of power in Rancière helps to lay out what is at stake in the very challenge to
power. Further, Rancière’s partition of the sensible provides a helpful characterization of
a hierarchy of expression as related to power—which in turn supports the reading of
crying as a resource of the powerless, as well as highlights the way its use by the
powerful can itself close off this avenue for the powerless.
More than simply another instantiation of within the same intellectual tradition,
Rancière also provides a theory of the subject, and the way the subject emerges through
rupture. He writes, “Politics is specifically opposed to the police. The police is a
‘partition of the sensible’ whose principle is the absence of a void and of a
supplement.”178 He elaborates on this point further, writing that the partition is “that
which excludes” and “that which allows participation.”179 This partition refers both to an
exclusionary mechanism that the divide performs, as well as the way this division marks
certain parts as visible or audible, while others invisible and inaudible. This partition, as
Rancière names it, excludes and in that exclusion elevates certain groups within society,
by virtue of their inclusion. The rupture occurs, then, when the excluded, those marked as
invisible or inaudible, reject their classification as such.
Rancière introduces the concept of the miscount into the political theoretical
lexicon. While the conventional definition of politics refers to the hierarchical structuring
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of the social order, Rancière understands this as the terrain of the police, not politics.180 In
contrast, politics disrupts this dominant order, the police order.181 The act of counting is
central to both these definitions, and to the distinction between them. The police order
counts the parts of a community in a way that involves a fundamental exclusion of certain
groups.182 For example, Rancière continuously returns to the exclusion of the poor from
this count. To be sure, Rancière is drawing on the ancient Greek linguistic roots of the
term demos as he develops this idea. He writes that, “’poor’, however, does not designate
an economically disadvantaged part of the population; it simply designates the category
of people who do not count, those who have no qualifications to take part in the arche, no
qualifications to be taken into account.”183 The poor are those who do not count as taking
part in ruling; they are those who are invisible and inaudible. But, it is the very exclusion
of these groups produces a part that has no part of the count.
The police order consists of various groups that make up the count, which are
those that define the order. These groups benefit from the way the dominant order
functions. The inclusion of peripheral (read, excluded) groups, such as the poor or other
marginalized populations, damages the level of control exercised by those that benefit
from the police order. Rancière writes, “Policing is not so much the disciplining of bodies
as a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of occupation and the properties of
the spaces where these occupations are distributed.”184 The police refers to the way that
certain bodies are made to appear while others remain invisible. What becomes known as
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the ‘part that has no part’ is precisely the part that is excluded from the count, from the
police order, from the conventional understanding of politics. They are the part that has
no form of conventional power, because they are the ones whose exclusion grants the
dominant group power in the first place. It is the part that has no part that inaugurates
Rancière’s politics. The disruption of the police order is the moment of politics.185 This
occurs when the part that has no part exerts itself, taking hold of language and making
themselves seen and heard on the basis of equality, which is the underlying logic of
politics, in opposition to inequality and exclusion, which drive the police order.
This discussion of visible and invisible, audible and inaudible, recalls the body to
the discussion of politics, of rupture, of power. On my reading, it is notable that the
mechanisms for exclusion are realized on and through bodies. The visible and the audible
divide certain acts, gestures, and sounds as counting as politics, and other that do not—
but these all have material and corporeal character as emanating from bodies. From these
distinctions, the police order emerges. This order is grounded in inequality. The ability to
dictate which bodies occupy either of these spaces is a crucial part of the police order.
The dominance is interrupted when excluded bodies articulate themselves as political
subjects. The control over language, and its use, is an important aspect of dominance and
the police order. Rancière refers to the ‘partition of the sensible’, writing that, “The
‘people’ that is the subject of democracy… It is the supplementary part, in relation to any
counting of parts of the population that makes it possible to identify that part of those
who have no part with the whole of the community.”186 The people is created in the act of
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counting, where some bodies are included and others excluded from this count—the
people are those who are excluded. They become a people, however, when they rise up
against their exclusion. Rancière names them the ‘supplement’ and highlights their
position vis-à-vis those who make up the count. They are outside, extra, invisible. Politics
occurs when this part injects itself into the dominant order, thus interrupting the very
order that is based on its exclusion. It throws everything into disarray, with the
articulation of what becomes its subjectivity. Again, that exclusion, and in turn,
subjectivity, are placed in terms of corporeality, described first as divides over what is
deemed visible and audible.
There is an opening carved out by Rancière’s understanding of politics, one
related to this recognition of the relevance of corporeality, of the body’s materialities. For
Rancière, the body is not quickly dismissed as irrelevant or irrational, but instead,
becomes the terrain upon which exclusions are exercised, a place where exclusions can
be seen to be arbitrary. Further, crying is so very much of the body, which animates and
influences the ways in which it disrupts. Crying leaves a physical remnant on the surface
of the body. It is not only of the body, but also always on the body. In this way, there is a
materiality to this that eludes other forms of emotional expression, such as laughter or
shouting. The material foundation of the affective experience of crying is critical to the
way it disrupts.187 These remnants are inseparable from the corporeality of crying; this
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physicality is part of the reaction crying engenders and part of the work that crying does
to transform a room. This corporeality also affects the conventions around crying. The
character of transformation is intimately connected to this materiality—it affects the way
the behavior is received and experienced, making it more difficult to dismiss.
How might excluded bodies become seen and heard? Here crying’s physicality
and materiality become crucial because they push against their very exclusion, leaving
traces on bodies, creating the effect of surfaces. This builds on Rancière’s work,
providing some specificity to the general experience he describes. Crying is primed to
perform the very rupture that Rancière names as politics. Building on the policing of
crying, Rancière’s framework helps illustrate the way that crying functions with regard to
politics. In performing this interruption, crying calls together those excluded from the
dominant order. By releasing an energy, an intensity into the space, crying animates
perhaps dormant relationships, providing an avenue through which to come together and
further disrupt the order. Crying interrupts this order as a function of its exclusion, but it
is doing much more than that, lubricating, illuminating, and transforming the very
possibilities from which it is excluded. Chambers writes that the insurrectionary moment
of politics occurs when a given order of domination is radically called into question by
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the emergence of a political subject, which makes visible what had been invisible, makes
audible what had been inaudible, by appropriating a space that had not been theirs.188
Crying is both inescapably audible and visible, and in my rendering, provides a way to
burst into the discursive arena for the part that has no part by generating a ripple of
affects that work to illuminate, lubricate, and transform relationships—these relationships
emerge from the space of intersubjectivity. One of the transformations effected by crying
is that move from inaudible to audible, or invisible to visible.
In Rancière’s idiom, crying would be outside the dominant order, policed by that
very order. As such, this sets it up as a resource for the part that has no part, and in turn,
as part of politics, by disrupting the very order. On my reading of crying, this is not
simply a theoretical point, but one that has relevance to the common experience of the
phenomenon—there is something disruptive about it, a disruption that is also related to its
physicality, to its materiality, and in turn, it is from these characteristics that its political
potentiality can be further understood. This is linked to Rancière’s part that has no part—
this part is made invisible, illegible, and inaudible by the existence of the dominant order.
Said order is defined in and through language, especially as discourse.189 Crying is
excluded from this definition; though it is expressive, it does not employ words or
communicate in a purely articulate form. Its messiness, related to its disruptiveness,
interferes with the smooth functioning of discourse. Crying is not part of what both
Aristotle and Rancière name as ‘logos’.190 It interrupts the logos. In this way, it pushes
against the dominant regime. Crying becomes a tool for the part that has no part to
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articulate its presence, to enter the realm of subjectivity by engendering an intersubjective
space where bodies move, feel, and experience together. That togetherness is integral to
the ability to challenge the existing power structure. The energy and the affective
atmosphere of crying create the conditions through which the part that has no part comes
together. It is crying’s exclusion from the domain of the sensible that enables its
availability as the mode of expression for the part that has no part. Its physicality and
materiality make it difficult to ignore. This also informs its disruptiveness.
The version of subjectivity that emerges through crying is worth exploring
further, especially since the part that has no part has a tenuous relationship to this idea.
Subjectivity is a characteristic of groups within In Rancière’s treatment, any semblance
of subjectivity that the part that has no part establishes through speaking is somewhat
limited in character. But it is a subjectivity that overlooks attendant affective aspects—
though one that.191 Rancière’s account of politics seems to rely most heavily on an
account of logos and spoken language, neglecting to attend to an affective register of
experience.192 Crying’s affects work towards a different form of subjectivity, one that
materializes on and between bodies, creating an intersubjective space, and with it, the
potential to come together to challenge the forces of domination that work to suppress
them. The character of intersubjectivity is related to the physicality of crying. This form
of expression thrusts bodies into the arena, in ways that are felt and experienced together.
Crying draws people outside of themselves, inviting others into their experience, building
with intensity as more and more come to be part of this collective experience. In feeling
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together, these bodies reach a tipping point, able to affect one another and drive each
other to action in concert. The crying subjects, those bursting into the order through their
tears, sobs, and wails, are vulnerable subjects, afforded no protections of the dominant
order.
In addition to appearance, crying also reintroduces the work of affect, and the way
this modifies conceptions of subjectivity, which I have addressed in previous chapters.
As an extension to Rancière, affect helps decenter the idea of the sovereign subject—
affect specifically registers the conditions of life that move across persons, and play out
in lived time, energizing attachments. As Berlant describes, she “gives a name to a
personal and collective kind of relation and sets its elaboration in a historical moment that
is as transnational as the circulation of capital, state liberalism, and the heterofamilial,
upwardly mobile good-life fantasy have become.”193 Here, Berlant marks the work of
affect as both historically specific, and as part of intimate and public relationships—as
affects move between these two realms, so too does crying, and affects as the part of what
crying mobilizes. That mobilization generates an intersubjectivity creates the possibility
of collective action. Returning to Rancière, affects offer a name to both the mode of
disruption, as well as distribute that subjectivity amongst multiple bodies, since affects
are not the possession of any one, but circulate between people. But it is that very
circulation that effects the disruption that Rancière names as the rupture that is politics.
This activity saturates corporeal and political performance; the affective traces render the
shared atmosphere palpable. This makes it first a resource for the powerless, but does not
preclude the possibility that the powerful might use it—in Rancière’s idiom, naming
193
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crying as part of the audible and visible would . Affect works to shape new ordinaries,
and these ordinaries are shared across bodies, traveling through atmospheric shifts and
traces to influence other bodies. Crying’s disruptiveness is intimately connected to a nonsovereign subject realized through the transfer of affect.
The disruption of the dominant order, of the liberal hegemony, is what is
developed in the work of most theorists in this tradition. The generation of the demos, a
political subject in the form of a people, is the level of subjectivity that receives the most
attention—the subjectification of the people is a key moment in theories of democracy
referenced earlier in this chapter. The collectivity generated by crying differs from
traditional treatments of the demos, the most relevant collective subject. The radical
democratic demos often overlooks the way subjectivity unfolds on an affective register.
Rancière gestures towards this, by naming the audible and the visible, which are tied to
the affective, which offers an opportunity to bring the affective into conversation around
subjectivity, considering the affective qualities and work of collectives. By generating a
set of affects that influence and implicate the bodies of those present, crying draws
people outside of themselves, inaugurating an intersubjective space that becomes the
breeding ground for further and future action. It is in that space that bodies exert a push
and pull upon one another, and explore the very possibility of coming together, which
blossoms out of the unruliness and the swirl of affects in that space. It is not just about
the togetherness, but the ways that we come together, and the affective register highlights
the shared state of vulnerability experienced by those bodies excluded from the count. It
is less about the collective movement and more about the way the affects travel through
bodies, drawing them together in the face of their own vulnerability—the tears that paint
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the faces of those present articulates an urgency, which propels people towards action in
concert, in an effort to push back against their vulnerable state. The protest becomes
emblematic of the kind of disruption that constitutes politics.194
However, this reading of crying builds on its capacity to draw people together, but
crying can also repel people. I think the repulsion is best read as a way that crying
forecloses the potential for solidarity, and part of overcoming the repulsion emerges from
the recognition that crying can be a move towards solidarity. But the repulsion is not only
a function of crying’s exclusion from the sensible; instead it is also part of the experience
of crying. I take up the character of repulsion in a discussion of how tears can foreclose
certain forms of solidarity, which is one way that repulsion manifests in relation to tears.
It is not the only way, but it is the most dangerous to claims about solidarity and crying as
a tool for the powerless. The discussion of Beloved in the next section attempts to engage
with both the ability to draw together and repel that I read as part of the affective
experience of crying. While the drawing together is integral for political work I locate in
the proliferation and mobilization of crying’s affects, this exists in tension with the
repulsion.
Judith Butler writes that the act of delimiting who “the people” are is a
performative form of power:
“The operation of their power is to some extent performative…When we say that
inequality is ‘effectively’ reproduced when ‘the people’ are only partially
recognizable, or even ‘fully’ recognizable within restrictively national terms, then
we are claiming that the positing of ‘the people’ does more than simply name who
the people are. They act of delimitation operates according to a performative form
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of power that establishes a fundamental problem of democracy even as it
furnishes its key term, ‘the people.’”195
This most recent work focuses on popular assemblies, arguing that, “it matters that bodies
assemble, and that the political meanings enacted by demonstrated are not only those that
are enacted by discourse, whether written or vocalized. Embodied action of various kinds
signify in ways that are, strictly speaking, neither discursive nor pre-discursive.”196 For
Butler, forms of assembly signify apart from any particular demands that they may
make—assemblies signify apart from what they are about. Butler’s argument is that
acting in concert can be an embodied form of calling into question the inchoate and
powerful dimensions of reigning notions of political life. She highlights the precarity of
bodies as a galvanizing condition of assemblies, and celebrates the contestations enacted
by assemblies, looking to the physical presence of many bodies as a way to place
demands on the viewing public by making the conditions of their precarity real and
apparent.197 In this way, Butler speaks to Rancière’s partition of the sensible, also
recognizing the way that embodiment might serve as a site of articulation of the political.
She characterizes gatherings as fugitive, reminding her readers that plural and embodied
action hold political importance. Linked to the question of performativity for Butler is the
form of expression and the idea of disruption. She asks, “how does the unspeakable
population speak?” noting that all humans are not equally recognizable.198 She also notes
that bodies are dependent upon other bodies and networks for support, and that it is not
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correct to conceive of individual bodies as completely distinct from one another, nor are
they completely blended into some amorphous social body. Instead, bodies are bound up
in networks of relations but have distinct boundaries, in Butler’s account, which is related
to the account I offer in chapter 2 of this project, looking at the way affect and emotions
work to produce the effect of boundaries between people. Bodily vulnerability is a
constitutive facet of existence, but one that is felt more readily by particular populations.
With these ideas, Butler gestures towards the very opening that crying can take with
regard to these relationships and power constellations. Crying in Morrison’s Beloved also
offers a commentary on the work that crying performs between bodies, and links the
experience of one’s body to that of a group.

Beloved and the Possibility of an Embodied Solidarity
I read crying’s disruptiveness as a key element in the broader work of crying. This
disruptiveness provides an opportunity to draw in the work of radical democratic
theorists, to theorize the way that crying’s disruption inaugurates politics. This bolsters
the account developed in the previous chapters, which focuses on the work of crying’s
affects between bodies. The form that crying’s disruption takes is also affective—
unfolding on this register in particular. This register is a key resource for the powerless,
and it is upon this register that a challenge to power can unfold—crying can function as a
response to suffering, as a response to powerlessness. This response also generates a
challenge to that very condition. In this section, I develop a parallel reading of an excerpt
from Toni Morrison’s Beloved while also using the opportunity to consider the way tears
might also emerge as an obstacle to solidarity. That is, in previous chapters, the affective
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register functions as a resource for those who are marginalized. Marginalized groups
experience a world in which they are often powerless to change—this reading of Beloved
highlights the social, legal, and political dimensions of powerlessness, finding their
articulation evident in Morrison’s narrative choices. Morrison’s novel illustrates crying’s
disruptiveness, and opens further questions about the way bodies can act as the site of
political transformation through solidarity, and the limitations of that solidarity. To be
sure, like Medea, the people who make up Baby Suggs’ congregation are also powerless
and suffering. Their tears are called forward by Baby Suggs in response to this condition,
and push against it.
In the novel Beloved, Toni Morrison offers a rich description of a recurring event,
where Baby Suggs preaches in the woods:
“After situating herself on a huge flat-sided rock, Baby Suggs bowed her
head and prayed silently. The company watched her from the trees. They knew
she was ready when she put her stick down. Then she shouted, ‘Let the children
come!’ and they ran to from the trees toward her.
‘Let your mothers hear you laugh,’ she told them, and the woods rang. The
adults looked on and could not help smiling.
Then ‘Let the grown men come,’ she shouted. They stepped out one by
one from among the ringing trees.
‘Let your wives and your children see you dance,’ she told them, and
groundlife shuddered under their feet.
Finally she called the women to her. ‘Cry,’ she told them. ‘For the living
and the dead. Just cry.’ And without covering their eyes the women let loose
It started that way: laughing children, dancing men, crying women and
then it got mixed up. Women stopped crying and danced; men sat down and cried;
children danced, women laughed, children cried until, exhausted and riven, all
and each lay about the Clearing damp and gasping for breath. In the silence that
followed, Baby Suggs, holy, offered up to them her great big heart…
‘Here,’ she said, ‘in this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs,
flesh that dances on bare feet in grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not
love your flesh. They despise it…’
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Sethe wanted to be there now. At the least to listen to the spaces that the
long-ago signing had left behind…”.199
The story is set in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1873, and follows the lives of escaped slaves,
particularly the journey of Sethe, who survived a traumatic escape from Sweet Home, a
plantation located in Kentucky. The novel primarily follows Sethe’s extended family,
including her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, through flashbacks, and her daughter, Denver.
As Morrison describes, after gaining her freedom, Baby Suggs put her heart to work, the
only part of her body not overtaken by years of slavery. As described in the excerpt
above, she ventured out into the Clearing, a place tucked away in the middle of the woods
near her house. All those who could make it through the woods would follow her to this
place, and then wait among the trees until she called out to them, to gather around her.
Initially, it is the women who are beckoned to cry. Children are made to laugh,
and men to dance. Eventually, Morrison describes the way that these roles got mixed up:
“women stopped crying and danced; men sat down and cried; children danced, women
laughed, children cried until, exhausted and damp, all and each lay about the Clearing
damp and gasping for breath.”200 In the aftermath of this deep, soulful exhaustion, Baby
Suggs implores her makeshift congregation to recognize that they are flesh that weeps,
laughs, and dances on grass, and as such, to love their flesh. The masters from their past
did not love their flesh; they despised it, but valued it only to the extent that it was useful
in their labor machine. Baby Suggs reminds her followers that flesh needs to be loved.
This powerful recollection ends with the note that in the Clearing, Baby Suggs claimed
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herself. Morrison writes that, “freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that
freed self was another.”201
This is a powerful scene, nestled at the center of Morrison’s novel. Morrison
introduces the affective atmosphere through rich description of the interactions between
the people in the clearing—when Baby Suggs commands that the women, “Just cry,” this
unleashes affects within the scene. We can track these affects through the following
paragraphs and pages, first where Morrison writes that the women let loose, then as
crying switches back and forth between the different people in the clearing, eventually
coming to a rest as they lay exhausted. Affects move about the people present, written in
such a way that emphasizes their circulation and even proliferation. Crying is described
in terms of letting loose, the ground moving from the dancing, and the children’s laughter
spreads out to evoke smiles from the adults. Morrison lays out these descriptions and then
immediately moves to the forms of expression switching and swapping between those
present. Again, this generates a sense of frenzy, a sense of chaos, and a sense of freedom.
It is notable, then, that following this frenzy, Baby Suggs begins her heartfelt preaching.
It is possible to read this movement within the text as affects opening up the possibility
for transformation—it is in the proliferation of affects amongst this community that
freedom can be introduced, and as such, felt and experienced.
Further, affects are written as part of the materiality of this moment within the
text. The crying, as well as laughing and dancing, all occur on and through bodies. For
example, when the women begin to cry, they do so without covering their eyes,
reminding the reader that tears materialize from the eyes, on the face. When the laughter
201
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is commanded from the children, it is so that their mothers’ can hear them—laughter gets
received through the ears, again linking the experience explicitly to the body. Baby Suggs
reinforces this materiality when she says that it is the flesh that weeps, laughs, and
dances. It is also in flesh that Baby Suggs locates love. The constant return to the body
paints it as an integral part of this moment—I argue that it is the body that can serve as
the source of power to challenge the very position of powerlessness. Baby Suggs’
sermon, in its focus on the body, and its ultimate message of freedom and love, supports
this reading. She lists each part of the body, and implores the community to love it in
turn. She ends the sermon by saying, “More than eyes or feet. More than lungs that have
yet to draw free air. More than your life-holding womb and your life-giving private parts,
hear me now, love your heart. For this is the prize.”202 Love travels through the body,
love emanates from the body. The body acts as the site of emergence for the solidarity
that precipitates from these feelings. For Morrison, through Baby Suggs, the body acts as
the site of emancipation. Crying mobilizes affects that are implicated in both of these
processes.
This example also somewhat effortlessly folds in an additional aspect of crying
worth mentioning here. Morrison’s description paints crying as contagious. It moves
quickly from the women, who receive the direction from Baby Suggs, through the rest of
the present population. Morrison describes it as a force overtaking the participants.
Durkheim’s work also highlights contagiousness in relation to the spread of emotions—
that contagion should be part of the conventional wisdom associated with emotions, with
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crying, and this scene in Beloved paints a visual depiction of it.203 Further, this might be
understood as a potential source of concern, insofar as contagion denotes something that
spreads in an uncontrollable fashion. This is easily rendered unproductive within a
politics that privileges order and efficiency. The contagious element, that uncontrollable
spark, is what helps challenge the status quo—this is the disruptive aspect of crying in
action. This breeds intersubjectivity, linking the bodies present to one another,
transforming the action of one into having implications for the condition of all. The
spread and circulation of affects then works to open the possibility for solidarity.
The affects that circulate through this excerpt, can also be read in relation to the
broader historical context, which sheds light on the different orders at work in this
moment. This event represents transgression from multiple vantage points, which can be
used to further reinforce the transformative potential that affects possess, here located in
the affects released by crying. It is significant and striking that this event occurs in the
woods. The clandestine physical space that houses Baby Suggs’ preaching marks the act
as transgressive. It must occur in the woods, away from the rest of society. This move to
the woods is reflected in Baby Suggs’ sermon: they are the only ones who will love their
flesh—within society, that love was impossible. In fact, it necessitated an affective frenzy
before being able to tap into it here, and so the move to the woods is also a move to a
space that allows such frenzy, where the proliferation of affects can take flight. The
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woods are the space of freedom, the space where these people can love themselves;
society is rendered the opposite with this very move.
The move to the woods reflects broader conventions of society in relation to race
and status. Though Baby Suggs’ group does not migrate to the woods with the sole
purpose to shed collective tears, the location of their meeting is significant insofar as it
acts as a form of cover. Legal instruments, such as the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law,
represent examples of forces and conventions at work that drive a population of former
slaves and free blacks into the woods. Their presence is punctuated by a fear of capture,
persecution, or punishment, because it is, in effect, a manifestation of transgression. The
move to the woods, to the clearing, is an escape. It is a physical move which
complements the broader desire for a community that corresponds to the needs, wants,
and desires of this nascent people. This is found in the woods, away from the
conventions, laws, and politics of society. It is found through a process of emotional
release, which acts as a response to the condition of powerlessness, and the absence of
love. But the presence of the collectivity of former slaves and free blacks, absent a white
master, itself constitutes a transgression against the dominant regime, and the rustlings of
an emergent collectivity. Crying works as a vehicle through which this emergence
manifests.204
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It is possible to read the generative power of affects in this moment. Reading the
way that crying moves between bodies, that affects move between bodies, and the sermon
that follows on the heels of this movement—bodies lay on the ground gasping as Baby
Suggs starts to speak. This scene of affective mobilization is directly followed by the
sermon—the swift shift from one to the other allows us to read affects performing an
opening for this sermon, both mentally and physically. This also suggests an intimate link
between language and bodies, where one animates and opens for the other, intertwined
together. Crying together, and its attendant circulation and proliferation of affects,
produces, if only for an instant, the generation of a collectivity that pushes against the
various forms of oppression that this group regularly endures. It does so through the
bodies of those involved, thrusting them into the fore. Crying in the woods transgresses
and transcends this force. This act pushes against the restrictive regimes that reign in the
physical and emotional space outside the woods. The collective experience gives power
to the emergent regime; it affords it some structure. It is the shared character of crying,
generated by Baby Suggs’ sermon, which provides a basis for said structure. It is within
the experience of crying itself that the emergent character of the affective regime
becomes visible. The intensity of the tears, which Morrison writes, representing the
fervor and swirl of emotions in this moment, moves those who cry and those around
them, the collection of intensities and affects feeding off each other. The contagion
energizes person after person, unlocking something and pushing it into the shared space.
It also, in the words of Baby Suggs, allows the people to claim ownership over
themselves. This very opening up that is a function of the body.205
205
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Further, there is an unnamed potential encapsulated in this collective experience,
a question remains about its activation. When readers are introduced to this scene within
the narrative, it is through Sethe, who longs for this space, this energy. The description of
the events in the Clearing give way a certain longing. Morrison writes, “Sethe wanted to
be there now. At the least to listen to the spaces that the long-ago singing had left behind.
At the most to get a clue from her husband’s dead mother as to what she should do with
her sword and shield now, dear Jesus, now nine years after Baby Suggs, holy, proved
herself a liar…”206 This place, this moment has an energy that draws Sethe back,
particularly in this time of need and confusion, where her grief has literally come back to
haunt her. The connection that Sethe feels to this place can be read as a function of the
affects mobilized in this space, and the lingering charge—she is attached to these affects,
to their release, but also to the collectivity that emerged in those long-gone moments.
That lingering, the way it creeps back into Sethe’s consciousness, the way it is connected
to the embodied experience and struggle with grief—this is also the question of its
activation. In Beloved, there is potential for action in concert generated in the woods
through crying, through the way bodies mobilize affects that help bring people together,
and that help move people forward, as Baby Suggs’ sermon urges. However, there is
something additional generated as well, a potential that can be activated even years later,
a fellow feeling that can be utilized towards rebuilding that collective. Sethe’s desire for
act of engagement in a process of transformation as the reader is urged to actively participate in the nonnarrative, non-literary experience of the text (Raynaud, 44). The participation of the reader also gestures
towards the working of affective regimes, as part of a broader mode of engagement with the way moments
like these in the text function. Further, the body is the site upon which the former slaves and free blacks are
made to realize their subjectivity, to claim ownership over themselves. The fact that crying is embodied is
related to this idea, and will be more fully explored in subsequent sections, especially in reference to the
discussion of Rancière.
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the Clearing years later reintroduces that potential for opening, for concert. It gestures
towards an imprint that travels across generations, suggesting that crying is doing more
than just responding to suffering or expressing grief, but aiding in the construction of a
people, even if it is fleeting, or even imaginary.
Reading this scene is instructive regarding the way the mobilization of affects can
work towards producing a collective, opening the possibility for this, shaping it in a
moment, leaving a lingering feeling even years later. This scene from Beloved generates a
visual and visceral representation of Rancière’s ideas, where the work of bodies can be
understood as invisible until they are not—as Baby Suggs’ demands that each member
present love their body parts, she makes them visible, audible, palpable when they have
not been in the past. She says, “And no, they ain’t in love with your mouth. Yonder, out
there, they will see it broken and break it again. What you say out of it they will not heed,
what you scream from it they do not hear…No they don’t love your mouth. You gotta
love it (Emphasis in original).”207 Here Morrison draws the divide between the people in
the woods and those in society—this is a racial divide. She notes that the sounds they
make and the words they say are inaudible, that their bodies are invisible; in Rancière’s
idiom, the people in the Clearing are part of the part that has no part. But it is significant
that in that Clearing, their bodies come together and produce an energy, circulate a set of
affects, that demand that they be visible to one another, and this suggests, that in
becoming visible to one another, there is a further potential in that. Becoming visible to
one another paves the way toward collectivity; the circulation of affects in crying
together performs a similar kind of work. It is about feeling oneself, knowing one’s
207

Morrison, Beloved. 104

153

embodied self as one whose presence can be seen, seen by others, that paves the way to
challenging the oppressive forces that declare such bodies invisible, inaudible, nonexistent. This moment in the woods, where these bodies become seen and heard to
themselves and to one another, this is what Rancière’s politics requires—this is how a
collective comes to be, a collective that can thrust itself into his police order.
In addition, it is not by coincidence that Baby Suggs’ congregation must seek
refuge away from the city, away from society. This circulation of affects, this nascent
collectivity, is transgressive—this is marked in multiple ways, including by the fact that
the participants must be beckoned to engage in these behaviors, as well as that this must
occur in a somewhere else. Seeking out a space reminds us the part that has no part also
has no place in the regulated spaces of conventional politics. It finds its place, hidden
away, outside the structures of the city, the white structures and their laws. The
movement away, then, can be read in relation to the potential legality of the moment, to
the politics of the moment, and even to the social structures that are in place. This entire
group of people exists outside the dominant order; their very existence as a collective is
contrary to that order. These people are Rancière’s part that has no part, by virtue of their
race (black), the time period (late 1800s), their status (some are former slaves), as well as
their actions (crying, dancing, etc). Each of these pieces places the members of the group
and the group itself outside the order. In fact, their exclusion constitutes the order itself,
the police order, both in Morrison’s narrative and in Rancière’s theorizing. And yet, the
swirl of affects here, their circulation, open up the possibility for future action. The
collectivity formed is one forged in the face of marginalization—and through embodied
forms of expression, including crying, dancing and laughing. Feeling the bodies around
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one another, crying together, unearthing the depths of shame, sadness, and grief joins
those present together. In the novel this lays the groundwork for future interaction, and
that future interaction works as a suggestion for the very power in the circulation of
affects—a powerful potential, one that must be further taken up in order to come to
fruition.
Further, this moment also points towards the powerful structures of domination
that are most visible through race. The extremity found in this moment is also instructive
in this regard. The extreme forms of emoting here, brought on by Baby Suggs’ directive,
but carried out in and on the bodies of those present, gesture towards additional
transgression as well. The intensity of this moment is felt through the rich descriptions of
the laughing, dancing, and crying, as well as through the way these affects travel through
the crowd in various ways, intersecting with one another, affecting even the landscape
(the dancing feet pound and produce vibrations), and eventually everyone collapses,
exhausted by this show. There is a way in which the intensity and fervor here reinforces a
set of stereotypes associated with race, particularly the trope of the angry black woman.
The extreme display of emotion, then, is perhaps one that is expected of those present in
the Clearing. However, Morrison takes this for herself, reworking the stereotype to seize
the affects and relationships between bodies for her own purpose. The extreme display of
emotion contains within it a certain power, one that galvanizes as suggested here in the
Clearing. The experience frees people from their bodies—dislocating their subjectivity in
important and generative ways, infusing it back into the crowd. For Morrison, it is a step
towards love, towards freedom, and in turn, a step towards a potential collective to push
back against the oppressive forces that necessitate this kind of response. Put another way,
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the trope of the angry black woman is turned on its head to be the starting point to
galvanize a concerted response against such a trope.
Morrison’s description of the events of the Clearing in Beloved provides an
illustration of Rancière’s theory, as well as suggest the way that affects, through the
expression of emotions, can explain the mechanism through which the part that has no
part can come to challenge the powers that exclude it. Further, the circulation and
mobilization of affects can have emancipatory potential, and a lingering effect. My
argument is not that solidarity must emanate from this experience, but simply that the
experience opens up the path towards solidarity through the circulation of affects.
Solidarity names the political transformation that crying enables—but it does not name a
telos. It represents an intensity, a power, that circulates through bodies and make the very
possibility of transformation possible. That possibility, that potentiality must be put into
action—intersubjectivity is not enough but it an important precursor to action in concert.
Crying works towards the genesis of a collectivity, by virtue of the disruption that it
performs, and again, the reconsideration and reconfiguration that occurs in its wake.
However, even as crying can work to generate a collectivity, and as such, open avenues
for solidarity, this excerpt also suggests potential challenges and obstacles that exist as
well.

Opening Up, Closing Down
The previous section read the scene in the Clearing from Morrison’s Beloved as
an example of Rancière’s politics, as well as with an eye towards the opening up that the
circulation of affects performs in this moment. In a project that is concerned with the
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political work of crying, and the particular way crying engenders the circulation of affects
towards transformation, it is tempting to read only the generative aspects of this event,
and further, of this phenomenon. But Morrison’s Beloved also suggests some limitations
of crying, worth pursuing. Specifically, in this description of the Clearing, questions of
power and futility arise. This section considers these questions, and argues that it matters
both who is crying in relation to power, and that others present take up your tears—only
in this way can crying build towards solidarity.
In particular, it is worth noting that in Morrison’s novel, it is the women who are
directed to cry, but as the frenzy reaches a fever pitch, the men and children might cry as
well. As Morrison writes the movement of tears, this all works to open up the space for
subsequent messages and experiences of freedom. Yet, this might also be read as a
warning—though crying is a response first assigned to the women, it is not confined to
them at all. Morrison’s use of the term “mixed up” can be read as putting forward a
preferred performance of crying, and then a subsequent reshuffling. The men and
children can partake in this form of expression. So too we might read the proliferation of
affects, and the way that crying function as a response to the condition of powerlessness,
here the condition of domination found in the master-slave relationship and in the way
that relationship lingers even years later. But further, the way tears move throughout the
collective serves as a reminder that affects are not necessarily the property of one
population alone. That is, it is possible to read into this movement a suggestion that
emotional expressions and affects are available to all—they are not simply the property
of the powerless. Of course, in this excerpt, all who engage in these behaviors are part of
a collective that is defined by its proximity to powerlessness—as former slaves and
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African Americans, all present experience powerlessness. However, it is that movement
that suggests further consideration of the way other populations, not necessarily
powerless, might engage in crying, because it is a readily available form of expression, as
evidenced in this excerpt.
Consider for example, the debate around white women’s tears, and its relationship
to Morrison’s description and story in Beloved. The fact that anyone can cry is both
exciting and worrisome. It is exciting because it reveals a level of equality around this
form of expression—in Morrison’s work, crying moves quickly from women to men to
children and back and all over again. It is, on its face, an exceedingly democratic form of
expression. This allows it to function as a resource for the powerless, in part because they
have access to this form of expression, and often time it serves as a response. This project
paints power into that response. However, just because it is available to all, does not
mean that all who cry do so from a position of powerlessness, and that crying is a valueneutral form of expression. That is, it matters who cries, and it matters their relationship
to power, and in considering this relationship, it is possible to see that while crying might
be available to all, it can also work to foreclose paths to solidarity. This is linked to the
way tears are read—or in Rancière’s idiom, whose crying is visible and audible, and
whose crying is not.
A recent Guardian article offers the following description of white women’s
tears:
“’Almost every black woman I know has a story about a time in a professional
setting in which she attempted to have a talk with a white woman about her
behavior and it has ended with the white women crying, on black woman wrote
on twitter, ‘The white woman wasn’t crying because she felt sorry and was deeply
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remorseful. The white woman was crying because she felt ‘bullied’ and/or the
black woman was being too harsh on her.’”208
Here, white women’s tears are weaponized against black women, in an effort to protect
the white woman’s position at the expense of the black woman’s. The tears form a shield
around the white woman’s experience, making it untouchable, protecting her from
challenges, and also insulating her from transformation. The weaponization of white
women’s tears shuts down the possibility of solidarity built out of the shared experience
of women—instead, it serves as a reminder that race plays a major role in differentiating
these experiences, even within the same workplace. Here tears do not work to draw
people together, but instead emerge as a vehicle to repel individuals from one another,
and erect a divide amongst groups.
The weaponization of white women’s tears is a heavily criticized use of crying—
the article mentioned above is part of a much larger archive of pieces that decry the
weaponization of white women’s tears. April 2018 saw an avalanche of activity on
Twitter criticizing the way white women’s tears are seen as a cry for help, while black
women’s tears are a threat, bound up in the threat of the black body. White women’s tears
work to generate sympathy, playing on the vulnerability tied to femininity, while black
women’s tears are angry, excessive, just as black bodies are assigned these
characteristics. Tears act as a silencing mechanism for the complaints and challenges
voiced by other women, black women. In a blogpost on the subject entitled
“Weaponization of lass destruction: The tears of a white woman,” blackgirlinmaine
writes,
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“Perhaps the only thing deadlier to a Black person’s soul and well-being than
actually being killed or incarcerated are the tears of a white woman—among other
weaponized emotions…White women tears kill the soul, they make you doubt
yourself and your right to exist, they render you voiceless because an emotionally
distraught white woman becomes the priority in whatever space she is in.”209
White women’s tears are described here as rendering black persons ‘voiceless,’ recalling
the partition of the sensible introduced by Rancière. The white women’s tears are
afforded priority over anyone else, and as such, erect a wall around her experience. This
shuts down paths for solidarity between white and black women in this regard, and also
paints the tears of black women as excessive while the tears of white women are cause
for action, for protection. There have been studies that examine the effects of race on the
reception of crying.210 In these studies, white women’s tears are typically read as less
manipulative and more generously than the tears of racial minorities. The reception of
crying is imbued with the dynamics of domination that the aforementioned articles,
twitter feeds, and blogposts display quite readily. The differential reception and
interpretation of tears further troubles any strict celebration of this form of expression.
However, in doing so, it suggests that the proximity to power is an important factor here.
Crying is available to all, but those closer to the source of power who cry do not tap into
its transformative potential, but instead fold this form of expression into the part of the
sensible that corresponds to the dominant power. White women’s weaponization of tears
over and against their women of color counterparts is an example of the extension of the
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sensible in ways that bolster the exclusion of the women of color. This is particularly
dangerous, because as the affective register is one of few resources for the powerless.
When the powerful move towards that register, they undercut its status as resource.
This brief consideration of these takes on white women’s tears demonstrates that
crying can be deployed in ways that work to shut down challenges, and solidify the
dominant base of power. Considering the ways that crying can foreclose solidarity—here
with regard to race—is an important corrective for an overly generous reading of tears.
However, in some ways, while the weaponization of tears in this regard is troubling, it
still supports the idea that there is a kind of power that circulates through crying, one that
is bound up with the production of affects. The problem is that these affects can be
mobilized towards a purpose that is not conducive to solidarity, by a person or a
population that is not interested in the democratic or transformative capacity of this
register, and instead towards bolstering extant power structures. As such, it is relevant
who is crying, and where they stand in relation to power, to be able to evaluate whether
these tears can actually be mobilized towards a transformative solidarity. Morrison’s
Beloved, where the people escape to the woods to cry, laugh, and dance together, to
embrace their bodies, and their freedom, offers a picture of the ways crying can push
back against the forces of domination through the mobilization of affects, whereas white
women’s tears suggest the opposite it also true.

Crying Alone: Frantz Fanon
There is an additional obstacle between crying and solidarity—for the
mobilization of crying’s affects to come to bear on political life, others must receive and
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take up one’s tears. The example with white women’s tears illustrate what happens when
the tears of one group work to silence the tears of another, shutting down avenues for
solidarity and rendering the tears of black women invisible, inaudible, and futile.
However, another challenge arises when we consider the tears of someone who cries
alone, where no one is there to receive the tears, or mobilize as a result. Crying can still
perform important work for individuals, but solidarity necessitates the presence of others
to feel one’s tears, and act in their wake. Frantz Fanon helps shed light on the
significance of the collectivity generated in the woods. In Black Skin White Masks, Fanon
writes, “Yesterday, awakening to the world, I saw the sky turn upon itself utterly and
wholly. I wanted to rise, but the disemboweled silence fell back upon me, its wings
paralyzed. Without responsibility, straddling Nothingness and Infinity, I began to
weep.”211 This comes after Fanon is hailed on the street with the uttering, “Look, a
Negro,” and he realizes that his subjectivity is not his, but that a narrative of race and
colonialism have been superimposed onto his body.212 Fanon goes on to say that black
men suffer their bodies differently from white men. Here, some of the circuits of
domination emerge more clearly—it is not just about laws or institutions, but also the
entire apparatus of race that materializes as a tool of domination. At the moment that
Fanon is made aware of his blackness, he is also robbed of his subjectivity. It has been
assigned to him; it is not within his control.
Fanon’s response to this realization is to weep. It is all he has in that moment,
standing face to face with the weight of the world. His lived experience until that moment
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has been revealed to him a lie, and all he can do is cry. He cries into the abyss, mourning
the loss of his subjecthood and the onset of his racial identity. Crying becomes the only
form of expression that can help Fanon take in and respond to this moment. This is
important, and yet, this happens in isolation. Fanon’s tears serve multiple purposes
here—to voice the despair he feels as he stares into Nothingness and Infinity, as well as
the grief he experiences at the loss of his identity. Further, it provides a response to the
realization of his blackness and the weight of history descending upon him. But it is
curious that Fanon’s tears come in the absence of others. It highlights his loneliness that
no one is there to receive and react to the tears. In a way, this illustrates the significance
of others with regard to crying. Weeping into the abyss, there is no one to receive
Fanon’s tears, no one to react to them, to take up their energy. Fanon’s tears cannot be
absorbed by anyone; they are not felt by anyone. Wohl’s warning about crying instead of
acting rings true here. Fanon cries in place of action—like Medea and other female
heroes in Greek tragedy, crying is the only form of response they have left; it is at once a
mark of powerlessness and a response to that very state.
While the weight of his racial identity produces Fanon’s reaction, his tears, this is
their only fate. Read against the crying induced by Baby Suggs, Fanon’s weeping seems
futile in his isolation. This does not diminish from the work the tears might perform for
Fanon himself, but it serves as a subtle reminder that without others to witness his tears,
there is very little that they can do to connect him to something larger than himself. By
noting that he faces Nothingness and Infinity, Fanon emphasizes the deep loneliness he
experiences as a result of his realization—he plunges into a new, unknown existence,
brought about by his new racial identity. Yet, though this is Fanon’s immediate fate, it is
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not the only possible future, as evidenced by the events in Morrison’s Clearing. Here, the
tears work to connect those present with one another, and to connect them to their bodies,
rendering those bodies very much theirs. The presence of others is crucial to the way
crying’s affects can perform the task of engendering and illuminating the intersubjective
space. To be sure, Fanon’s tears reach out to others, yet there is no one there to receive
them, infusing the entire scene with the very despair Fanon himself experiences.
Crying can lay the groundwork for action. Fanon’s tears reach out to others, but
no one is there. They are a response to the tightening reigns of domination that Fanon
experiences as a function of his raced body. They take him outside of his body, into the
world that has assigned meaning to that very body. Ultimately, the tears only serve him.
In contrast, the tears and affects that swirl through the Clearing help to generate a
collectivity of people who are present for one another. They make evident the tendrils of
relationships that perhaps existed beforehand. And later in the book, we see that these
relationships can be activated to help a member of the community. These tears represent
a challenge to the very power that assigns the bodies of Baby Suggs’ their place in
society. Read together, it is clear that there is no pre-determined future or action that
crying establishes—these two events illustrate an inherent complexity. Neither inaction
nor action in concert is promised by tears, but instead, the likes of both are made
possible. It is important that when crying’s affects are taken up, it is done with purpose. It
is also important for others to experience our tears.
To reflect back on the racial dynamics that are present in each of these scenes, in
different ways, both Fanon and Baby Suggs’ congregation experience domination
through race. For Fanon, he becomes cognizant of the dynamics of domination alongside
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his realization that he is black. This intimately affects his subjectivity, and worse, his
tears do not enable an overcoming of this reality. Instead, they are cast out into the void.
Similarly, the congregation in the Clearing is defined by the domination they experience
as a function of their race. They find themselves in the Clearing, in part, because of their
shared racial identity, which is intertwined with a shared history and shared relationship
with the institutions of the state. But crying together, being moved together by Baby
Suggs’ preaching in the Clearing, makes their shared history and shared identity palpable;
it makes it felt. There is something more there—there is a way that the expression of
emotions and the unleashing of affects clings to these networks of relations. In doing so,
the underlying infrastructure appears in a way that can be further activated. As with
Medea, the affects released by crying are helpful in transforming relationships, helping to
open possible futures. The powerlessness of both those in the Clearing and Medea is also
a characteristic shared by Fanon.
Considering the way that policing emotions maps onto broader structures of
domination helps shed light on the significance of crying. Those groups who experience
domination in obvious and conventional ways (through laws and institutions) are also
those who so desperately need a way to push back against their condition. If politics is
defined as action in concert, then the ways in which that concert is generated, facilitated,
or proliferated are key to the experience of political life. By cutting people off from one
another, particularly people who experience the tendrils of domination acutely in their
everyday lives, they are robbed from the experience of politics. Rancière writes that the
exclusion of these very people is critical for the police order—they become the part that
has no part in the functioning of the state. But, it is also the disruption orchestrated by
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those excluded that transforms a moment, infusing it with the exercise of politics, as
opposed to the police order. Crying emerges as both excluded from and constitutive of
said order, and the embodied expression of grief constitutes a political move as it
inaugurates the possibility of transformation.
As a form of expression excluded from the sensible, crying can help push back
against the exercise of domination. It helps push back when works towards the generation
of a collective, and towards a broader transformation of the relationships that undergird
action in concert. But insofar as crying can serve the interests of the privileged, it is not
only a resource for the marginalized, and this is something that troubles a full defense of
crying and its attendant affects. Further, crying necessitates an audience, a set of people
to recognize and take up the tears, to feel the affects released by the person crying, in
order for it to work in the service of a collective. Without others, we are all just crying
into the Abyss, like Fanon. To be sure, this is not to say that crying does not perform
important work for us individually—Fanon’s experience with and description of tears
reveals the way in which crying works to transform his self-conception of subjectivity,
and provides a platform through which to theorize further the bounds of that subjectivity.
This is important, but again, not necessarily an aspect of the relationship between crying
and solidarity. This chapter has dealt with both the generative capacity of crying, and the
ways to understand this as part of its political work, as well as its limitations in this
regard.
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Crying Together
What does this tell us about the character of the collective that emerges in crying?
What does this tell us about the role bodies play in the generation of that collective?
These questions were posed in the first chapter, and in important ways, animate the
discussion that drives the present chapter. These questions are linked to the discussion of
disruption at the outset of this chapter, and carry through the exploration of Morrison’s
Beloved, the debate around white women’s tears, and even the brief sojourn into Fanon.
The body serves as the site of struggle, the initiator of disruption, within this treatment of
crying. The character of the collective, then, is one established through disruption, a
disruption that is initiated through the expression of bodies.
Morrison’s novel offers an illustration of the kind of collectivity that emerges
through crying—a collectivity that is disruptive on multiple dimensions, and one where
bodies perform the important work of disruption towards its instantiation. Though
Morrison’s work is fiction, the way that she represents the collective, linking its
generation so explicitly to the way the bodies present express themselves, is instructive in
considering the role that bodies can play in this regard. The collective that emerges does
so from the disruption performed by bodies—crying creates a bridge between the bodies
in Morrison’s novel. Crying produced a similar bridge in Medea, where multiple
characters within the play remark upon Medea’s tears, which I read as being drawn in by
her tears. I locate that drawing in as part of the bridge that crying produces between
bodies.
The body is the site of disruption, and it is the site of generation of the collective.
This is a function of the proliferation and mobilization of affects. Morrison’s description
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of the events in the Clearing paints a picture of the way affects are generated by bodies
and move between them to stir up the energy to a fever pitch. The crying starts with
women but moves between all people present—that traveling also parallels the way
affects travel between bodies, and the generation of energy through that very traveling.
The character of the collective that emerges from the work of bodies, from the affects that
are released through embodied expression and swirl between bodies, is a collective that is
also one that is first felt, then cognized. Baby Suggs’ sermon begins only when the bodies
have exhausted themselves, when the swirl of affects between them brings about a
collective collapse on the ground, suggesting that the bodies first feel, then think. Her
sermon returns to the bodies of her congregants, where she implores them to love their
bodies because no one else will, and in doing so, locates their emancipation within their
bodies.
The collective that emerges from crying, then, is a collective that is felt across the
bodies that experience the affects. When I write that crying forms a bridge, I am
identifying the work that these affects perform, in the first place. But the work does not
cease there; instead, it extends further into the crowd, exerting a pull upon the other
bodies, one that materializes through the affects felt and received. There is a power in
this, an energy—the previous chapter identified the way that crying can mobilize affects
to trouble the very policing of emotions that is meant to occur in the space of the theater.
Morrison’s treatment of crying in the Clearing demonstrates a similar picture of affects
moving between bodies, but one with a different endpoint. Here, unlike in Medea, there is
no established end. The story that Morrison tells with affect is a story of its potentiality. It
is a story that does not yet have an end; it is a story that is about potential found in
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bodies, potential whose intensity is heightened with as it bounces back and forth between
bodies. This is not a collective that is necessarily processing its civic identity, or
participating in a struggle over meaning, but instead a collective that is located in the
expression of bodies, and the way these expressions reverberate between bodies. It is in
this affective experience of catharsis that the collective emerges.
However, there is a cautionary tale here as well. The collective that emerges from
crying is one that emerges from a state of, and in response to the condition of,
powerlessness. Crying is not the exclusive purview of the powerless, however. Though
crying works as a force of empowerment in the Clearing, those more proximate to the
locus of power can also engage in crying—this is a function of its extensive availability.
But, when the powerful cry, they close off this this form of expression from the repertoire
of the powerless. And, as evident in the debate over white women’s tears, they also shut
down the possibility for solidarity as a result. This serves as a powerful reminder that the
tears of all do not hold the same weight, and sometimes the tears of the powerless might
be met with disdain, while others they might be met with tears from the powerless. This
robs the tears of the powerless of their immediate ability to challenge this very position,
but the circulation of affects, and the lingering capacity upon bodies suggests that this can
be reactivated in turn.
Morrison’s Beloved offers a picture of what the mobilization of affects can
produce—and in doing so, demonstrates shape of the political transformation possible
through crying. By moving between bodies, crying’s affects build bridges between the
bodies present. In their shared powerlessness, their shared vulnerability, these bodies
present themselves to one another, and in doing so, open the possibility to assist one
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another in challenging that position. The physicality of crying plays an important role in
this potential transformation, because it can inaugurate an affective solidarity, one that is
felt through bodies, one that builds on this state of shared vulnerability that is both felt
and expressed through bodies. Morrison’s novel works towards this possibility. In doing
so, crying as the embodied expression of grief provides the source for political
transformation—it is not about peoplehood, memorialization, or struggle, but instead, a
vehicle through which the powerless can find a response to, and potentially a corrective
for, their very suffering.
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CHAPTER 5: PARKLAND AND AFFECTIVE SOLIDARITY

Overall, one central claim of this project is that crying acts as a response to the
condition of powerlessness, through the circulation of affects that draw bodies together.
Crying connects bodies to one another both by forming a physical bridge through tears as
well as releasing affects which are felt by other bodies. This establishes an intersubjective
network that can be further mobilized to challenge the condition of powerlessness. The
previous two chapters have engaged with the literary sources in an effort to examine the
condition of powerlessness, and the work that crying performs in these scenarios. These
two chapters have focused on characters that exist in a state of powerlessness—a state
which comes through clearly in the action of the play or the descriptions of the narrative.
Chapter three offered a reading of Euripides’ Medea. The titular Medea begins the play in
tears, left by her husband for another woman, on the precipice of exile, seemingly
powerless against these forces. Chapter four offered an interpretation of Toni Morrison’s
Beloved, focusing on a specific scene where Baby Suggs draws her people into the
woods, and reminds them that they must love their bodies, because no one else will. Her
people is a group of African Americans, most of whom are former slaves from the same
plantation, and so their powerlessness emanates from this status and the trauma
associated with it. Both chapters offer interpretations of the work of affects in the face of
powerlessness, and explore the potential encapsulated in crying. By exploring Medea and
Beloved, it is possible to see the work that affects perform between bodies, and some of
the ways they work to draw bodies together to challenge the very condition that
precipitated their release.
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However, both chapters employ fiction in the service of these questions, albeit
different genres. The use of fiction is productive in many ways, particularly because it
can provide elaborate descriptions of interactions in service of the story that also work to
illustrate the dynamics that I pursue in this project. It also often offers multiple layers of
interaction ripe for analysis, layers that can be untangled from one another in fruitful
ways to illustrate the complexity of political and social life. But this also raises the
question of whether the work crying performs in these texts is also the work crying
performs in practice. These texts offer a chance to read crying as part of a movement
towards solidarity, through the intersubjectivity that they make evident. But it remains to
be seen whether crying is generative of solidarity in practice, outside of these texts alone.
This chapter focuses on two recent events where crying can similarly be interpreted as
part of a response to powerlessness: the school shooting in Parkland, FL and the decision
not to indict Darren Wilson, the office who shot Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO. In
particular, this chapter focuses on the responses voiced by Emma Gonzalez and Lezley
McSpadden in each of these events, and the potential of tears to move others around them
towards solidarity. This chapter ultimately argues that crying can build towards
solidarity, as Medea and Beloved suggested, an affective solidarity that is generated by
the embodied experience of crying. As a response to powerlessness, crying’s circulation
of affects can move towards a solidarity that is felt, that lingers in and on bodies, that can
be activated as a function of its embodiment.
This project also reads crying and its proliferation and circulation of affects as a
corrective to literature on the work of mourning. The events at both Parkland and
Ferguson are also instances animated by grief. The events of Parkland that I discuss here
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occur in the wake of a former classmate entering Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School, and ultimately murdering 14 of his classmates and three faculty members. The
events in Ferguson occur in the wake of Michael Brown’s murder, and the subsequent
failure to indict the officer who shot the boy. Death is at the center of each, and grief
animates the character of the responses. As such, this chapter also adds to the work on
mourning, offering a commentary on American mourning, and on the central role that
crying plays, specifically working towards an affective solidarity. This reading of these
events does not sidestep the role that mourning bodies play, but instead locates the
critical work of crying as the circulation of affects towards solidarity. In Parkland in
particular, the expression of grief in the face of powerlessness has a galvanizing effect—
my argument is that the way crying works between bodies helps them band together in
the face of powerlessness. It opens an avenue to future and further action. Like Beloved,
it does not guarantee future action, but that opening, that rupture, is a necessary
precursor.

Parkland and Emma Gonzalez’s Tears
On February 14, 2018, Nikolas Cruz entered Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School (MSD) in Parkland, Florida, discharging a firearm and ultimately killing 17
people—14 of his classmates and three teachers. The country watched in horror in the
hours and days that followed, as the survivors of the shooting released testimonials about
their experience that day. This shooting was heavily publicized, like the shooting in Las
Vegas late last year, and Orlando before that, and Newtown some years earlier. In some
ways, this kind of tragedy is becoming normal in America. The same debate was
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rehearsed on the heels of the Parkland shooting that emerged around these other
shootings—a debate over gun control and the Second Amendment. Guns’ rights activists
released their ubiquitous refrain of: ‘guns don’t kill people, people kill people.’ In
response to Parkland, this came in the form of, “I don’t believe that this insane monster
should have ever been able to obtain a firearm. This individual was nuts,” said by NRA
spokeswoman Dana Loesch at a town hall following the shooting.213 Even President
Trump chimed in to support this line of argument, tweeting, “Very sad that the FBI
missed all of the many signals sent out by the Florida school shooter. This is not
acceptable. They are spending too much time trying to prove Russian collusion with the
Trump campaign – there is no collusion. Get back to the basics and make us all
proud!”214 Trumps highlights the failure of the FBI and those around Cruz to recognize
warning signs. By emphasizing the mental health of the shooter, both the NRA and
President Trump attempt to move the discourse away from regulations around gun
control, and instead, place blame on the FBI to highlight the failure in this particular
instance, instead of a more widespread issue. MSD sophomore Sarah Chadwick tweeted
her response at the President, “I don’t want your condolences you fucking piece of shit,
my friends and teachers were shot.”215

213

Mark Berman and David Weigel. “NRA goes on offensive after Parkland shooting, assailing media,
calling for more armed school security.” Chicago Tribune, February 22, 2018.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-nra-wayne-lapierre-school-shooting-20180222story.html# Retrieved September 24, 2018
214
Tweet from @realDonaldTrump twitter account posted February 18, 2018; cited in Phil Helsel. “Trump
blasts FBI over Parkland shooting, says ‘too much time’ spent on Russia probe.” NBCnews Politics Blog.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-blasts-fbi-over-parkland-shooting-says-too-muchtime-n849121. Retrieved September 24, 2018
215
This tweet is quoted in: Emily Witt. “Calling B.S. in Parkland Florida.” The New Yorker. February 17,
2018. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/three-days-in-parkland-florida. Retrieved September
24, 2018.

174

This tweet demonstrates the rage palpable in the aftermath of this shooting, and
the frustration around inaction directed towards politicians in particular. Emerging from
the chaos surrounding Parkland was a set of burgeoning activists, led by one Emma
Gonzalez, who delivered multiple powerful speeches in the days and weeks following the
shooting. Gonzalez, a senior at MSD, spouted disdain at President Trump and the NRA
alike, dismissing their ‘thoughts and prayers’, demanding action instead. “Politicians who
sit in their gilded House and Senate seats funded by the NRA, telling us nothing could
ever be done to prevent this: we call BS. They say that tougher gun laws do not prevent
gun violence: we call BS,” indicting the words and inaction of the officials. The events of
Parkland and its aftermath are tangled up in expression of grief, rage, and frustration. But,
the way that the grief spreads out through the crowd and works to mobilize people to
action, in the face of powerlessness, is critical here. This spreading out is evident in
multiple ways, including through Gonzalez’s tears, chants, and subsequent actions that
take place through the expression of grief.
During the anti-gun rally just three days after the Parkland shooting, Emma
Gonzalez gave a speech that linked public and private expressions of grief, as well as
action in the face of inaction. She said, “Every single person up here today, all these
people should be home grieving. But instead we are up here standing together because if
all our government and President can do is send thoughts and prayers, then it’s time for
victims to be the change we need to see.”216 Her words move grief into the public sphere,
but more than that, she delivers this message through tears. Gonzalez does not simply
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explain to her audience the movement from private to public, but instead, performs this
very move as she cries onstage.
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The picture above was taken at the rally, and shows Gonzalez wiping away her
tears that accompanied her speech. Behind her is a woman whose face also looks as
though she has been crying, perhaps brought to tears by Gonzalez’s words, perhaps
crying already because of the situation at hand. Crying onstage is significant here. It
breaks from the mold of mourning American tragedy; it is not anesthetized, but instead
literally dripping with tears and emotions. The grief felt in this moment is palpable, made
so both by Gonzalez’s words, as well as her tears, which serve to materialize these
feelings on and through her body. It is notable that the grief extends beyond Gonzalez, in
this picture to the woman and the people behind her, but into the crowd as well. Emily
Witt’s account of the rally reflects this spreading—she documents her experience in the
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crowd, noting that, “The crowd now joining in [with the ‘we call BS’ refrain]…The
crowd was now in a frenzy of anger and sadness, the people around me tearing up as they
yelled, ‘We call BS’.”218 Gonzalez’s words are taken up by the crowd, and they begin to
chant with her, joining in on the ‘We call BS’ refrain. But in addition, Witt remarks that
the crowd began to tear up as well.
This remark might seem trivial, but it gestures to something important—it
gestures to the way that tears accompany language in this moment. My argument here is
not that crying supplants Gonzalez’s words language, but instead, enhances their
messages, adding an additional dimension of grief to the experience. The crowd takes up
her words and they take up her tears, moved to tears by the words—these work together.
Crying and language, in this moment, are not foes, but work in tandem with one another,
not only to express Gonzalez’s grief, but to bring those in the crowd into that experience
as well. Further, while not oppositional, crying is part of the material experience of grief,
the experience that is felt primarily through the body, while the words of the speech
unfold first on the discursive register. The differential locus of each experience is
relevant, because it allows us to see the all-encompassing experience of grief as it unfolds
through the crowd upon the discursive and affective registers that emerge through
Gonzalez’s speech and crying alike. Put another way, crying provides a window into the
felt experience of grief, while the words are most closely related to the cognized
experience of the moment. That felt experience opens the path to a new form of
solidarity, an affective solidarity.
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As Gonzalez cries, her tears and grief cease to be solely hers; she has already
declared this in her speech, and the presentation by her body reinforces this idea. Her
tears reach out to the members of the crowd, proliferating and circulating affects that
bring her body’s experience to the bodies of others. These affects get taken up by the
crowd, pushing them to cry themselves, to get swept up in the frenzy of grief that
surrounds them. This opens the possibility of solidarity—as the members of the crowd
enter into the experience of grief, they also make possible solidarity, as their bodies are
open to the experiences of others and open themselves to be experienced by others. The
taking up of tears, their spread, marks these bodies as open to the very possibility of
being affected by and affecting others, which is key to the experience of affective
solidarity, a solidarity felt on and through bodies. Crying together, then, opens up a space
for a response to powerlessness—it opens the possibility to challenge power, by drawing
those bodies, marked as open, together.
The spread of tears throughout the crowd during Gonzalez’s speech is a similar
spreading that is present in both Medea and Beloved. It is also overlooked if we focus
only on the discursive moves that Gonzalez makes, or attempt to understand this moment
as one of working through. Focusing on the spread of tears, the spread of affects, offers a
different way to understand this expression of emotion and experience of grief. It offers a
chance to see the work that the expression of grief performs between bodies, to bring
those bodies together. If these tears are refused, the experience of solidarity is no longer
available—the bodies provide a bridge to one another, and if Gonzalez’s tears are
rejected by those around her, by the crowd, then the experience of intercorporeality is
foreclosed. The bodies cease to be linked to one another; they do not become part of the
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experience of grief, and they are not affected by the embodied experience of grief itself.
Further still, then, the experience of intersubjectivity is foreclosed—and it is this
experience that is generative of solidarity. Feeling together, as our bodies engage in
fellow feeling, the sense of a collective is born. As Gonzalez cries, others around her cry
as well, feeling her grief, grieving themselves, these emotions swirl through the affects
that crying releases into the crowd, and the crowd back at Gonzalez. Though the
members of the crowd were not necessarily in the school, their friends not necessarily
shot and killed, they become part of the moment of grief, crying along with Gonzalez,
joining in with her chants, becoming part of a ‘we’—‘We call BS!’ Gonzalez’s grief
becomes their own as part of an intersubjective experience, and this is made possible by
the spread of tears, of affects, through the crowd.
Intersubjectivity emerges when people are thrust outside of themselves—it
emerges when the boundaries of the body start to fall away, and the experiences of others
start to pulse throughout the crowd. Intersubjectivity is most critical for those who
experience vulnerability and precarity—the expression of grief, and the visible
manifestation of this grief through tears onstage mark Gonzalez as vulnerable. Reading
Gonzalez’s tears and the circulation of affects they produce both allows for a recognition
of vulnerability, as well as a pathway towards a corrective to that vulnerability.
Intersubjectivity, then, emerges as a result of shared vulnerability, and can provide a way
to counter the weakness that might be associated with this state. Further, the shared
experience of grief that happens through tears and their attendant affects, operates as a
pathway to intersubjectivity—as Gonzalez’s tears work their way through the crowd, and
get taken up by those present, they invite others into the material experience of her grief,
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to be affected by her feelings, to feel them through their own bodies, instead of simply
watching the grief unfold onstage. This is the virtue of Gonzalez’s public tears—grief
ceases to be hers alone, and becomes a grief experienced by many others, and more than
that, the material experience links those to Gonzalez and to those around them. And so, it
is not simply the public marking of grief, like one might see in a Funeral Oration or in
memorializing the dead, but here, it is the physicality, the corporeality, the materiality
that transform Gonzalez’s grief into collective grieving, which opens the possibility of
solidarity based on the intersubjectivity that is created in this transformation.
Gonzalez’s tears animate her words, but they also do more than that. They
amplify her emotional experience; they project her grief out onto her audience, onto the
world. They move her experience beyond her body alone—her tears offer this experience
to the collective to take, to digest, and even to become part of it. They also provide a
material expression of her state-of-being. In doing so, they exert a demand on those who
experience those tears as well. Gonzalez’s tears intermingle with her speech and
represent a call to action for those around her. Her grief cannot be ignored. Her tears are
tears of grief, but also tears of rage, to return to the concept of menis. Yet, she is not
bloodthirsty, and she is not calling for the death of those that she identifies in her speech.
Instead, the mix of grief and rage calls for political action against those who she sees
complicit in the tragedy that befell her and her peers in Parkland. In fact, this action is
explicitly, perhaps conventionally, political: action on the part of our elected officials,
policy reform and in the absence of this, action on the part of the public, to hold the
officials accountable, and elect others in their stead. This action is also political in a
broader, agonistic sense: it is a call to action for those who hear her voice and see her
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tears, who see themselves in her and her friends, to enter into the fray, to take part in the
struggle against the status quo in a real way. Insofar as they demand a change in the
status quo, a challenge to the existing order, Gonzalez cries tears of grief, tears of rage,
and political tears. As Gonzalez’s tears spread throughout the crowd, working towards
intersubjectivity, they are also inviting others into the struggle, to mobilize the grief they
feel together, the grief of others and of themselves that materializes on and through their
bodies.
We miss something when we fail to explore this register of human interaction,
where our corporeal experiences unfold and mingle. As Connolly writes, “it is the
materialities of experience shape who we are and how we interact with others.”219 In
effect, they shape how we do democracy. If we fail to explore this register, how can we
actually have a handle on the interactions that inform our political lives? Gonzalez’s tears
are intertwined with her speech as she speaks through her tears and sobs; to me, they are
difficult to fully separate from one another, though our dominant modes of analysis
suggest otherwise. But moving beyond a simple critique of these modes, these tears also
add to the moment elements and aspects that might not otherwise be there, or at least be
evident. Gonzalez’s tears accompany her moving speech; while her words work to
communicate her reaction to the tragedy to those around her, her tears articulate a world
of feeling that perhaps cannot be neatly packaged into words. They express a range of
feelings that make their way into her speech as well: rage, fear, and grief, to name a few.
They introduce grief as a structure of feeling through which we experience the world and
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each other, and in effect, our political machinations. The affective atmosphere of the
moment is altered as the intensity that accompanies the crying spreads out through the
crowd—those in the crowd begin to cry as well, as the space becomes open and accepting
of this emotional expression. This structure of feeling—demonstrated or even enabled by
Gonzalez’s tears—undergirds the full experience of politics. It is not disconnected from
political reality. One mode of expression does not necessarily stand in for the other; the
raw emotion expressed through Gonzalez’s tears is also evident in the carefully crafted
sentences she speaks to those watching.
If we approach this moment through the other lenses of mourning addressed
earlier in this project, the weight of affect and the experience of intersubjectivity wash
away. That is, Stow’s approach to mourning prompts us to focus on the words that
Gonzalez utters, and the way her tears do or do not open up a space for debate. On my
reading, her words perform important work, challenging those in power to change the
reality, to pass new laws, to send something more than ‘thoughts and prayers’. Gonzalez
becomes the interlocutor who voices these challenges, who calls for debate. Her tears
simply accompany her words, perhaps illustrating the weight this experience has for her,
but the analysis does not endeavor over the work the tears themselves might perform.
Further, the role of the crowd is dramatically reduced if we read this even through Stow’s
lens. Mourning is a collective act, but the galvanizing effect of mourning, and the way the
material experience of these emotions works to bind the crowd together does not enter
into his analysis. Instead, he works to channel all emotions towards discursive processes.
Here, I highlight the expression of emotions, the tears, as themselves performing this
work to galvanize, to establish an intercorporeal experience, to build towards
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intersubjectivity. The crowd is as important an actor as Gonzalez. There are bonds that
are forged through tears, by seeing someone else’s tears, by feeling those tears, by taking
up those tears and crying for oneself, for the collective.
But, it is not simply about reading the tears instead of overlooking them. To return
to the readings of Medea and Beloved, it is not simply about the spreading through the
crowd that is at stake here. It is about the way these tears can work to facilitate collective
action; it is about the link between tears and affective solidarity that is at stake in this
project. Crying mobilizes affects, but it is not enough to watch them move through the
crowd. It is not enough for one’s grief to touch and be felt by the bodies of others. Those
affects hold the potential to pose a challenge to the very forces that render the powerless
as such. This builds upon the intercorporeality, the felt vulnerability, and the
intersubjectivity they help make evident and possible. This shared grief, these circulating
affects can be mobilized towards transformation. That is, as crying mobilizes affects,
inaugurating fellow feeling, building bridges between bodies, this can all be channeled to
counter the experience of tragedy, and the condition of powerlessness. At Parkland, it is
the victims, their families and their friends who are rendered powerless by the gunman;
they are also rendered powerless by the politicians who refuse to act. But by making their
grief public, by spreading its materiality through those who are willing to listen, there is a
galvanizing effect—this opens the possibility of others to join the cause, to band together.
Gonzalez’s tears issue a call to action to those around her. It is magnified through
the video cameras trained on her face, as well as through the tears that paint that face—
crying amplifies her pleas, releasing pleas on a register of their own. She is changing the
way we do democracy in this moment. This call to action is one that does not ignore the
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emotions we experience as part of political life. In fact, it draws on the notion that we are
all connected, and as such, can exert demands upon one another. In many ways,
Gonzalez’s tears tap into this very idea. The affects unleashed by crying travel through
the crowd, making Gonzalez’s grief felt, bringing the grief of others to the surface as they
cry themselves. These emotions surge through those present. Her tears and emotional
expression do not paper over the struggle at the heart of politics; instead, they galvanize
those who experience them towards political action. Gonzalez taps into the grief we all
experience, but advocates for its use in specifically political spaces. She calls on those
who watch her cry to show these officials that they will no longer be silent. And silent
they were not. In the days and weeks following the tragedy, these high school students
met with top level officials, and subsequently organized a series of collective actions.
This organization is built upon the grief unleashed by these events, the structures of
feeling laid bare, and the affective solidarity made possible in these moments. The ability
to organize further, to galvanize the feelings and intensity of these initial demonstrations
begins with their expression in the first place. While it is unclear exactly where this will
lead, it is safe to say that the tears of grief, tears of rage of Emma Gonzalez did not spark
a cycle of menis—instead they have sparked a movement.
By paying attention to the way Gonzalez expresses her grief, the way her tears
affect those around her and those that watch her, we can start to unpack the complicated
material processes that occur in the spaces of mourning. We can see how her words and
her tears twist together to affect those around her, and how these start to exert a demand
towards action on her audience. These forces, movements, and awakenings are critical
elements that work towards affective solidarity. We see this phenomenon appear also in
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the intensity of responses from those opposed to Gonzalez’s calls. Those opposed to the
kind of world she demands are quick to dodge Gonzalez’s call to action, and dismiss her
tears. In a recent Harper’s Bazaar piece, Gonzalez remarked that her critics are quick to
call children emotional, stating that, “We are children who are being expected to act like
adults while the adults are proving themselves to be children.”220 These critiques are
dripping with attempts to dismiss the legibility and legitimacy of any emotional
expression. But Gonzalez’s message is simple and pushes back against these attempts. It
illustrates the phenomenon of affective solidarity quite simply as well: we are bound up
in each other; we are always a little outside of ourselves. Our emotional responses reach
out to and affect those around us, because we are bound up in each other, and as such,
seem to owe each other something. For years, modernity has papered over this idea—the
rampant individualism that punctuates neoliberalism helps us forget that we are
connected to each other. Gonzalez’s call reignites the tug we can all exert upon each
other through our bodies and our words in turn. It becomes clear, then, that political is not
just discussion, it is not confined to the realm of discourse alone. It is action in concert,
and includes all the pieces and elements that facilitates this working together. Discourse
is bound up in the structures of feeling that emerge; affective solidarity builds upon the
way in which we are bound up in one another, which is made manifest through the
collective experience of grief.

Michael Brown, Lezley McSpadden, and Black Lives Matter
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Of course, there are other groups and populations whose lives are defined by
precarity and vulnerability. The preceding chapter touched on the way that race refracts
the work of crying, revealing a more complex relationship between crying, affects, and
policing than previously addressed. Consider the tears and sobs of Lezley McSpadden
upon hearing that the man who shot her son would not be indicted. McSpadden’s son
Michael Brown (18) was shot by police officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, MO. Wilson
hit Brown with no less than six bullets.221 This event ignited a series of protests, led by
the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement.222 Missouri governor Jay Nixon declared a
state of emergency for Ferguson, and protestors at the site of Brown’s murder were
confronted with police in riot gear, and a curfew was imposed on the city. The National
Guard was called in. Governor Nixon declared a second state of emergency ahead of the
St. Louis grand jury’s decision over the indictment of Wilson.223 McSpadden was in a
crowd of protestors when she heard the news that Wilson would not be indicted. Upon
learning the news, she screams about injustice and how unfair the situation is; as the
decision not to indict Wilson is televised at the rally she is attending, McSpadden begins
to cry.224 Numerous news outlets captured her eruption into tears—as her sobs and wails
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pierce the crowd, four or five people rush to surround her, to hug her, and to comfort her
in a moment when comfort evades her.225
One of the most prominent critiques of BLM is that in order to be considered
legible, it must engage in reasoned and ordered practices that are legible within the
dominant political order.226 McSpadden’s anger is directed, in part, at the way she feels
invisible and undermined to the very system that is meant to support her, as a citizen of
the United States. That system, in her eyes, has failed her, and it has failed her son—first
in killing him and then in failing to indict the man who killed him. His skin color made
him a crime—it made him worthy of bullets. The failure to indict Wilson is the system
rejecting Brown’s and McSpadden’s claims of citizenship, and of personhood. With this
as the backdrop, it is significant that McSpadden’s shouts give way to tears and sobs,
which in turn lead those around to envelope her with their arms, crying with her.
McSpadden is powerless—she has lost her son and the system that was ostensibly
supposed to help her has rejected her claims full-on. The only thing she has left is her
tears, her sobs, and her wails. They reach out to those around her, who rush to her side to
comfort her in this time of need. The critique of BLM around the legibility of their
actions within the dominant political order fundamentally misunderstands that the order
itself is built upon the exclusion of this very group, alongside others. Here, McSpadden
and those that surround her make up the part that has no part.
My purpose here is not to fully unpack this moment, but instead to highlight the
way that crying facilitates a move towards affective solidarity in this instance. If the
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Parkland vignette gestures towards the way crying generates a set of affects that helps
move the crowd to action, this vignette adds some further considerations as we probe the
contours of affective solidarity. First, it bolsters the claim that the affective register can
serve as a resource for the powerless—it does not promise action or solution, but exists
nonetheless. Second, and related, this serves as yet another example where crying
lubricates the networks that perhaps already exist. We see this with Parkland—those
present for Gonzalez’s speech are affected in some way by the tragedy, but her tears and
their affects permeate the crowd, and draw people together through their bodies and their
experiences in the world. McSpadden’s wails in Ferguson are a heightened version of this
phenomenon. They take her outside of herself and exert a demand on those around her, a
demand that people feel and take up without hesitation—this is evident in the video when
others rush to her side as she cries hysterically. There is a material effect here; there is a
change in the very configuration of bodies in a split second. This is but one illustration of
the mechanistic way that crying and its affects help bodies move towards affective
solidarity. In addition, for McSpadden, and those that surround her, it is clear that anger
and grief are intimately intertwined, adding to the way grief and anger alike might work
towards affective solidarity.
In many ways, this discussion returns to the question of visibility and legibility of
the part that has no part, folding in further consideration of the movement demonstrated
in Beloved, but here as part of contemporary politics and no longer simply the subject of
fiction. In the way it alters the affective atmosphere, in the transformations it affects
between bodies and amongst bodies, crying illuminates the presence of such a group, the
needs of such a group, and even bursts the group itself into existence. Crying circulates
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affects, and presents them as a resource to be mobilized in response to the condition of
powerlessness. This circulation opens up the possibility of solidarity between bodies,
through the movement of grief throughout a crowd. As affects move through the crowd,
they influence the bodies present, spreading the corporeal experience of grief in their
wake. This mobilization makes solidarity a viable possibility, because it is not just about
the spread of affects but the effect the bodies of others have on those present. One effect
is to render these bodies visible to others, visible through their tears, which act as a signal
to others of the collective experience of grief.
Affective solidarity is not simply about becoming visible to those parties that are
predicated on the exclusion of the part that has no part, to revisit Rancière’s idiom, but
also about becoming visible to those who share in that part, who themselves have no part.
What is required to achieve this position? What functions as the means to get there? My
discussion of crying and its affects present a potential answer to this question. It is
difficult to see through the eyes of those who occupy different positions from ourselves—
it can be difficult to move outside of our point of view. Emotions and affects exist as
ways we are already a little outside of ourselves, and recognizing this will enable the
move towards visibility and legibility of others. Sharing in the corporeal experience of
grief, then, acts as an important path towards these. This is also linked to the experience
of intersubjectivity, which paves the way towards solidarity. Locating these experiences
in the body, and on the body, visible for others, adds to the galvanizing capacity
contained in the circulation of crying’s affects. Crying plays multiple roles here: it
expresses emotions; it marks us as outside of ourselves; it activates a structure of feeling;
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it moves us towards a form of solidarity. Affective solidarity becomes a possibility as we
become visible to one another as part of the powerless, part of the part that has no part.
However, the discussion of McSpadden’s tears cannot be disentangled from the
fact that she is read as a black woman, which also affects the way that her tears might be
read. There is a tension that arises at the intersection of different social identities,
particularly gender and race.227 Studies have shown that white women benefit from white
privilege through interactions with women of color—this is also reflected in the debate
over white women’s tears discussed in the previous chapter. This raises the question,
alongside McSpadden, about the character of affective solidarity, and to whom it is
available.228 Privilege is a complex issue, and maps onto social identity in different ways.
For example, white women might experience oppression based on gender, but can also
experience privilege based on race. And so, white women’s tears seem to signal
helplessness, while black women’s tears are more likely to be overlooked, as her struggle
is pathologized in ways that the white women’s struggle is not. The tears of some can
shut down and render invisible the tears of others. The proximity to power, which
sometimes can be mapped through race, but not always, should call into question the
character of crying and the mobilization of affects. This is a medium that is available to
all, powerful and powerless alike, but one that holds particular weight for those who are
otherwise rendered invisible, inaudible, and illegible. Discussions of becoming visible
and legible must also recognize that the path to visibility and legibility is not the same for
everyone, nor for all groups of people. That there exists research on differential
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receptions and implications of white and black women crying suggests a more pervasive
racialized seeing that extends beyond the policing of emotions. Black women’s tears,
following this logic, are policed in a more extensive and intense way, which is linked to
more extensive and intense policing of black women as well. The murder of Michael
Brown by the policeman in Ferguson, MO, only reinforces this point.
My argument is not that affective solidarity magically overcomes these racial
disparities in modes of seeing and interacting with state institutions and individuals alike.
Instead, it is simply that the release of affects that we experience through grief, that can
be generated through crying, can assist in the complicated process of facilitating action in
concert. This does not underestimate the difficulty in overcoming all of these obstacles,
but puts forward the idea that the embodied experience of grief and rage alongside others
helps draw people into our orbits, and in turn aids in the move towards action in concert.
The felt experience of these emotions, the way our bodies respond to one another, and the
intensity of our feelings, can act as a resource to bring people together. Literature on
public mourning already presupposes this move—however, it does not attend as much to
the material reality that the move necessitates. My claim about the materiality of crying is
that the material presence of tears and affects inaugurates the move towards solidarity,
which can aid in the transformation of the very condition of powerlessness that brought
on the tears. When crying is rejected, the ability to build a bridge between bodies, to
invite others into our experiences is also denied, which forecloses the possibility of
affective solidarity.
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Solidarity: Affective and Otherwise
In its simplest form, solidarity is the configuration of relations linking members of
a group to one another—it breeds the feelings of devotion and enthusiasm for a group
that is shared by its members.229 Most treatments of solidarity are based on the
identification of a group alongside the identification with that group. That is, solidarity
involves both the identification of a collective entity and the identification with members
of that entity. Some scholars also note that typically worldviews and ideologies foster that
identification of and identification with groups. As discussed in Chapter 2, Emile
Durkheim wrote that consciousness and solidarity were the keys to social cohesion and
depends on an awareness of and identification with a collectivity.230 Cohesion revolves
around shared morals and goals—the first step to this is identification, which leads to
solidarity. Participation often emerges out of this very sense of solidarity; when members
of a group feel linked to one another, they are more likely to act or participate on the
basis of that feeling. So solidarity, generally conceived, plays a major role in the kind of
action that constitutes politics for most scholars. Group identity plays a major role in
these definitions—for these authors, solidarity is based on either consciousness or
collective identity.
Juliet Hooker identifies solidarity as a practice. She identifies the central
problematic of her book on the subject as, “how the social fact of race shapes the practice
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of solidarity (emphasis added)…”231 She defines political solidarity as, “the reciprocal
relations of trust and obligation established between members of a political community
necessary for long-term egalitarian projects to flourish.”232 Political solidarity includes
four key elements: it has an affective dimension and ethical orientation that moves us to
action; it must be multiple and overlapping; it is the product of structural conditions that
require people to develop contingent solidarities not dependent on common interests; and
it is fundamentally shaped by race.233 The recognition that political solidarity is mediated
by race is an important, if obvious, contribution to scholarship on solidarity. Hooker
identifies a social and affective distance that accompanies race, which itself produces
different perspectives between whites and non-whites. She writes, “racial thinking and
seeing, and the social and affective distance they establish between citizens, are seen as
constitutive of the challenge of how to build solidarity, one that is not necessarily
resolved simply by shared political membership.”234 Hooker argues for a racialized
solidarity, one that is dependent on the ability to see skin color; in this view, to ignore
race is itself a mark of privilege.
These definitions of solidarity all intimate the work of affect. That feeling of
being linked to others is itself affective to some degree. That is, the connection that
people feel with one another is not fully cognitive or logical, but includes the feeling of
one’s body being drawn to others, perhaps somewhat inexplicably. Durkheim writes
about collective effervescence and the way it travels through the crowd to foster
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connection between those present, and move people to action. I read this as an account of
the transmissibility of affect. For Durkheim, the travelling of emotions and affects is an
important property of crowds—a certain electricity is released when people are in close
contact with one another, leading to a high degree of collective emotional excitement.
Hooker’s account of political solidarity explicitly recognizes that solidarity is both
rational and affective. Against accounts of solidarity that disagree “about whether
solidarity is primarily affective (based on fellow feeling) or rational (based on a capacity
to will the common good),” among multiple disagreements.235 She writes that solidarity
always involves fellow feeling, in addition to a normative orientation that moves us
towards action, which is brought about in part by a recognition of a shared fate.
According to Hooker, “the question of whether solidarity is based on fellow feeling or on
a shared capacity to will the common good has been of particular concern…This
juxtaposition is misleading, however. It suggests that solidarity is either affective or
rational…(emphasis in original).”236 In this regard, Hooker presents the affective
component of solidarity as part of what drives us to action, which is in line with my own
understanding of the relationship between affect and political life. Hooker’s treatment of
race is also instructive—she treats racism as a form of structural exclusion, and
recognizes that dominant and subordinate groups will have different ethical orientations,
which affects the ability for solidarity to exist in a real way between racial groups. She
writes, “By not acknowledging the way race has fundamentally structured modern
political relations, theorists of multiculturalism—even those who have considered the
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question of racial injustice—have not revealed the existence of the racial polity.”237 For
Hooker, making whiteness visible to whites is key to moving beyond the racialized
polity; she highlights the Civil Rights movement as defined by this visibility, but
recognizes the difficulty of reconstituting the bonds of political solidarity on more
equitably grounds.
These treatments of solidarity help to frame both what is missing from and what
this project adds to these accounts. On the one hand, this project endeavors after a politics
defined as action in concert, and solidarity enables just that. This entire project is
predicated on tracing and understanding the ways in which we are connected to one
another, and the role that grief and its attendant affects can play in this regard. Even
traditional definitions of solidarity include affective elements and recognize the work that
certain emotions perform in the service of solidarity. On the other hand, these accounts
often demonstrate two shortcomings. First, they are rooted in group identification that
prioritizes recognition over fellow feeling. That is, fellow feeling emanates from the
initial identification of others as part of an in-group. This is part of the problem that
Hooker identifies. This indeed breeds action in concert, but that action is based upon
recognizing that others are part of the same group. Hooker’s account recognizes that
racial difference is a major barrier to solidarity—whites are trained in racial seeing and
thinking, which influences who they see as part of a ‘we’, and who they recognize as
experiencing any form of suffering, which is a major barrier to solidarity. Again, it is a
barrier, first and foremost, to identification with those whom we might exist in solidarity.
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Second, and related to Hooker’s discussion of race, while many treatments of
solidarity recognize its affective components alongside the role of emotions, they do not
delve into the material and corporeal components of solidarity, or the way in which these
components enable forms of solidarity. While Hooker’s description of racial seeing is
linked to embodied racial difference, the role that the body plays in solidarity is murky at
best. Hooker argues that we need to develop cognitive mechanisms to combat racial
seeing, alongside breaking down the structural conditions that preserve the power of
dominant group. I agree with these recommendations. However, it is not strictly about
cognitive mechanisms. Instead, bodies themselves can serve as sites to build the
challenge to existing power constellations. Building upon the way bodies feel together,
and prioritizing these feelings within situations where suffering and grieving people come
together presents an additional form of solidarity, affective solidarity. This form of
solidarity prioritizes the corporeal and material components that others identify as aspects
of solidarity over identification with a group. This form of solidarity also prioritizes the
way bodies feel over worldviews. That is, the more conventional approach to solidarity
prioritizes social identity and ideology over fellow feeling and the affective elements of
solidarity. Affective solidarity rearranges this hierarchy, and starts to consider the way
embodied emotional expression, crying, can build bonds between bodies so as to enable a
political transformation.
Clare Hemmings uses affect to critique existing theories of solidarity. She in fact
introduces the term “affective solidarity” to refer to a politics of transformation that is
grounded in affect instead of group identity. Hemmings writes,
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“While I am critical of political approaches that privilege identity or marginality
as the basis of sustainable change, or that prioritise empathy as the primary affect
through which affective connections with others might be achieved, I
acknowledge the need for transformation and its subjective dimensions as
constituting the heart of feminist political theory. Thus I want to propose here the
beginnings of an approach through the concept of affective solidarity that draws
on a broader range of affects…but that does not root these in identity or other
group characteristics (emphasis in original).”238
Her approach pushes back against the privileging of identity as well as empathy—finding
only one source of solidarity, and a source that must be sustained over time, is
counterproductive in Hemmings’ account. Overall, her approach gestures towards a
vision of solidarity that is neither rooted in a sustainable category (identity) or celebrates
one affective experience over others. It is not about empathy over other affective states,
but instead about the way in which affects circulate that opens the possibility of
solidarity. By looking towards transformation, Hemmings prioritizes the objective over
the route to obtain it. This is instructive because it both endeavors after an ambition
adjacent to my own, as well as because it allows for a more wide-ranging set of prospects
to bring about solidarity. Building on Hemmings, our embodied experience of grief can
indeed serve as the starting point towards solidarity—rooting solidarity in these
experiences does not preclude the genesis of solidarity from additional emotional
experience located in the body, nor more cognitively based experiences. However, I
argue that the political transformation that crying induces takes the shape of affective
solidarity through the mobilization of affects.
Hemmings uses the phrase “affective dissonance” to refer to the gap that people
experience between an embodied sense of self and the prevailing social norms and
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narratives—she writes that, “Over the years, I have come back to Probyn’s distinction
between an embodied sense of self and the self we are expected to be in social terms,
between the experience of ourselves over time and the experience of possibilities and
limits to how we may act”.239 Naming the gap between norms and embodiment with the
term “affect” recognizes that there is something missed or overlooked in the broad
sweeping movements exercised through social norms. That missing piece is what is felt
and experienced through our bodies. I follow Hemmings, employing the term “affective
solidarity” to refer to the transformation that is produced through the mobilization of
affects; this is a transformation that draws people together through an experience of
grieving together.
As an embodied expression of grief, crying is a physical and material
manifestation of this experience—but more than that, it circulates the affects of grief
between bodies. These affects can be mobilized to address the condition of powerlessness
that can accompany grief, or can even engender it. Put another way, expressing grief by
crying together produces a sense of solidarity in the moment. That solidarity can lead to
future action; feeling as though others take part in your experience can help you feel
supported, and help you use your grief to bring about change. Parkland offers an
example, then, not only of tragedy, but also the potential of grief to bring about change.
The students’ activism in the weeks and months following the shooting, is tied together
with their grief, and the public experience of that grief. There is work towards
transformation in this context, but the transformation is not guaranteed. In this way, the
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public expression of grief through crying can be said to allow transformation, even
working as lubricant, but by no means ensure it.
Affective solidarity does not presuppose an established collective identity.
Instead, it is available to those present, and accessible to all who share in the experience
of grief, whose bodies share a space where the mobilization of affects through crying can
reach and ripple through their bodies. There is something about the experience of
intensity through one’s body that holds the potential for transformation. This circulation
of affects can even mobilize a dormant structure of feeling, activating a set of inchoate
relationships that exist between bodies. Again, returning to Parkland, this is perhaps what
we are observing in the wake of this tragedy. Consider the March for Our Lives, which
took place on March 18, 2018, roughly one month after the shooting at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School. Reports estimate 800,000 attended the rally in
Washington, D.C.240 800,000 people were not present in the high school on the day that
the shooter made his way through the halls, shooting 17 students and staff. But the public
expression of grief by those that were present has clearly had some effect on the broader
population. At the rally that capped off the March, Emma Gonzalez spoke once more.
“No one could comprehend the devastating aftermath or how far it could go,” she said.
“For those who still can’t comprehend, I’ll tell you where it went—right into the
ground.”241 Not everyone has had her specific experience, and not everyone can
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understand its weight or the suffering it brings—this is the kind of experience that people
can convince themselves will not happen to them. However, the deaths of her friends and
teachers are permanent, and more than that, their bodies occupy a physical space, in the
ground. Here, the material reality of this moment affords weight to Gonzalez’s message.
The reference to the buried bodies, the way that the audience might picture them,
heightens the significance of her words. The material presence also allows the weight of
these deaths to be felt, and the tragedy to be palpable further still.
At one point, Gonzalez stood in silence for several minutes. Tears fell down her
face. The crowd began to clap and chant, “Never again,” which has become a central
message in the wave of activism following the shooting.242 This shift from silence to
chanting, which is punctuated by Gonzalez’s continued expression of grief onstage,
through the silence, through her tears, once again introduces a decidedly material element
to the moment. Her body’s expression of grief through the silence, is palpable, and felt by
those present. Her tears work to circulate affects, and those affects are part of what
precipitates the crowd’s chanting. This shift is emblematic of the way the physicality of
crying mobilizes affects—here it is the move from an attentive audience to an active
response. A transformation germinates in this shift. Affective solidarity blossoms from
Gonzalez’s tears through the audience as they are moved to chant in response. Affective
solidarity presents the possibility for further change, further response, and further
transformation.
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Recall that Honig introduces mourning as a vehicle for both political possibility
and new forms of solidarity.243 In Antigone, Interrupted, lamentation activates the
feelings of grief associated with mourning in those present; those who experience the
mourning process are meant to be moved by the lamentations, either emanating from the
actors onstage or the women within the procession. These words and wails stir up
feelings in those who hear and experience them. The circulation of grief and its affects in
these moments reaches out to bodies, activating the networks between bodies in part
through fellow feeling. Affective solidarity, can also be found in the insights of Honig,
highlighting the roles that materiality and corporeality play in drawing people together.
While lamentation taps into this register, and as both Honig and Markovits hold,
mobilizes affects, the mobilization of affects through crying is always already felt on and
through the body.
With affective solidarity, emotions cease to be an afterthought-like component of
solidarity, and become an integral way through which we are bound up in each another.
They are an obvious way to bind people together because they mark moments when we
find ourselves as outside of ourselves, reaching out to one another, even if it escapes
conscious intent. The embodied expression of grief serves as a vehicle to activate the
networks that exist between people, and even transform relationships between others.
Activating, lubricating, transforming relationships works towards action in concert;
affective solidarity is a step towards this action, it inaugurates political transformation—it
allows the collective experience of grief to be mobilized to bring about change, to
challenge the very condition of powerlessness that predicated grief itself. This form of
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solidarity articulates itself through our bodies, and through the way our bodies interact
with and influence one another. It finds its expression in ways that leave material traces
and remnants, lingering on our persons. Affective solidarity can also enhance these other
forms of solidarity; it does not exist in contrast or opposition to these other forms, but
instead unfolds upon a different register. As such, it presents an alternative path to
solidarity, one that builds the shared physicality of crying, the bridge it builds between
and among grieving bodies. It is solidarity built out of intercorporeality and
intersubjectivity, and importantly, solidarity that feeds off the embodied expression of
vulnerability that accompanies the grieving.

Returning to Parkland and Mourning
These days, it feels like there is a new tragedy every time I look at the news.
There is constantly a new source or story about suffering. Parkland is one of many school
shootings that have occurred in the United States this year alone; this chapter also
touched on Lezley McSpadden’s public expression of grief mixed with rage as yet
another example of tragedy, suffering, and grief. It can seem hopeless, like we are
powerless against this never-ending supply, and its constant, accompanying experience of
grief. As the school shootings multiply, the prospect of legislative change seems to move
farther away. As the murder of unarmed black men and women reproduces itself over and
over again, the likelihood of any adjustment seems to vanish. Sometimes it seems like the
only thing left to do is cry.
This project takes up this very response to futility, to the condition of
powerlessness, and explores the possibilities it engenders. Throughout the preceding
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chapters, I have argued that the very way our bodies experience grief, through crying,
calls out to others, and in doing so, it holds the potential for political transformation.
Crying can bring about this transformation, through the proliferation, circulation, and
mobilization of affects that move between bodies to establish an intercorporeality, and
intersubjectivity. Crying is transformed from a mere expression of grief.to a response to
powerlessness, and even a challenge to this condition. This transformation takes shape as
affective solidarity, engendered through the mobilization of crying’s affects, felt on and
through the body, and driven by the confrontation with powerlessness. Instead of an
expression of futility, this project argues for a reading of crying as inaugurating political
action as it expresses grief that accompanies the condition of powerlessness.
The first chapter introduced a series of questions surrounding the physicality of
grief and its significance, noting its absence in recent scholarship on politics and
mourning. The very way our bodies express grief through crying, and the physicality of
this expression, influence the character of collective action. Crying can engender
collective action, and as such, influences the very shape it takes. It does so by generating
intersubjectivity, through the way its affects move on and through bodies, influencing the
bodies of those who observe, experience, and take part in this grief. Crying can bring
about a political transformation, by generating the conditions for affective solidarity, by
making the grief felt beyond the person who cries. Our tears can reach out to others,
interact with them, extend the experience felt on our bodies to those of others. Crying
invites others into our struggles, as is the case with Emma Gonzalez in Washington D.C.
following the March for Our Lives. The 800,000 people standing with her did not have
the same acute experience as she did, hiding from a classmate turned gunman in the halls
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of her high school. But those 800,000 people, who began to chant, “Never again,” as
Gonzalez shed tears silently onstage, had been invited into Gonzalez’s grief, in part
through her tears, and in part through the activism built in response to the grief. Crying
facilitates the experience of intersubjectivity here, expanded Gonzalez’s experience
beyond herself, beyond her body, but through the expression created by her body.
The particular experience of intersubjectivity engendered through crying shapes
the subsequent political possibilities—as crying induces intersubjectivity, it carves a path
for political transformation. Intersubjectivity emerges as critical for moving beyond
crying as an expression of futility. The physicality of crying, of tears in particular,
bridges the gap between bodies, so that they share in corporeality, and in turn, generate
an expanded subjectivity. This occurs in the way crying mobilizes affects, and makes
transformation possible, and sometimes, even palpable. In this way, crying offers a way
out of the condition of powerless; through the mobilization of affects it can mobilize
those around us. Crying expresses grief, and sometimes we feel as though this is all that
we can do, cry in the face of powerlessness. But crying can also engender political
transformation, acting as a tool to challenge our suffering, our powerlessness. Crying
does not take the place of action, but is action in itself.
And so, even as tragedies pile up, populating our lives at an alarming rate,
perhaps this project provides some solace. Our embodied expression of grief can hold the
key to transformation. It can open the very possibility of that transformation. Not every
tragedy produces an 800,000 person march; not every tragedy engenders an entire
movement. But the fact that even in the face of utter despair, with what seemed like no
escape, tears can provide the first sparks of a larger, more fundamental, political
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transformation. It is not a promise, but a possibility, but in the face of the swelling list of
tragedies, that possibility is at least something to hold onto.
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